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Abstract 
 
Nowadays a large part of academic literature and international organizations largely and 
increasingly recognize that corruption acts as a major impediment to growth.  However, there 
are still some doubts and large room to further investigate the economic consequences of 
corruption. Very recently, the most important international agency focused on fighting 
corruption (Transparency International) has underlined the importance to better understand the 
links between corruption and organized crime and their combined effects on economic growth. 
The purpose of our research is to further investigate these issues, both theoretically and 
empirically. More precisely, thinking about the phenomena of corruption and organized crime, 
the questions we try to answer through our research are: i) is there some relationship between 
the two phenomena? ii) if yes, can we explain this relationship using a theoretical model? iii) 
can we find appropriate proxies and indexes of organized crime and corruption in order to 
empirically test the theoretical model described in point ii)? and moreover: iv) is there some 
possibility to solve the doubts about the economic effects of corruption taking into account the 
relationship between the two phenomena? These are the main questions which lead our 
research and that we try to answer in this dissertation. Clearly, in order to better understand 
these questions and related answers, a detailed literature review of theoretical and empirical 
studies on corruption, crime and organized crime will be presented (Chapter 1). Then, we 
develop a simple theoretical framework which analyses the effects of the two phenomena on 
the economy and empirically test the effects of the two illegal activities on the economic 
growth of Italian regions (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively).  
3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                         
 
CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
                                                                                                      
1. Definition, measurement and causes of corruption                                                       p.8                                          
                                                                                                                                                                  
1.1. The definition of corruption                                                                                                  
1.2. The measurements of corruption                                                                                          
1.3. The causes of corruption                                                                                                     
 
        1.3.1. Political Factors                                                                                                        
          1.3.1.a. The democratic environment 
          1.3.1.b. Political stability 
          1.3.1.c. The judicial system and the origin of the legal system 
 
                              1.3.2. Historical Factors                                                                                                     
 
        1.3.3. Social and Cultural Factors                                                                                      
                 2.3.3.a.  Religion 
           2.3.3.b. Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization  
 
                                 1.3.4. Economic Factors                                                                                                     
                                      1.3.4.a.  The degree of openness 
                              1.3.4.b.  A country’s endowments of natural resources 
                              1.3.4.c.  The size of the public sector 
 
2. Corruption and Economic Growth                                                                                      p.21                                                                                  
             
                      2.1. Corruption as a “beneficial grease” for economic growth                                                  
                      2.2. Corruption as a “major obstacle” for economic growth                                                     
                       
                            2.2.1. Corruption and Economic Growth Theory                                                                                
                               2.2.2. Review of related theoretical and empirical literature                                                               
 
                                         2.2.2.a. The effects of corruption on investment 
                                         2.2.2.b. The effects of corruption on government expenditure 
                                         2.2.2.c. The effects of corruption on public investment 
                                         2.2.2.d. The effects of corruption on foreign aid 
                                         2.2.2.e. The effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty 
                                         2.2.2.f. The effects of corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
 3. The East Asian Paradox                                                                                                        p.35                                                                   
 
 3.1. What the paradox consists? Some possible explanations                                                                   
                         3.2. The different experience between East Asian NICs and Sub-Sahara African countries                    
                         3.3. The relevance of the distinction between economic growth and economic development                 
 
4. Corruption and Organized  Crime (OC)                                                                              p.47                                                
 
4.1  Review of the theoretical literature on Organized Crime 
4.2   Review of the empirical literature on crime and Organized Crime 
4.3  Corruption and Organized Crime: some previous microeconomic and empirical studies  
 
References                                                                                                                                     p.61                                                                                                             
   
 Appendix                                                                                                                                       p.72                                                                                                         
 
List of Illustrations 
4 
 
 
Tables:  
Table 1.  Growth rate and Corruption Perceptions Index                                                        p.36                            
 
Table 2. Factors attracting investment by region in developing countries                              p. 39 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Table 3.  Corruption and growth regimes                                                                                p. 42                                                        
 
Table 4.  Corruption, Gini coefficient and HDI                                                                      p.44                                                   
 
Table 5.  The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)                                                                 p.72                            
 
Table 6. The Organized Crime Perception Index (by WEF)                                                   p.78 
 
Figures:  
Figure 1. Corruption and Growth (2002-2007)                                                                      p.36                                                  
 
Figure 2. Corruption and FDI inflows (2002-2007)                                                               p.37                                            
 
Figure 3. FDI net inflows (current US$) in developing countries (2002-2007)                    p.39        
 
Figure 4. Investment Preferences by host region, 2006 and 2007-2009                                p.40             
 
Figure 5. Corruption and the HDI (2007-8)                                                                           p.54       
 
 Figure 6. Corruption and Gini coefficient (2008)                                                                 p.54  
 
Figure 7.  World Map of Corruption Perceptions Index ( CPI, 2012)                                   p.77 
 
Figure 8.a  World Map of Organized Crime Perceptions Index                                            p.82 
 
Figure 8b.  European Map of Organized Crime Perceptions Index                                      p.82 
 
Figure 9. Organized Crime and Corruption: Some preliminary statistical analyses           p.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
CHAPTER 2                                                                         
 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION: A NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
1. Introduction                                                                                                            p.87 
 
2. The model without corruption                                                                                p.90 
2.1 Agents 
2.2  The Criminal Organization (Mafia) 
 
3. The model with corruption                                                                                      p.98 
3.1 Agents 
3.2 Law-enforcers 
3.3  The Criminal Organization (Mafia) 
 
4. Conclusions                                                                                                                p.100 
 
      References                                                                                                                                                     p.107 
      Appendix                                                                                                                                                       p.113 
    The model without corruption 
    The model with corruption 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION: GROWTH IMPLICATIONS FOR ITALY 
 
1. Introduction                                                                                                             p.118 
 
2. Estimation Strategy and Methodology                                                                  p.126 
 
3. Data                                                                                                                           p.134 
 
4. Baseline Results                                                                                                        p.136 
 
5. Robustness checks                                                                                                    p.139 
 
5.1 Robustness to different specifications 
 
5.2 Robustness to alternative measures of organized crime 
 
6. Conclusions                                                                                                                p.143 
 
References                                                                                                                              p.144 
 
Appendix                                                                                                                           
 
Figure 1 Economic Growth, Corruption and Organized Crime                                        p.148                       
Figure 2 Time Series Trend (1983-2010) of the Organized Crime Index.                         p.149 
      Figure 3 Time Series Trend (1983-2010) of the Organized Crime Index. Region vs Italy     p. 152 
      Figure 4 Rankings of the Italian regions for the 5 different components of the OC Index   p.154 
 
6 
 
 
Table A Description of Variables and Sources                                                                 p.157 
 
Table B. Correlation Matrix of Alternative Organized Crime Measures                        p.158 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Table 1. Summary Statistics                                                                                              p.159 
 
Table 2. Preliminary Findings                                                                                          p.160 
 
Table 3.  Benchmark Findings                                                                                          p.161 
 
Table 4. Robustness to different specifications                                                                p.162 
 
Table 4b Robustness to different specifications                                                               p.163 
 
Table 5. Robustness to Alternative Measures of OC                                                        p.164 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, a large part of academic literature and international organizations largely 
and increasingly recognize that corruption acts as a major impediment to growth. The World 
Bank (2000), for example, identified corruption as “the single greatest obstacle to economic 
growth and social development in the third world countries”, as it distorts the rule of law 
and weakens the institutional foundations on which economic growth depends. In fact, 
though corruption is present in almost every country, it has the most devastating effects in 
developing economies, since it obstructs any advance in economic growth. It has been 
demonstrated, for example, that an improvement in a country of 6 points on the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, may increase GDP by more than 
20% (Lambsdorff, 2004).  
In what follows we will briefly review the definition of corruption, its measures and 
the existing literature on the effects of this phenomenon on economic growth. As we will 
see, this literature is vast. However, there are still some doubts, especially with regard to the 
effects of corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI) and the so called East Asian 
Paradox. Additionally, of particular interest is the existence of some links between 
corruption and organized crime and their combined effects on economic growth and 
development. As we largely discuss through the essay, the purpose of our research is to 
further investigate these issues, both theoretically and empirically. Clearly, in order to better 
understand the problems discussed, a detailed literature review of theoretical and empirical 
studies on crime will be presented.  
The phenomenon of organized crime exists in almost every country in the world. In 
fact, other than the well-known Italian and American mafias, examples include the Yakuza 
in Japan, the Triads in Hong Kong, Green Gang in Shanghai, Colombian and Mexican drug 
cartels, numerous grouping in post-Soviet states, youths gangs in Los Angeles, New York, 
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Soweto and San Paolo. Then, the phenomenon is more widespread than one could imagine, 
and it affects the economies of countries in a way that needs to be better understood. 
Nowadays it is well-recognized that organized crime can obstruct economic growth and 
development, however only a few empirical and theoretical studies have analyzed the 
economic effects of this phenomenon. As we will see, there is still large room in the 
literature for further research on organized crime.  
Moreover, thinking about the phenomena of corruption and organized crime, the 
questions we would like to answer through our research are: i) is there some relationship 
between the two phenomena? ii) if yes, can we explain this relationship using a theoretical 
model? iii) can we develop a macroeconomic theoretical model which is able to demonstrate 
the effects of the two phenomena, jointly considered, on economic growth? iv)can we find 
appropriate proxies and indexes of organized crime and corruption in order to empirically 
test the theoretical model described in point iii)? and moreover: v) is there some possibility 
to solve the doubts about the economic effects of corruption taking into account the 
relationship between the two phenomena? These are the main questions which lead our 
research.  
The dissertation is organized as follows: the first chapter presents a detailed literature 
review on corruption and organized crime; the second chapter is a simple theoretical 
framework which analyses the effects of corruption and organized crime on the economy; 
the third chapter is an empirical analysis of the effects of corruption and organized crime on 
the economic growth of Italian regions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME: A LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
1. Definition, measurement and causes of corruption 
 
This section will try to clarify the meaning of corruption, and the different indexes that are being 
used to measure it, or better to measure the perceptions of it. Moreover, we will analyze the causes 
of corruption, which can be categorized into four main factor-groups, specifically: political and 
judicial factors; historical factors; social and cultural factors and economic factors. This 
introductory section will be really useful for a full understanding of the phenomenon of corruption 
and its impacts on economic growth. 
 
1.1. The definition of corruption. 
 
One of the difficulties of studying corruption lies in defining it. While it may appear to be a 
semantic issue, how corruption is defined actually ends up determining what gets modeled and 
measured
1
. Although it is difficult to agree on a precise definition, in most cases different observers 
would agree on whether a particular behavior connotes corruption. In this sense corruption is like an 
elephant: “even though it may be difficult to describe, it is generally not difficult to recognize when 
observed” (Tanzi,1998: 8). Unfortunately, the behavior is often difficult to examine directly 
because, typically, acts of corruption do not take place in broad daylight (Tanzi, 1998). 
 
The most popular and simplest definition of corruption identifies it as “the abuse of public power 
for private benefit”. This is the definition used by the World Bank2. From this definition it should 
not be concluded that corruption exists only in the public sector, but rather that corruption in the 
public sector is more important for the purposes of public policy in developing economies and the 
public sector should take the lead in establishing high standards of honesty and liability. However, 
corruption can be found also in the private sector, especially in large private enterprises, as for 
example in procurement or even in hiring. The phenomenon also exists in private activities 
regulated by the government. A firm, in fact, could have an incentive to offer a bribe or accept 
paying a bribe to obtain benefits that would not be accessible without corruption, such as being 
granted a contract, or avoid having to comply with regulations or taxes (Boddewyn, 1988; 
Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Additionally, as underlined by Tanzi (1998), in several cases of 
corruption, the abuse of public power is not necessarily for one's private benefit but it can be for the 
advantage of one's party, class, tribe, friends, family, and so on. In fact, in many countries some of 
                                                 
1 One sign of the difficulty of defining corruption is that almost everyone who writes about it first tries to define it. For a brief 
summary of various definitions, see Jain (1998: 13-19). For a discussion of the importance of the definition of corruption, see 
Johnston (2000a); Lancaster and Montinola (1997) and Philp (1997). Collier (1999: 4) attributes the absence of a theory of corruption 
partly to the lack of an agreement upon the definition of corruption. (all cited in Jain, 2001). 
2 “A more neutral definition is that corruption is the intentional noncompliance with arm's length relationship aimed at deriving some 
advantage from this behavior for oneself or for related individuals” (Tanzi, 1995). For other definitions, see Theobald (1990), cited in 
Tanzi (1998). 
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the incomes from corruption go to finance the political parties.  
 
Additionally, as Jain (2001) has observed, certain illegal acts such as fraud, money laundering, drug 
trades, and black market operations, do not constitute corruption in themselves because they do not 
involve the use of public power
3
. However, people who undertake these activities must often 
involve public officials and politicians if these operations are to survive and therefore this activities 
rarely prosper without widespread corruption
4
. Moreover, even in their simplest forms, these acts 
can influence government policy. 
 
Tanzi (1998) notes that not all acts of corruption result in the payment of bribes. For example, a 
public employee who claims to be sick but goes on vacation is abusing his public position for 
personal use. Thus, he is engaging in an act of corruption even though no bribe is paid. Or, the 
president of a country who has an important airport built in his small hometown is also engaging in 
an act of corruption that does not involve the payment of a bribe. So, it is clear how it could become 
really difficult to draw a distinction between some forms of rent seeking activities and corruption. 
Furthermore, Tanzi (1998) underlines that, in many instances, bribes can be camouflaged as gifts, 
but actually they must be distinguished. This indicates that the identification of a bribe may not 
always be simple, and consequently also the identification of corruption. 
 
Another important definition of corruption is that made by El- Rufai (2002), who believes that 
corruption covers a broad range of social misconducts raging from considerable fraud, extortion, 
misappropriation, bribery, nepotism, conferring of favors to friends, supports of elections, abuse of 
public property, and so on. Blackburn et al. (2006) describe corruption as a “clandestine activity 
which takes place away from the glare of publicity and which, therefore, is difficult to measure 
empirically”. Carefully, Rose-Ackerman (1999) laments that corruption exists when institutions 
established to regulate the interrelationships between the citizens and the state, are used instead for 
personal enrichment and provision of benefits to the corrupt and undeserving.  
 
So, we can conclude that it is really difficult to give a specific definition to corruption, but while 
there is no agreement in the literature on how to define the phenomenon of corruption, one thing is 
clear: corruption is a governance problem. Corruption is a result of weak state management and 
exists when individuals or organizations have monopoly power over a good or service, discretion 
over making decisions, limited or no responsibility, and low levels of income (Klitgaard, 1988). 
Here we will refer to the frequently cited World Bank (1997a) definition of corruption as “the abuse 
of public office for private gain”.  
 
1.2. Measurements of corruption  
 
Besides the difficulties of defining corruption, there is the problem of measuring it. By its nature 
                                                 
3 No one, however, can deny that some of these phenomena are closely connected to corruption. Vogl (1998: 32), for example, 
highlights the importance of combating money laundering. Naylor (1987, 1996) links the drug trade, black markets and corruption.  
4 Illustrations provided by Naylor (1998), in fact, demonstrate that the distinction between “illegal activities” and “corrupt activities” 
is sometimes not very precise. 
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corruption would be difficult to measure since it is carried out, in most cases, clandestinely and 
away from the public eye and records. “If corruption could be measured, it could probably be 
eliminated” (Tanzi, 1998: 20). In fact, notionally it is not even clear what one would want to 
measure. Simply measuring bribes paid would ignore a whole range of corrupt acts which are not 
accompanied by the payment of bribes
5
. If one attempted to measure acts of corruption rather than 
the amounts of bribes paid, he probably would count many relatively unimportant actions, he would 
have to identify each act, and, in any case, he would not have the information. Jain (2001) suggests 
that a researcher trying to develop quantitative measures of corruption has to struggle with the 
question of what will be included in such a measurement, and then try to measure something that 
those who know about are trying to hide. Jhonston (2000b) provides a detailed discussion of 
challenges involved in measurement and analysis of indices of corruption.  
 
In spite of the difficulties, there have been several attempts to measure corruption. Most of these 
attempts are based on the assumption that it is not possible to measure corruption, but it is possible 
to measure perceptions of it. In fact, while there are no direct ways of measuring corruption, there 
are several indirect ways of getting information about its prevalence in a country or in an institution. 
Some useful information can be obtained from: 
 
-Reports on corruption available from published sources including newspapers. The Internet is 
becoming a progressively more precious source. Newspapers such as Le Monde, The Financial 
Times, and The New York Times, and magazines such as The Economist and The Far Eastern 
Economic Review have been reporting many articles on corruption. 
 
-Case studies of corrupt agencies such as tax administrations, customs, police or some other 
institutions. However, while there are many of such studies, often the reports are internal and are 
reserved confidential. 
 
-Questionnaire-based surveys. These surveys measure perceptions of corruption rather than 
corruption per se. Several business-risk analysts and polling organizations regularly construct 
indices of “perceived” corruption, based on surveys responses of business people, country experts, 
and local residents. These indices, typically, measure corruption by asking those surveyed to score a 
country, with respect to the probability that government officials would demand bribes. The four 
most popular of these indices are the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) constructed by 
Transparency International
6
; the International Country Risk Guide index (the ICRG index)
7
; the 
Business International index (BI index)
8
; and the control of corruption index (WB index) from the 
“Governance Matters” database at the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2005).  
                                                 
5 Since October 1999, Transparency International publishes a survey: the ”Bribe Payers Survey” report, which  looks in detail at the 
sources of corruption in the international marketplace, both in terms of where the bribes are paid and by which businesses. Above all, 
the Bribe Payers Survey illustrates how the supply of corruption is viewed by a global selection of senior business executives, who 
understand the markets and market pressures in their own countries, some of which drive corruption. 
6 Lambsdorff (1998) describes how this index is created as well as some problems with previously available indices of corruption. 
Kaufmann (1998) and Johnston (2000b) discuss some problems with this index (cited in Jain, 2001: 76). 
7 Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) have described and used this index. 
8 Mauro (1995) may have been the first to use BI data for empirical analysis. Ades and Di Tella (1997a) provide some details of these 
ratings. 
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A major problem with all these perception-based indices is that they do not measure real corruption, 
but only rely on perceptions. In other words, it is important to keep in mind that they reflect 
perceptions and not objective and quantitative measures of actual corruption. It is fairly possible 
that these perceptions are influenced not only by conventional wisdom about how institutions and 
cultures may be conducive to corruption, but also by the economic performance of the country 
being evaluated. Another major limit of the perception-indices is that there are inconsistencies over 
time in the way that they are constructed and that the time-span for which they are available is 
relatively short
9
.  However, correlations between various indices tend to be very high, providing 
some support for the argument that survey data on corruption may provide reliable estimates of the 
real phenomenon.  Moreover, in spite of the objections to these measures of corruption, authors like 
Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995) pioneered the use of the perception- indexes for 
empirical analysis. Since then, most researchers have used a combination of these measures to 
estimate the relationship between corruption and a multitude of other variables (i.e., investment, 
FDI, government expenditure, and so on). This is the main reason that lead us to concentrate on the 
perception-indices, especially the CPI, rather than on other variables.  
 
However, for a complete exposition, we have to underline the fact that some of the most recent 
scholars think that perception-based indices might not be a good indicator of actual corruption in a 
country. Strongly persuaded of this, Kaufmann et al. (1999) have created an aggregate measure 
combining the following three elements of governance: probity, bureaucratic quality and the rule of 
law
10
. Their aggregation process addresses some of the problems associated with survey data like 
those collected by Transparency International. Interestingly, Dreher et al. (2007) derived an index 
of corruption from a structural equation model that treats corruption as a latent variable, that is 
directly related to its underlying causes and effects.  
 
Very recently, Aidt (2009) used the WBES index in his empirical analysis of the effects of 
corruption on economic development. This alternative cross-national index has been provided by 
the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted in 1999-2000. The index is based on 
survey responses of managers living and working in particular countries about their own experience 
with corrupt officials. Therefore, it claims to measure real, as opposed to perceived, corruption
11
. 
While this index avoids some of the potential biases associated with the perception-based indices, it 
is obvious that managers may have incentives to understate their direct experience with corruption. 
Treisman (2007) showed that the correlation between the two types of indices (perception-based 
indices and WBSE index) is very weak and that many of the standard predictors of perceived 
corruption, such as democracy and press freedom (Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2003), are mostly 
unrelated to the WBES index. 
 
                                                 
9 The ICRG and BI indexes are available since the early 1980s, the CPI and WB indices are available since the mid-1990s. 
10
 According to them, since corruption is one aspect of what constitutes governance, some of the researches on corruption could be 
extended to the aggregated concept of governance. 
11 At the national level several other objective measures of corruption are available. These include data on the number of officials 
convicted for corruption (see, e.g., Alt and Lassen, 2003 for a study of US states; and Del Monte and  Papagni, 2001 for a study of 
Italian regions) and data on the amount of leakage from infrastructure projects in Italian regions (Golden and Picci, 2005). 
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However, in spite of the objections, the most used index of corruption is the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist 
among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, which makes use of surveys of 
business people and assessments by country analysts. The strength of the CPI lies in the 
combination of multiple data sources in a single index, lowering the probability of misrepresenting 
a country’s level of corruption. The CPI 2007 ranks 180 countries (an increase from 163 countries 
in 2006), and draws on fourteen different polls and surveys from twelve independent institutions, 
using data published or compiled between 2006 and 2007.  
 
The CPI assesses the perception of corruption on a scale of 0 to 10: ten refers to a corruption-free 
country, and zero refers to a country where most transactions or relations involve corruption. Table 
5 in Appendix shows the indexes for 1996, 1997, 2006/07/08 provided by Transparency 
International. The CPI 2007 shows seven out of every ten countries (nine out of every ten 
developing countries) with an index of less than 5 points out of 10 (Transparency International, 
2008: Global Corruption Report: 297-320).  
 
The CPI is not capable of answering whether the world as a whole is improving or not in terms of 
perceived corruption, but it can reveal whether regions or groups of countries are improving relative 
to each other. The analysis shows that poorly scoring countries tend to have difficulties escaping a 
downward trend. Generally we can say that countries normally hold their positions over the period 
(as clearly shown by  
Table 5 in Appendix). And when there are changes, how closely changes in these indexes reflect real 
changes within given country is an important, open question. A single but widely reported case of 
corruption may easily change perceptions in a given country and lead to an index that may not 
correctly assess corruption in that country (Tanzi, 1998).  
 
1.3. The causes of corruption  
 
The causes of corruption can be categorized into four main factor-groups, specifically: political and 
judicial factors; historical factors; social and cultural factors and economic factors. Below we will 
analyze in detail these different causes. 
 
1.3.1. Political Factors 
 
The political factors capture the democratic environment and political stability of a given country, 
the effectiveness of its judicial system and the origin of its legal system. 
 
1.3.1.a. The democratic environment  
 
The role of democracy has been highlighted in several studies of corruption
12
. It is widely believed 
                                                 
12 See, among others, Treisman (2000) and Paldam (2003). 
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that corruption is related to the deficiencies of the political system and that democracy, by 
promoting political competition and hence increasing transparency and liability, can provide a 
check, although an imperfect one, on corruption. Freedom of association and of the press, in fact, 
stimulate public interest groups and reporters to expose abuses. Moreover, greater civic engagement 
may lead to closer monitoring. In democratic systems, in addition, competitors for office have an 
incentive to discover and publicize the misuse of office whenever an election beckons. For all these 
reasons, the risk of exposure may be higher in more democratic, open political systems (see e.g., 
Diamond and Plattner, 1993)
13
.  
 
However, Treisman (2000) argued that the fact that a country is democratic today makes just about 
no difference to how corrupt it is perceived to be. What matters is whether or not it has been 
democratic for decades. His regression estimates suggest a painfully slow process by which 
democracy undermines the foundations of corruption. Those countries with at least forty years of 
consecutive democracy enjoyed a significant, though small, improved corruption dividend, and 
those with 20-30 years may also have benefited slightly.  
 
Other characteristics of the political environment, including electoral rules and the degree of 
decentralization
14
, may also be important in explaining corruption.  
 
1.3.1.b.  Political stability 
 
Also political instability may matter for corruption, the expectation being that more unstable 
countries will have higher levels of perceived corruption. As Treisman (2000) put it, besides the 
probability of getting caught, officials will consider the consequences if they do. The punishments 
for criminal malfeasance are obviously relevant. Short of prosecution, offenders are likely to lose 
their job, whether by recall, if elected, or dismissal, if appointed. The cost this involves depends 
upon the benefits provided by that job, such as the level of salaries in public office and the length of 
time for which an honest official could expect to enjoy them (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997; Ul Haque and Sahay, 1996; World Bank, 1997b). A high degree of 
political stability will lengthen officials’ time horizon, and a bureaucracy that offers long-term 
careers with chances of advancement will promise greater future benefit to a low-level bureaucrat 
than one in which jobs are more insecure and promotion less likely (Rauch and Evans, 1997). 
Besides losing their job, corrupt officials often face social dishonor if exposed to a degree that 
depends upon the prevailing norms and expectations within the culture
15
. From all of these 
arguments, Treisman (2000) derived the hypothesis that corruption will be higher where political 
instability is greater, however he found little support for this. We will return to this argument in the 
final section. 
                                                 
13 However, as Geddes (1997) and Heywood (1996) have pointed out, electoral competition may create other incentives for 
corruption: the need to raise campaign funds can lead to abuses of power not to benefit the individual but the private interests of a 
party. 
14 Treisman (2000), and Fisman and Gatti (2002). 
15 Various authors have suggested that in traditional societies, where the lines between public and private are less clearly drawn and 
where tribute giving is not clearly distinguished from bribery, the social stigma may be lower, or non-existent at all (Myrdal, 1970: 
237; Ekpo, 1979). 
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1.3.1.c.  The judicial system and the origin of the legal system. 
 
The judicial system is also expected to play a role in controlling corruption (Becker, 1968). The role 
of the legal system and the rule of law have featured significantly in many studies on the quality of 
governance and its consequences for development
16
. Strong legal foundations and efficient legal 
systems protect property rights and provide a stable environment for economic activity. Failure of 
the legal system to provide for the enforcement of contracts undermines the operation of the free 
market and, in turn, reduces the incentives for agents to participate in productive activities. But 
legal systems may differ in the degree to which property rights are protected and in the quality of 
government they provide. Empirical work suggest that the common low system, mostly found in the 
colonies of Britain, appears to have better protection of property rights compared with the civil low 
system typically associated with the former colonies of continental Europe (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Treisman, 2000). 
 
To better understand the role of the legal system, we can mention Treisman (2000), who suggested 
to construe the official as balancing the expected cost of a corrupt act against the expected benefit. 
Clearly, the most evident cost is  the risk of getting caught and punished. The probability of getting 
caught depends in part on the effectiveness of the country’s legal system. Two related aspects can be 
distinguished. First, legal systems differ in the degree of protection and the opportunities for 
recourse they offer to private property owners harmed by corrupt acts of officials. La Porta et al. 
(1999) have argued that common law systems differ on this dimension from civil law systems. 
While the common law tradition developed first in England as a defense of parliament and property 
owners against the attempts by the sovereign to regulate and expropriate them, civil law systems in 
their Napoleonic, Bismarckian, or other forms developed more as an instrument used by the 
sovereign for state building and controlling economic life (La Porta et al., 1999; David and Brierly, 
1985). Common law developed from precedents established by judges, usually associated with the 
property-owning aristocracy against the Crown, while civil law developed from codes drawn up by 
jurists at the sovereign’s request. The authors hypothesize that the greater protections of property 
against the state embodied in common law systems improve various aspects of government 
performance, including reducing corruption. 
 
Second, legal systems differ not just in the formulations and original intent of laws but also in the 
prevailing expectations and practices that govern how they are enforced, what might be termed 
“legal culture”. Conceptions of the social role of law and the relative importance of law in 
preserving social order vary across countries. In Britain and some of its former colonies, scholars 
have noted an almost obsessive focus on the procedural aspects of law. In Eckstein’s words, “The 
British … behave like ideologists in regard to rules and like pragmatists in regard to policies. 
Procedures, to them, are not merely procedures, but sacred rituals” (Eckstein, 1966: 265). By 
contrast, in many other cultures, social order is associated not so much with adherence to 
                                                 
16 See, for example, North (1990), and Easterly and Levine (1997). 
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procedures as with respect for hierarchy and the authority of offices. This British preoccupation 
with procedures has been thought by some to explain why most of the newly independent states 
with extended democratic experience were former British colonies (Weiner, 1987: 19; Lipset et al., 
1993). “A willingness of judges to follow procedures even when the results threaten hierarchy 
obviously increases the chance that official corruption will be exposed “ (Treisman, 2000: 6).  
 
Thus, one might expect countries with different colonial traditions to have different legal cultures, 
and different degrees of vulnerability to corruption, irrespective of whether they have common law 
or civil law systems. As we will better analyze below, legal system and colonial experience are, of 
course, highly correlated
17
.  
 
1.3.2. Historical Factors 
 
To a large extent, it is difficult to separate the historical factors from the political and judicial factors 
since the effectiveness of the judicial system is dependent on the colonial heritage of the country in 
question. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that a common law legal system is associated with superior 
governance, with more effective judicial systems, and with better protection of property rights 
compared with the civil law system. Also Treisman (2000), as seen above, explores the direct 
influence of historical tradition on perceived corruption, showing that countries with a history of 
British rule were robustly rated “less corrupt”. 
 
Additionally, another way in which historical tradition might affect the perceived costs of corrupt 
actions is through the influence of religion, as discussed below.  
 
1.3.3. Social and Cultural Factors 
 
This group of factors captures the social and cultural characteristics of a country that may impact 
upon the commonness of corruption in a given country, such as religion and ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization. 
 
1.3.3.a.  Religion  
 
 Religion has often been thought to condition cultural attitudes towards social hierarchy and family 
values, and thus it may determine the acceptability, or otherwise, of corrupt practices. In more 
hierarchical systems (i.e., Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam), challenges to the status quo 
are less frequent than in more equalitarian or individualistic religions, such as Protestantism
18
. 
Religions may also influence how individuals view their loyalties to family as opposed to other 
citizens, what Banfield (1958) has called “familism”, which, in turn, may affect the level of 
                                                 
17 Actually, some former British colonies do not have a common law legal system: for instance, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Malta 
and Mauritius. And some countries that were never British colonies have adopted common law systems, in whole or in part: 
Thailand, Western Samoa, Liberia, and Namibia (Treisman, 2000). 
18 La Porta et al. (1997) find evidence that hierarchical religion correlates with high perceived corruption. The classification of 
Catholicism, Islam, and Eastern Orthodoxy as “hierarchical religions” is taken from their paper. 
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nepotism . 
 
A second way by which religion could affect corruption levels is via the historical pattern of 
influence that developed in different settings between church and state. According to Treisman 
(2000), protestant churches often developed in counterpoint rather than in fusion with the state and 
may thus have stimulated a more autonomous civil society. In fact, in religious traditions such as 
Protestantism, institutions of the church may play a role in monitoring and denouncing abuses by 
state officials. In other traditions, like e.g. Islam and Roman Catholicism, where church and state 
hierarchies are closely intertwined, such a role may be absent.  
 
La Porta et al. (1999) demonstrated that religion may also impact on the quality of the legal system. 
In fact, they found that countries with a high proportion of Catholics or Muslims reduce the quality 
of government and, by extension, may reduce the prevention of corruption. The authors argued also 
that the percentage of Protestants in the population is a robust predictor of lower corruption. 
Religious fractionalization may also have an impact on corruption and other characteristics 
associated with the quality of government. Alesina et al. (2003), for example, demonstrated that 
religious fractionalization is positively correlated with measures of good governance.  
 
1.3.3.b.  Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. 
 
Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization of a society may also contribute to the commonness of 
corruption in a given country. The evidence is, however, mixed. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
suggested that countries where the population consists of several different ethnic groups are more 
likely to be characterized by a less organized, and therefore more deleterious, type of corruption
19
. 
This hypothesis is used in Mauro (1995), where it is found that an index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is correlated with corruption. Also, La Porta et al. (1999) found evidence that, in 
societies that are more ethno-linguistically diverse, governments exhibit inferior performance. 
Later, Alesina et al. (2003) have presented evidence that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization has a 
statistically significant negative impact on corruption, in the sense that countries that are ethno-
linguistically diverse are associated with higher perceived levels of corruption. However, Tanzi 
(1994) argues that public officials are more likely  to do favors to their relatives in societies where 
family ties are strong, and this can more likely happen in societies without, or with less, ethno 
linguistic fractionalization.  
 
1.3.4.  Economic Factors 
 
The economic determinants of corruption across countries have focused typically on three factors: 
the degree of openness; a country’s endowments of natural resources;  and the size of the public 
sector. 
 
1.3.4.a. The degree of openness  
                                                 
19
 The corruption regimes will be largely analyzed in the last section. 
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The trade literature suggests that trade restrictions generate a significant amount of rents and rent-
seeking activities, noted by Bhagwati (1982) to include not only attempts to evade tariffs but also 
efforts at premium seeking when agents compete for premium-fetching licenses, revenue seeking 
when agents try to appropriate a share of the revenue resulting from import restrictions
20
, and tariff 
seeking when agents lobby for the imposition of protectionist tariffs
21
. Krueger (1974) estimated 
that rents generated by government regulations in import licenses exceeded 5 percent of national 
income for India in 1964 and about 15 percent of GNP for Turkey in 1968, suggesting that rents 
accruing from the imposition of trade regulations are both theoretically and quantitatively 
significant. It follows that the degree of openness to foreign trade should be an important factor in 
determining the level of rent-seeking activities, or the extent of corruption. 
 
Ades and Di Tella (1996, 1999) have found that a higher degree of openness of the economy 
(measured on the basis of the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP) is significantly 
associated with lower corruption. Also Treisman (2000) demonstrated that corruption will be lower 
the greater the country’s exposure to competition from imports, though he argued that it is hard to 
be sure of the direction of causation. Later, also Wei and Wu (2001), showed evidence that countries 
with capital controls have higher corruption and, in turn, receive less foreign investment and are 
more prone to financial crisis.  
 
However, Neeman et al. (2003), more recently, demonstrated that an higher level of openness will 
more likely increase the impact of corruption, because openness will consent to dissipate stolen 
money abroad
22
. Moreover, it must be also noted that globalization, in all its ramifications, has 
brought into frequent contacts individuals from countries with little corruption with those from 
countries where corruption is endemic. Then, openness can be seen as a factor which increases the 
worldwide diffusion of corruption trough contagion. The growth of international trade and business, 
in fact, has created many situations where the payment of bribes may be highly beneficial to the 
companies that pay them by giving them privileged access to markets, or access to profitable 
contracts over competitors, or also to particular benefits such as tax incentives. In fact, when the 
economic operators of some countries begin to pay bribes, they put pressure on those from other 
                                                 
20It means that, in the presence of quantitative restrictions on imports of a certain good, the necessary import licenses are very 
valuable and importers may be willing to bribe the relevant official in order to obtain them. 
21Protection of home industries from international competition generates rents that local entrepreneurs may be willing to pay for, in 
the form of bribes. The ability of an official to provide a private partner profitable protection in some domestic market, in fact, will 
depend upon how open that market is to external competition from imports.  
22 Neeman et al. (2003) considered a neoclassical growth model with endogenous corruption. Corruption and wealth, were shown to 
be negatively correlated. Richer countries tend to be less corrupt, and corrupt economies tend to be poorer. This observation 
generated the following puzzle: if poorer countries do indeed experience higher levels of corruption, and if indeed as suggested by a 
number of empirical studies corruption hampers growth, then how did rich countries, who were poor once, become rich? Their 
answer to this puzzle was that one or two centuries ago, illegally obtained capital remained and was invested in one’s home country. 
Thus, there was no need to smuggle illegally obtained resources outside the economy, and the gains from corruption became part of 
the economy’s productive capital. In contrast, today it is harder for public officials, even in third world countries, to hide the profits 
of their illegal activities within their own country, and therefore, a larger proportion of stolen money is smuggled abroad. 
Interestingly, more recently Neeman et al. (2008) argued that in open economies, corruption and GNP per capita are strongly 
negatively correlated, but closed economies display no relationship at all. This fact is robust to a variety of different empirical 
specifications. They found that the degree of financial openness is primarily what determines whether corruption and output are 
correlated. Moreover, corruption is negatively related to capital accumulation in open economies, but not in closed economies.  
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countries to do the same. The cost of not doing so is lost contracts, as argued by Kantor 
23
. 
 
1.3.4.b.  A country’s endowments of natural resources. 
 
Natural resources endowments have also featured in cross-country studies of corruption; the 
explanation is that the concentration of exports on natural resources is a proxy for rent-seeking 
opportunities. Mauro (1996) argued that natural-resource endowments constitute a classic example 
of sources of rents, since they can typically be sold at a price that far exceeds their cost of 
extraction. Sachs and Warner (1995) argued that natural resource abundance creates opportunities 
for rent-seeking behavior and that it is an important factor in determining a country’s level of 
corruption (see also Leite and Weidmann, 1999). Additionally, in countries with large endowments 
of valuable raw materials (such as fuels, minerals, and metals) corruption may offer greater 
potential gains to officials who distribute the rights to exploit these natural resources. In a simple 
growth model, Ades and Di Tella (1999) illustrate the interrelationship between natural resources, 
corruption, and economic growth, showing that the extent of corruption depends on natural resource 
abundance, government policies, and the concentration of bureaucratic power. Finally, also 
Treisman (2000) found empirical evidence that a higher concentration of natural resource exports 
increases perceived corruption.  
 
 
1.3.4.c. The size of the public sector. 
 
A number of possible causes of corruption are related to the extent of government intervention in 
the economy, and more generally, to variables (such as, for example, the level of import tariffs, 
subsidies, or civil service wages) that are determined by government policy. When pervasive 
regulations exist and government officials have an excessive degree of discretion in applying them, 
and when regulations lack simplicity and transparency, private parties may be willing to pay bribes 
to government officials in order to obtain any rents that the regulations may generate (Mauro, 
1996). Actually, a strong suspect is that many regulations, whatever their original rationale might 
have been, are kept in place with the sole propose of allowing bribes to be collected. 
 
 Tanzi (1998) summarized the following sources of corruption (due to government policy) that have 
been identified in the literature:  
 
 The original rent-seeking literature emphasized trade restrictions as the prime example of 
government-induced sources of rents. As largely discussed in the previous Paragraph 
2.3.4.a. 
 
                                                 
23 American policymakers have argued that American exporters have lost out in foreign deals because they have not pay bribes to 
foreign officials. For American companies  the payment of bribes to foreign officials is a criminal act and the bribes paid cannot be 
deducted as costs for tax purposes. See, for example, the remarks by (then) Secretary of Commerce, Michael Kantor, to the Detroit 
Economic Club (July 25, 1996) in which he stated that since 1994 American companies had lost international contracts worth $45 
billion because of bribes paid by foreign contractors to the officials of foreign countries (see Hines, 1995; all cited in Tanzi, 1998). 
However, in nowadays, things are changing due to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention established in 1997, see notes 62-63.  
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 Government subsidies (including tax expenditures) can constitute sources of rents, as argued 
by Clements et al. (1995). Ades and Di Tella (1997b) explained corruption as a function of 
industrial policy, showing that subsidies to manufacturing as a proportion of GDP are related 
to corruption indices. 
 
 Because of the discretion that some high level public officials have over decisions regarding 
public expenditure,  these can become much distorted, both in size and in composition, by 
corruption
24
. 
 
 Price controls are also a potential source of rents, and therefore of rent-seeking behavior. For 
example, entrepreneurs may be willing to bribe government officials to maintain the 
provision of inputs at below-market prices
25
.  
 
 Similarly, multiple exchange rate practices and foreign exchange allocation schemes lead to 
rents. For example, supposing that, in a given country, state-owned commercial banks 
conduct rationing of foreign exchange by allocating it according to the priorities established 
by each bank manager, then entrepreneurs may be willing to pay bribes in order to obtain the 
necessary foreign exchange to purchase their imported inputs. 
 
 Low wages in the civil service relative to private sector wages or per capita GDP can be 
seen as a potential source of (low-level) corruption, following efficiency-wage mechanisms 
(Kraay and Van Rijckeghem, 1995; Haque and Sahay, 1996). When civil service pay is too 
low, civil servants may be grateful to use their positions to collect bribes as a way of 
“making ends meet”, and in any case their expected cost of being caught  is correspondingly 
low (Mauro, 1996). Also Tanzi (1998: 16-18) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) found 
that low wages for civil servants have a statistically significant effect on corruption, 
demonstrating that if the wages that public officials receive are relatively low, the 
mechanism of corruption is reinforced.
26
 
 
Another important factor that appears closely linked with corruption and the size of the public 
sector is privatization. There is no question that public or state enterprises have been a main source 
of corruption and especially of political corruption. In fact, they have been used to finance the 
activities of political parties and to provide jobs to clienteles of particular political groups
27
. 
Privatization of non-natural monopolies is a necessary step to reduce this form of corruption 
because it eliminates an instrument often used especially in political corruption (Tanzi, 1998). 
Unfortunately, the process of privatizing public or state enterprises has itself created situations 
                                                 
24 See Tazi and Davoodi (1997). The effects of corruption on public investments and expenditures in general will be largely analyzed 
in Paragraph 3.2.2.c. 
25 For a detailed analysis of this argument see also Tanzi (1998: 13-15). 
26 It may be useful to take such considerations into account when faced with difficult tradeoffs on whether an excessive civil service 
wage bill should be lowered through cutting salaries. Fiscal Affairs Department (1995: 15), warns of the dangers involved in 
lowering civil service wages (cited in Mauro, 1996). 
27 This was clearly the case in Italy, before tangentopoly, and in many Latin America countries. The Italian case was largely 
discussed by Nordio (1997; cited in Tanzi, 1998). Carlo Nordio was one of  the leading judges in the Italian fight against political 
corruption. 
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where some individuals (ministers and high political officials) have the discretion to make the basic 
decisions while others (managers and other insiders) have information not available to outsiders so 
that they can use the process to benefit themselves. These problems have been observed and 
reported in all regions of the world, but the abuses appear to have been particularly significant in the 
transition economies
28
.  
 
The previous arguments support the hypothesis that the size of the public sector can play an 
extremely important role in influencing corruption across countries. Corruption is, in fact, generally 
connected with the activities of the state and especially with the monopoly and discretionary power 
of the state. Consequently, as Gary Becker, Nobel Laureate in economics, pointed out in one of his 
Business Week columns, if we abolish the state, we abolish corruption
29
. But, of course, a civilized 
society cannot function without a state and in modern, advanced societies, the state must have many 
functions. Additionally, the Becker argument collides with the reality that some of the least corrupt 
countries in the world, such as Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, have some 
of the largest public sectors
30
. Thus, the solution to the problem of corruption may not be as simple 
as just reducing the size of the state. Rather, the way the state operates and carries out its functions 
is far more important than the size of public sector activity. As seen above, particular aspects of 
governmental activities, such as regulation and authorizations, taxation, spending decisions, and the 
provision for goods and services at below market prices, create a fertile ground for corruption
31
. 
Identification of such policy-induced sources of corruption is obviously helpful in bringing it under 
control. According to Tanzi (1998) the role of the state in influencing corruption is so important 
that, in many cases, the fight against corruption cannot proceed independently from the reform of 
the state. In many ways, it is the same fight. Thus corruption will be reduced only in those countries 
where governments are ready to substantially reduce some of their functions. 
 
The above review of the different causes determining corruption, especially political and economic 
causes, will be very useful to better understand, in the last section, why the phenomenon is affecting 
different countries in different ways. Additionally, we have discussed the causes because sometimes 
it is not easy to understand the direction of causality, for example: “Are close countries more 
corrupted, or is corruption discouraging openness?”. This question shows how it could be difficult 
to identify the correct direction of causality, and then to distinguish between causes and 
consequence of corruption.  
 
The next section will largely analyze the different economic consequences of corruption, underlying 
especially the negative consequences (such as: reduced domestic and foreign investment, distorted 
government expenditures, overblown and less productive public investment, and so on) which have 
been seen by the scholars as the major channels through which corruption affects economic growth. 
This is the main reason which leads us to present, in Paragraph 3.2.1, a short summary of economic 
growth theories, to better understand which are the variables on which economic growth depends 
                                                 
28For an overview of privatization and corruption in transition economies see Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1996); for  Russian 
privatization see Goldman (1997) and  for a review of Latin American experience, see Manzetti and Blake (1997). 
29 Cited in Tanzi (1998). 
30 See Table 5 in Appendix for the Corruption Perceptions Index of these countries. 
31 For a more detailed analysis of these issues see Mauro (1996: 5-7) and Tanzi (1998: 10-15). 
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and to understand how this variables are affected by corruption. 
 
 
2. Corruption and Economic Growth                                                                                    
 
Although there exist several studies assessing the relationship between corruption and economic 
growth, their findings, however, are not universal and sometimes they are contradictory. A 
pioneering school of thought made up of proponents like Leff (1964), Huntington (1968) and Lui 
(1985), share the opinion that corruption is a beneficial grease that lubricates the engine of 
economic growth. On the contrary, a second school of thought argues that corruption exerts adverse 
effects on long-term economic growth and sustainable development. A host of scholars and 
international organizations constitute the proponents of this view. Among others: Mauro (1995, 
1996, 2002);  Akkihal et al. (1997); Porta and Vannucci (1997); Tanzi and Davoodi (1997); UNDP 
(1997); Wei (1997, 2000); World Bank (2000); Mo (2001); Gupta et al. (2001, 2002); Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2004); Blackburn et al. (2006, 2008), Dreher et al. (2007), Baliamoune and Ndikumana 
(2008), Aidt (2009). These authors hold the opinion that corruption has a corrosive effect on 
economic growth. The transmission mechanism of these adverse effects includes reduced 
investment; distorted government expenditure away from health and education; excessive military 
spending and excessive infrastructure and capital intensive investment; lower productivity of public 
investment;  reduced effectiveness of foreign aid flows, and decreased floods of FDI.  
Overwhelming statistical evidence supporting this view exists in numerous recent studies.  
 
In this section, we will first examine the theories in support for the hypothesis that corruption is 
beneficial for economic output, showing that, however, they rely on weak arguments which have 
been largely contradicted. In fact, the most recent empirical studies indicate that the effects of 
corruption are negative and pervasive throughout the economy, and that corruption might be seen as 
a “major obstacle” for economic growth rather than as a “beneficial grease”. 
 
2.1 Corruption as a “beneficial grease” for economic growth  
 
Some authors suggested that corruption might be desirable. According to this point of view, 
corruption works like piece-rate pay for bureaucrats, which induces a more efficient provision of 
government services, and which provides flexibility for entrepreneurs to avoid inefficient 
regulations. From this perspective, corruption acts as a lubricant that smoothes operations and, 
hence, raises the efficiency of an economy. The arguments in favor of this view are summarized 
below
32
. 
 
Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968), for example, advanced the view that corruption can be 
efficiency-enhancing because it removes government-imposed rigidities which impede investment 
and interfere with other economic decisions favorable to growth. Thus, corruption “oils the 
mechanism” or “greases the process”. More recently, also Acemoglou and Verdier (1998) have 
                                                 
32 The discussion in this section is based on Jain (2001). For alternative surveys of the literature, see Bardhan (1997), Rose-
Ackerman (1999), Aidt (2003) and Svensson (2005). 
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argued that some degree of corruption may be part of the optimal allocation of resources in the 
presence of incomplete contracts or due to market failure. This opinion is partly justified on the 
ground that illegal payments are required to make things pass faster and favorably through the state 
bureaucracy (Amundsen, 2000). By implication, corruption has the potency of making an economic 
agent more efficient and, in the long run, it promotes economic growth. These arguments have often 
been used to explain the high rates of growth in some East Asian countries, which are characterized 
by high levels of corruption. Given the importance of this anomaly, the paradox (better known as 
the East Asian paradox) will be amply discussed in Section 4. 
 
In the same school of thought, Beck and Maker (1986) and Lien (1986) have developed models that 
show that in bidding competitions, those who are most efficient can afford to offer the highest bribe. 
Consequently, bribes can promote efficiency by assigning projects to the most efficient firms.   
 
Lui (1985), instead, has argued that time has different values for different individuals,  depending 
on their level of income and the opportunity cost of their time. Those for whom time is most 
valuable will offer bribes to public officials to be allowed to economize on time by jumping in front 
of the line, that is by getting decisions more quickly. Thus, corruption can be efficient because it 
saves time for those for whom time has the greatest value. However,  later Lui (1996) has argued 
that while corruption may improve the allocation of resources in some circumstances, it reduces 
growth because it provides some individuals the incentive to acquire the kind of human capital that 
can be used to improve corruption opportunities. This argument is related to those by Baumol 
(1990) and by Murphy et al. (1991), discussed later in this paragraph. 
 
Corruption has also been perceived as a useful political glue as it allows politicians to get funds that 
can be used to hold a country together. The letter outcome is seen as a necessary condition for 
growth (see e.g., Graziano, 1979).  
 
According to same authors, additionally, bribes can supplement low wages. Then, corruption can 
allow the government to maintain a lower tax burden which can favor growth (see e.g., Tullock, 
1996 and Becker and Stigler, 1974). The issue here is whether a lower tax burden is more favorable 
to growth than a lower degree of corruption. 
 
However, the pro-corruption theoretical arguments discussed above can be contradicted in many 
ways, as largely discussed by Kaufmann (1997) and Tanzi (1998). The former argument is 
countered by the fact that rigidities and rules are not exogenous and  unmovable features of a 
society, but they are created, and they may be intentionally created by public officials to extract 
bribes. When rules can be used to extract bribes, more rules will be created. Additionally, these 
rules are often kept intentionally unclear, so that more power will remain on the side of those who 
implement them.  
 
Furthermore, in disagreement with the second argument,  those who can pay the highest bribes are 
not necessarily the most economically efficient but  the most successful at rent seeking. If bribes are 
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seen as investments, those who pay them must figure that they are investments with a high rate of 
return. Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991) have advanced related arguments that can be used 
to argue that in traditional or corrupt societies, the most able individuals will be diverted, by 
existing incentives, from pursuing socially productive activities towards rent seeking activities. This 
diversion will impose a high cost for the growth of these countries. If the potentially most socially 
productive individuals are in scarce supply, as they are assumed to be, the diversion of their talent 
toward rent-seeking activities and corruption will be particularly damaging to society.  
 
Payment of speed money may be an inducement for the bureaucrats to reduce the speed at which 
most practices are being processed (see e.g., Myrdal, 1968). Bribes, in fact, may change the order in 
which public officials process the practices,  but they may slow down the average time for the 
whole process. 
 
Moreover, corruption and rent-seeking as political glue or as wage supplement may be helpful in 
the short run, but they may lead to major problems over the longer run as shown by Zaire under 
Mobutu (see Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). 
 
Consequently, we can argue that the theories according to which corruption can be seen as a 
“beneficial grease” rely on weak arguments and, as shown above, Kaufmann (1997) and Tanzi 
(1998) have offered a comprehensive list of practical and theoretical limitations of this view. 
Moreover, as we will mainly discuss below, the recent empirical literature suggests that less 
optimistic growth scenarios are plausible for countries affected by persistent corruption. Before than 
review this literature, however, we will briefly summarize the economic growth theories, to better 
understand which are the variables on which economic growth depends, and to understand, in the 
remaining part of the section, how corruption is affecting these variables. So, the questions which 
we will answer here are, respectively: 1) Which variables are influencing the economic growth? 2) 
Does corruption affect these variables, and, if yes, in which way? Obviously, to answer these 
questions we will refer to the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. In summary, according to 
the existing economic growth theories, the most important variables influencing the economic 
growth are: investment, human capital, foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign aid
33
. There is a 
large body of theoretical and empirical literature which prove that the phenomenon of corruption is 
directly affecting these variables, or indirectly by influencing the governments who are called to 
decide about them. 
 
2.2 Corruption as a “major obstacle” for economic growth 
 
2.2.1. Corruption and Economic Growth Theory 
 
Why are some countries rich and others poor? Why do some economies grow quickly, while others 
grow slowly or not at all? Why do some African countries remain mired in deep in poverty, with 
                                                 
33 Actually, the effects of foreign aid on economic growth have been studied by the economic growth scholars only recently, as we 
will discuss in some detail  in Paragraph 3.2.2.d. 
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few signs of sustained growth and development? What determines the rate of growth of an economy 
and its aggregate level of output? These are some of the main questions in the study of economic 
growth. The most important exogenous (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965) and 
endogenous theories of economic growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1990; Rebelo, 1991), 
try to explain the processes by which economies grow and develop. Most models of economic 
growth focus primarily on the basic factors of production: the labor force and the capital stock. The 
simplest production function used in basic models of economic growth assumes that capital and 
labor always are utilized in a fixed proportion to produce different levels of output. This fixed-
coefficient, constant returns to scale production function is the focus of a well-known early model 
of economic growth that was developed independently during the 1940s by economists Harrod and 
Domar (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946, 1947). The Harrod- Domar condition states simply that the 
rate of growth of national income will be directly or positively related to national saving ratio and 
inversely related to the national capital-output ratio. The economic logic of H-D equation is very 
simple: in order to growth, economies must save and invest a certain proportion of their GDP. The 
more they can save and invest, the faster they can growth. However, the empirical evidence strongly 
confirms the weakness of the H-D model. Domar himself argued that his model was not appropriate 
for determining long-term growth rates, and supported instead the Solow neoclassical growth model 
which predicted growth rates were dependent, not on investment, but on the rate of technological 
change (Easterly, 1998). The Solow neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956) represented the 
seminal contribution to the neoclassical theory of growth. It expanded on the Harrod-Domar 
formulation by adding a second factor, labor, and introducing a third independent variable, 
technology, to the growth equation. Unlike the fixed-coefficient, constant-returns-to scale 
assumption of the Harrod-Domar model, Solow’s neoclassical model exhibited diminishing returns 
to labor and capital separately and constant returns to both factors jointly. Technological progress 
became the residual factor explaining long-term growth, and its level was assumed to be determined 
exogenously, independently of all other factors. 
 
A key implication of the Solow growth model is that, if all countries have the same potential level 
of income, poor countries will grow faster than rich countries and eventually will catch up at the 
steady state. In other words, we should observe the levels of income of countries around the world 
“converging“ toward one another over time. Has this actually happened? The short answer is no. 
Since the 1950s, the opposite empirical result has been observed on average. In fact, only few poor 
countries have grown quickly, but others have recorded very low (even negative) rates of growth
34
. 
The only part that seems accurate is that almost all the rich countries display relatively slow growth 
rates, as expected (Perkins et al., 2001) 
35
.  
                                                 
34 Previous statistics, however, not really do justice to the Solow model. In fact, while there is no evidence for “absolute 
convergence” of income levels among all countries, there is a large body of evidence for “conditional convergence” of incomes once 
we control for differences in steady-state income levels (Baumol, 1986; Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
35 According to the World Development Indicators 2008, “average growth of low- and lower middle-income economies has been 
rising, surpassing that of upper middle-income and high-income economies in the last three decades. Since 2000 annual GDP growth 
in low-income economies has averaged 6.5 percent, compared with 5.6 percent in middle-income economies and 2.3 percent in high-
income economies. Nevertheless, only a few large countries drive these averages: China, India, and the Russian Federation, which 
have performed exceptionally well and carry large weights in the aggregates. Growth remains uneven across regions and economies. 
Poverty traps, exclusion from global markets, internal conflicts, resource constraints, poor policies, and market failures and 
corruption have limited growth and poverty reduction in low-income economies, especially in Africa and Latin America” (World 
Development Indicators 2008: 194). 
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  The studies that could find not convergence of per capita incomes in the world economy have been 
the major inspiration behind the development of the “new” or “endogenous” growth theories, since 
the mid-1980s. In fact, as we have seen above, contrary to the prediction of neoclassical growth 
theory based on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital, which, given identical preferences 
and technology across countries, should lead to faster growth in poor countries than in rich ones, the 
empirical evidence could not find convergence. So, endogenous Growth Models were developed as 
a response to the criticisms of the neoclassical growth model and to offer better explanation of the 
process of long-run economic growth. In these new models of endogenous growth there are 
assumed to be positive externalities associated with human capital formation (i.e.,  
education) and research and development that prevent the marginal product of capital from falling 
and the capital-output ratio from rising. The theory views innovation brought about by investment 
in knowledge generation as the driving force of long term economic growth (Romer, 1986). More 
importantly, variants of endogenous growth models including Lucas (1988), Barro (1990), AK 
models like Rebelo (1991) and others, have demonstrated that policy variables can have significant 
impact on long-run economic growth. Furthermore, unlike the Solow model, new growth theory 
models explain technological changes as an endogenous outcome of public and private investments 
in human capital and knowledge-intensive industries. Thus, in contrast to the neoclassical theories, 
models of endogenous growth suggest an active role for public policy in promoting economic 
development through direct and indirect investments in human capital formation and the 
encouragement of foreign private investment in knowledge-intensive industries (Todaro and Smith, 
2008: 149). 
 
A large number of empirical studies, which have been inspired by “new” growth theories, observe 
the robustness of different variables in the determination of the growth rate. Thirlwall (2003: 177-
181) has surveyed six pioneer studies: Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), Levine and Renelt 
(1992), Levine and Zervos (1993), Barro and Wha Lee (1993), Knight et al. (1993). Among a group 
of eight variables (saving-investment ratio, population growth, education, government consumption, 
political instability, monetary and fiscal variables, trade variables and inflation), only four seem to 
be robust in the sense that they remain statistically significant regardless of what other variables are 
included in the equation. These robust variables found in the majority of studies are the ratio of 
savings and investment to GDP, population growth, the initial level of per capita income, and 
investment in human capital measured by the secondary school enrollment rate. All other variables 
are not significant. 
 
It’s clear, at this point, how corruption can affect economic growth and development. In fact, if, as 
seen above, public policy has a fundamental and active role in promoting development through 
direct and indirect investments in human capital formation and the encouragement of foreign 
private investment in knowledge-intensive industries, and, if the public policies are affected by 
corruption, there will never be satisfactory economic growth and development. The overwhelming 
statistical evidence demonstrates that countries with high corruption levels have poorer economic 
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performance. Though corruption was not given an explicit recognition in the traditional economic 
growth theories, it has now become a globally recognized policy variable especially in less 
developed countries where it is considered more critical for the attainment of long-term economic 
growth and sustainable development. Over the years, several studies have shown that corruption 
hinders economic growth. The World Bank (2000) identified corruption as “the single greatest 
obstacle to economic growth and social development in the third world countries”, as it distorts the 
rule of low and weakens the institutional foundations from which economic growth depends.  
In fact, though corruption is present in almost any country, it has the most devastating effects in 
developing economies, because it hinders any advance in economic growth. There are different 
channels through which it might happen. In fact, it has been found that corruption: (i) reduces 
investment; (ii) distorts government expenditure away from health and education; (iii) increases 
public investment, encouraging excessive infrastructure and capital intensive investment, and 
reduces its productivity; (iv) decreases the flood of inward foreign direct investment (FDI); and (v) 
diminishes the effectiveness of foreign aid flows. Moreover, it has been largely recognized that 
corruption also increases inequality and poverty. All these channels/impacts will be mostly analyzed 
in the following part of this section. 
 
2.2.2. Review of related theoretical and empirical literature 
 
The aim of this paragraph is to summarize the most influencing existing literature regarding the 
channels through which corruption affects economic growth. 
 
2.2.2.a. The Effects of Corruption on Investment 
 
In the presence of corruption, entrepreneurs know that a portion of the profits from their 
investments may be claimed by corrupt officials. To obtain the issue of necessary permits and 
authorizations, in fact, payment of bribes is often required. Consequently, corruption may be 
interpreted to act as a tax, though of a particularly damaging nature, given the need for secrecy and 
the uncertainty that come with it, which correspondingly reduces incentives to invest (Mauro, 
1995). 
 
The first econometric investigation on the impact of corruption on investment in a cross-section of 
countries was undertaken by Mauro (1995), who engaged in an empirical analysis of the impact of 
corruption on economic growth and investment across countries
36. Mauro’s objective was ”…to 
identify channels through which corruption affects economic growth and to quantify the magnitude 
of these effects” (1995: 682). His results indicated that corruption significantly lowers the levels of 
investments in an economy, even when allowance is made for the level of bureaucracy within the 
country
37
. Such reduction in investment is assumed to be caused by the higher costs and by the 
                                                 
36 Using Barro’s (1991) framework, Mauro (1995) pioneered the econometric investigation of the impact of corruption on economic 
growth and investment across countries. Using Business International (BI) data for 70 countries for the period 1980-83, he found a 
significant negative relationship between corruption and the average annual economic growth rate over the 1960-85 period, and 
between corruption and the investment-GDP ratio and other kinds of investments for 1960-85 and for 1980-85 as well.  
37 Keefer and Knack (1995) obtain broadly similar results and, in their estimates, institutional variables have a significant direct 
effect on growth in addition to the indirect effect through investment.  
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uncertainty that corruption creates. In Mauro’s analysis, the reduction in the rate of growth is a 
direct consequence of the decline in the investment rate. In other words, his analysis is based on a 
production function that makes growth a function of investment.  
 
2.2.2.b. The Effects of Corruption on Government Expenditure 
 
Mauro (1996) extended its pioneering study to a larger sample of countries and examined, in 
addition to the links between corruption and investments, the effects of corruption in the size and 
composition of government expenditure. The results of this extended study confirmed Mauro’s 
earlier results that corruption significantly affects economic growth and investments in the 
economy. Moreover, he found that corruption reduces expenditures on health and education, while 
encourages excessive infrastructure and capital intensive investment. This is because the 
opportunities to extract rents from public expenditures on health and education are relatively less 
compared to other sectors. 
 
Corrupt government officials, in fact, may be more likely to choose to undertake types of 
government expenditure that consent them to collect bribes and to maintain them secret. Sleifer and 
Vishny (1993) suggested that large projects and specialized items, whose exact value is difficult to 
monitor, lead to more lucrative opportunities for corruption. Then, one might expect that it is easier 
to collect considerable bribes on huge infrastructure projects or high-technology defense equipment 
than on textbooks and teacher’s salaries. Hines (1995), for example, argued that international trade 
in military aircraft is particularly susceptible to corruption. Furthermore, Gupta et al. (2001) have 
shown that corruption is associated with higher military spending as a share of GDP and total 
government expenditures, and with larger procurement expenditures in relation to both GDP and 
government spending. They concluded that, although some caution is needed, due to the data 
limitations, the evidence reported in their paper is indicative that countries perceived as being more 
corrupt tend to spend more on the military
38
. 
 
In other sectors, such as health, the picture is less clear-cut: opportunities to collect bribes may be 
abundant in the case of hospital buildings and state-of-the-art medical equipment, but may be more 
limited in the case of doctors’ and nurses’ salaries39.  
 
Similarly, as we will see in the next paragraph, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) found that corruption also 
reduces expenditure for operation and maintenance for the same reasons that reduce expenditure for 
education and health. 
 
So, the argument here is that politicians choose to spend more on those components of public 
                                                 
38
 Their results are fairly robust to different model specifications, estimations techniques, and data sources (the 
empirical analysis is based on data from four different sources for up to 120 countries during 1985-1998). The paper 
supported the possible use of military spending in relation to GDP and total government spending as an appropriate 
governance indicator (Gupta et al., 2001). 
39
 As noted also by Tanzi (1998: 29), the provision of health is often distorted by bribes to doctors or to other medical 
personnel to get better or faster services. 
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expenditure on which it is easier to levy bribes. And, in this way, corruption affects the composition 
of government expenditure. The question whether corruption affects the composition of government 
expenditure is an interesting one to consider because, even if the empirical literature has yielded 
mixed results on the effect of government expenditure and, in particular, its composition, on 
economic growth
40
, most economists seem to think that the level and type of spending undertaken 
by governments do matter for economic performance. For example, even if cross-country regression 
work has not conclusively shown a relationship between government spending on education and 
economic growth, it has been found quite robust evidence that school enrollment rates (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992) and educational attainment (Barro, 1992) play a considerable role in determining 
economic growth
41
. 
 
2.2.2.c. The Effects of Corruption on Public Investment 
 
In the same vein of Mauro (1996), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) also examined the effect of corruption 
on the size and composition of public expenditure, with particular attention to public investment. 
More specifically, they argued that corruption, especially “grand corruption”, distorts the entire 
decision-making process connected with public investment projects. This will happen mainly when 
some of the essential controlling or auditing institutions are not well developed and institutional 
controls are weak. The evidence they presented showed that higher levels of corruption are 
associated with (i) higher public investment; (ii) lower government revenues; (iii) lower 
expenditures on operations and maintenance (O&M); and (iv) lower quality of public infrastructure. 
The evidence also showed that corruption increases public investment while reducing its 
productivity. Clearly, these  are five channels through which corruption lowers growth.  
 
As seen in Paragraph 3.2.1., economists favor high capital spending because they believe that it 
contributes to growth. Harrod, Domar, and others, for example, argued that countries need capital to 
growth and, more importantly, that there is an almost mechanical relation (the so-called capital-
output ratio) between increased capital spending and increased growth; however there has been a 
strong intellectual bias in the economic profession in favor of capital spending. For example, when 
economists evaluate the allocation of public money between current and capital spending in 
government budgets, they tend to be critical of countries that allow the share of current spending to 
grow. On the other hand, they generally praise countries where the share of capital spending in total 
government expenditure goes up. The above bias is protected in the “golden rule” that many 
economists advocate for countries. That rule essentially affirms that it is all right to borrow as long 
as the borrowing is for investment projects; this means that only current expenditure needs to be 
balanced by ordinary revenue, and that a country can have a fiscal deficit equal to the net capital 
                                                 
40
 Concerning the overall level of government expenditure, Levine and Renelt (1992) showed that it does not seem to 
bear any robust relationship with economic growth. Easterly and Rebelo (1993), however, found some significant 
correlations: public investment on transport and communications is positively associated with economic growth, though 
not with private investment; public investment in agriculture is negatively associated with private investment; general 
government investment is positively correlated with both growth and private investment; and public enterprise 
investment is negatively correlated with private investment. 
41
 Probably, part of the reason why it has proved difficult to find significant and robust effects of the composition of 
government expenditure on economic growth is that the quality of the available data may be relatively low.  
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spending of the government
42
. This rule continues to be invoked as a good guide to policy, even in 
the face of much evidence that some current spending, such as “operation and maintenance” that 
keeps the existing infrastructure in good conditions or spending that contributes to the accumulation 
of human capital, such as spending for education, can promote growth more than capital spending. 
Moreover, as suggested by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997: 21), “economists should be more restrained in 
their praise of high public sector investment spending and of rules such as “golden rule”, especially 
in countries where corruption, and especially high level corruption, is a problem”. 
 
Politicians have internalized and “exploited” the above pro-investment bias and have pushed for 
larger investment budgets. However, larger expenditure for highly visible investment projects such 
as roads, airports, power plants, and ports may come at the cost of smaller expenditures for less 
visible and less politically attractive expenditure on operations and maintenance (O& M). 
Additionally, public investment projects lend easily to manipulations by high levels officials to get 
bribes. In effect, there is nothing routine about the investment budget and its composition. While 
much current government spending reflects particularly explicit or implicit entitlements or previous 
commitments (e.g. pensions, interest payments on the debt, salaries, subsidies, and so on), thus 
allowing restricted discretion in the short run to politicians, capital spending, instead, is highly 
discretionary. As seen in Section 2, when politicians have high discretional power, then there is 
large room for corruption, and this is the case especially for public investment projects. Most of the 
times, in fact, public investment projects tend to be large and in some cases they are very large
43
. 
Their execution is often contracted out to domestic or foreign private enterprises. There is thus a 
need to choose the enterprise that will be responsible for undertaking the project. The process of 
approval of an investment project involves several phases, and in some of these phases, it will be 
possible for a strategically-placed high-level official to influence the process in ways that lead to the 
selection of a particular enterprise. Clearly, for a private enterprise, getting a contract to complete a 
project, and especially a large one, can be extremely lucrative. Consequently, the managers of these 
enterprises may be willing to pay a “commission”44 to the government officials that help them win 
the contract
45
.  
 
According to Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), the enterprise that pays the “commission” will not suffer 
from the payment of the bribe if it is able to recuperate the cost. This could be made in several 
ways: (i) through up-front cost recovery if it can win the bidding competition with an offer that 
includes the cost of the commission; (ii) the enterprise can have an understanding with the 
influential official that the initial low offer can be adjusted upward along the way; or (iii) reduce its 
projects costs by saving on the quality of the work done and on the materials used. In all these 
                                                 
42
 Essentially, this means that it is all right to borrow to finance the building of new roads but not to finance the repairs 
of existing roads; or to borrow for the building of a new hospital, but not for the hiring of doctors or nurses or for 
buying medicines. 
43 Here we mainly refer to infrastructure investments. It has been known for some time that corruption is most prevalent in 
infrastructure sector ( see e.g., Wade, 1982  Rose-Ackerman, 1996). 
44 “Commission” is a euphemism for what is essentially a bribe. 
45 In some countries, commissions paid by their enterprises to foreign politicians are both legal and tax deductible. Such 
“commissions” are often calculated as percentages of the total cost of the projects (see Footnotes 61-62).  Interestingly, in many 
cases the act of bribery may not start with the enterprises but with the officials who control the decisions. Foreign enterprises 
reported that in some countries it is impossible to get a government contract without paying a bribe (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997: 6). 
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alternatives, which require the cooperation of the corrupt official, the country will end up with 
either: a bigger or more complex project than would have been necessary, with a higher cost for the 
specified project than would have been the case in absence of corruption, or with a project of 
inferior quality that will require costly repairs
46
. This means that corruption lowers the quality of 
public infrastructure. More specifically, according to Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), when 
“commissions” paid out by enterprises to public officials to win an investment contract are attached 
to the projects’ costs, an incentive may be created for larger projects. The net results are: first an 
increase in the share of public investment in the total budget
47
; second a fall in the average 
productivity of public investment; and finally a possible reduction in some other categories of 
public spending, such as O&M expenditures and expenditures on education and health. Reductions 
in O&M expenditures result in deteriorating the quality of the infrastructure, and then its 
productivity. Moreover, the authors argued that corruption can reduce government revenue if it 
contributes to tax evasion, improper tax exemptions or weak tax administration. Therefore, because 
corruption reduces public revenue and increases public spending, it contributes to larger fiscal 
deficits, making it more difficult for the government to run a sound fiscal policy (Mauro, 1996). 
 
It is important to emphasize that the arguments discussed above identify some of the channels 
through which corruption, affecting public investment, reduces economic growth. First, corruption 
can reduce growth by increasing public investment while reducing its productivity. This finding is 
consistent with typical reduced-form cross-country growth regressions. For example, Devarajan et 
al. (1993) have found that higher public investment is associated with lower growth, and Tanzi 
(1994) found that the relationship between growth and investment is highly sensitive in a couple of 
countries. Second, corruption can reduce growth by reducing the quality of the existing 
infrastructure. A deteriorating infrastructure increases the cost of doing business for both 
government and private sector (e.g., congestion, delays, break-down of machineries, etc) and thus 
leads to lower output and growth. The importance of infrastructure in growth has been shown in 
many cross-country regressions (Canning and Fay, 1993; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Hulten, 1996). 
Finally, as we said, corruption can reduce growth by lowering government revenue needed to 
finance productive spending, such as education. 
 
2.2.2.d. The Effects of Corruption on Foreign Aid 
 
Using the neoclassical production function, some authors (e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 2003) have 
argued that higher aid could be assumed to raise physical capital one-for-one, and then also raise the 
percent of GDP growth. However, despite the simple implications of the neoclassical model, early 
studies
48
 failed to agree on the observed effect of aid on output growth. Although several later 
studies
49
 found a positive growth impact when aid interacts with other growth determinants. 
                                                 
46 The experience with public sector projects, especially in developing countries, is full of stories about roads that needed to be 
repaired a short time after completion, power plants that worked at much lower capacity than anticipated, and so on (Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 1997: 8). 
47 See also Mauro (1996). 
48 For example: Griffin and Enos (1970); Papanek (1973); Dowling and Hiemenz (1982); Gupta and Islam (1983); Boone (1994) all 
cited in Farah et al. (2009). 
49 For example: Burnside and Dollar (2000); Chauvet and Guillamont (2002). 
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Roodman (2003) and Easterly et al. (2003) demonstrated that the significance of this relationship is 
not robust. Rajan and Subramanian (2005) found that aid has negative effects on economic growth 
because of the adverse effects of aid-induced appreciation of the real exchange rate on exports, 
though the methodology used to obtain these conclusions has been contested
50
. 
 
Recent studies that look at more disaggregated aid data seem to discover a positive relationship 
between aid and growth. Clemens et al. (2004) found that aid allocated to physical investment (e.g., 
infrastructure and program assistance) has a visible impact on growth while that allocated to human 
capital (e.g., health and education) has a long term growth payoff that is econometrically harder to 
identify. Minoiu and Reddy (2007) discriminated geopolitical aid (e.g., general budgetary support, 
roads for military bases) from development aid (e.g., irrigation, infrastructure, health, and 
education). They found that a 1 percent of GDP increase in development aid increases average 
growth by about 0.5 percentage points over the following 10 years and between 0.6 and 2.1 
percentage points after 25 years; but they also found that geopolitical aid has either a zero or a 
negative growth impact, depending on the specification. Also Heady (2005, 2007) and Bobba and 
Powell (2007) found a positive impact of non-geopolitical aid.  
 
More recently, Agénor et al. (2005) developed a model that captures the links between foreign aid, 
the level and composition of public investment, and their effects on economic growth and poverty. 
Farah et al. (2009) developed a simple macroeconomic model that assesses the effects of higher 
foreign aid on output growth and other macroeconomic variables. The model takes into account the 
impact of aid on physical and human capital accumulation, while recognizing that the impact of the 
latter is more extended. The authors applied the model to Niger, founding that if foreign aid as a 
share of GDP were to be permanently increased from the equivalent of 10 percent in 2007 to 15 
percent in 2008, annual economic growth would accelerate by more than 1 percentage point, 
without generating significant risks for macroeconomic stability. As a result, by 2020 Niger’s 
income per capita would be 12.5 percent higher than it would be without increased foreign aid. 
Moreover, the higher growth would help the country to cut the incidence of poverty by 25 percent 
by 2015, although the country will still be incapable to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
of poverty reduction.  
 
So, we can assume that aid, especially development aid, has a positive impact on economic growth. 
Consequently, the possibility that corruption might reduce the effectiveness of aid flows, through 
the misallocation of funds, is of particular negative importance to developing countries. The vast 
literature on aid flows has addressed the question of whether the fungibility of aid resources may 
imply that aid eventually finance unproductive public expenditures. The critics of aid programs, in 
fact, argue that contrary to the more or less sincere intentions of the donors, corrupt governments 
following very poor policies receive just as much aid as less corrupt ones. Actually, according to the 
World Bank (1998), financial assistance does not often reach the really deprived in developing 
countries, but instead it is wasted in inefficient public consumption. Many critics make an even 
                                                 
50  Kraay (2006); Minoiu and Reddy (2007). 
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stronger argument, specifically that not only corrupt governments are not discriminated against in 
the flow of international assistance, but, in fact, foreign aid promotes corruption by increasing the 
size of resources contested by interests groups and factions. This point is made in Svensson (2000), 
and it is coherent with Tornell and Lane’s (1999) theory.  
 
Probably, as a result of this continuing debate, many donor countries have focused increasingly on 
issues of good governance, and in some cases where governance is considered to be very poor, 
some donors have scaled back their assistance (IMF, 1995: 32-34, cited in Mauro, 1996). Actually, 
Alesina and Weder (2002) found that there is no empirical evidence that more corrupt governments 
receive less foreign aid
51
. However, the authors found significant differences across donors. 
Scandinavian donors (the most generous in per capita terms, at that time) and Australia give more to 
less corrupt governments, while the United States appears to favor democracies over dictatorships, 
but seems to pay not attention to the quality of governments of receiving countries
52
. Also 
multilateral aid, namely aid from international organizations, does not discriminate against 
corruption of the receiving country. 
 
Whatever is the effect of corruption on the capacity of a developing country to attract foreign aid, it 
remains that, if there is corruption, foreign aids are being used in a wrong way, so they lost their 
natural function of financial help to eradicate poverty and promote development. 
 
2.2.2.e. The Effects of Corruption on Income Inequality and Poverty 
 
If there is corruption, government officials may use their authority for private gain in designing and 
implementing public policies (Tanzi, 1997). This phenomenon may result in enriching these 
officials as well as private individuals who obtain a larger share of public benefits or bear a lower 
share of public costs. In this way, corruption distorts the government’s role in resource allocation. It 
has been argued (Tanzi, 1995) that the benefits from corruption are likely to flow to the better-
connected individuals in the society, who belong mostly to high-income groups. Thus, corruption 
would affect not only broad macroeconomic variables, such as investment and growth, but also 
income distribution (we will return to this point in Paragraph 4.3). It has been further contended 
that corruption increases poverty by reducing the level of social services available to the poor, 
creating incentives for higher investment in capital-intensive projects and lower investment in 
labor-intensive projects. Such a bias in investment strategy deprives the poor of income-generating 
opportunities (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, 1999).  
 
Empirical evidence of the considerable adverse effects of corruption on income inequality and 
poverty has been shown by Gupta et al. (2002)
53
. These authors carried out an elaborate empirical 
                                                 
51 The same result applies to debt relief program, and additional forms of aid. 
52 The reason why Scandinavian donors and Australia can better discriminate is that they did not have colonies and they are free from 
specific political pressures.  
53 The authors found that a worsening in the corruption index of a country by one standard deviation (2.52 points on a scale of 0 to 
10) increases the Gini coefficient by 11 points which is significant, given the average Gini value of 39. A one-standard deviation 
increase in the growth rate of corruption (a deterioration of 0.78 percentage points) reduces income growth of the poor by 4.7 
percentage points per year  which is considerable given the average income growth of 0.6 percent a year. 
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study on the effects of corruption on inequality. They found that corruption tends to increase 
inequality and poverty through lower economic growth; biased tax systems favoring the rich and 
influential; lower social spending, unequal access to education and poor targeting of social 
programs; interest-group lobbying that perpetuates asset inequality; and increased risk for 
investment decisions of the poor. 
 
High corruption can lead to high poverty for two reasons. First, evidence suggests that a higher 
growth rate is associated with a higher rate of poverty reduction (Ravallion and Chen, 1997), and 
that corruption slows the rate of poverty reduction by reducing growth
54
. Second, income inequality 
has been shown to be harmful to growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994), 
and if corruption increases income inequality, it will also reduce growth and thus limit poverty 
reduction (Ravallion, 1997)
55
. 
 
Moreover, as discussed before, corruption can lead to tax evasion, poor tax administration, and 
exemptions that disproportionately favor the well-connected and wealthy population groups. This 
can reduce the tax base and the progressivity of the tax system, possibly leading to increased 
income inequality (Gupta et al., 2002: 26). Additionally, for a given tax system, the higher the level 
of corruption, the lower the tax revenue and the lower the resources available for funding public 
provision of certain services, including education.  
 
There are also other factors determining the influence of corruption on education. First, corruption 
increases the operating cost of government, and, therefore, reduces the resources available for other 
uses, including the financing of social spending that is crucial to the formation of human capital. 
Second, wealthy urban elites can lobby the government to bias social expenditure toward higher 
education and tertiary health, which tend to benefit high-income groups
56
. Finally, corruption can 
increase the share of recurrent expenditures devoted to wages as opposed to operations and 
maintenance (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). This lowers the quality of education and health services 
and affects the ability of the state to improve educational attainment levels.  
 
Corruption can also affect the targeting of social program to the truly needy. The use of 
government-funded programs to extend benefits to relatively wealthy population groups, or the 
siphoning of funds from poverty-alleviation programs by well-connected individuals, will diminish 
the impact of social programs on income distribution and poverty (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
 
2.2.2.f. The Effects of Corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
For a long time, foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important role in international 
business and in the economic development. In fact, international direct investment is particularly 
important for developing countries, for which it is not only a source of scarce capital but also an 
                                                 
54 A number of studies have found a negative correlation between income growth and inequality, for example World Bank (2002), 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar (2004). 
55 It is possible for income inequality to be high enough that it results in rising poverty, despite high growth (Ravallion, 1997). 
56 As seen above, corruption can also increase expenditure on tertiary health because bribes can be more easily extracted from the 
building of hospitals and purchasing of state-of-the-art medical equipment than from expenditure on, for example, vaccinations. 
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important channel for the transfer of technological and managerial know-how (Eaton and Tamura, 
1995)
57
.  
 
FDI represents one of the most studied yet not completely explained topics in international business 
literature
58
. There exist two views of corruption: one negative, according to which corruption 
reduces FDI because it increases costs and uncertainty, and another positive, according to which 
corruption increases FDI because it helps avoid the costs of operating in an environment 
characterized by poorly-developed regulations. These two views have been presented as opposing 
arguments. But, as largely discussed in the literature, one way to solve the apparent theoretical 
contradiction is to argue that they operate in different situations. We will return to this later. 
 
Initially, the effects of corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI) have been empirically 
analyzed by Wei (1997) who examined bilateral FDI from 12 developed countries to 45 destination 
countries and found that corruption negatively impacts FDI, since it acts as a tax
59
. Additionally, 
Wei (1999) concluded that the less predictable the level of corruption (i.e., the higher is its 
variance), the greater is its impact on FDI, as higher variance makes corruption act like an 
unpredictable and random tax that increases risk and uncertainty. We will return to this later. Thus, 
increases in corruption and its arbitrariness are equivalent to increases in the tax rate on 
enterprises
60
. Similarly, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) empirically examined bilateral FDI flows from 
7 developed countries to 89 countries and found that both the level of corruption in the host country 
and the difference in levels of corruption in the home and host countries have a negative impact on 
FDI. Furthermore, they found that the degree of international openness and the political stability of 
the host market moderate the influence of corruption. Lambsdorff (2003) studied investment in 54 
countries and found that corruption has a negative impact on foreign investment. Voyer and 
Beamish’s (2004) analysis of Japanese FDI found that corruption has a negative impact on FDI in 
developing nations. Besides reducing FDI, corruption induces firms to change the mode of entry 
and select joint ventures over wholly owned operations (Smarzynska and Wei, 2000; Uhlenbruck et 
al., 2006). Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) argued that corruption results in relatively lower FDI from 
countries that have signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
61
; this suggests that laws against 
bribery abroad may act as a deterrent against engaging in corruption in foreign countries. 
Furthermore, corruption results in relatively higher FDI from countries with high levels of 
corruption; this suggests that investors that have been exposed to bribery at home may not be 
deterred by corruption abroad and instead seek countries where corruption is widespread.  
 
The above arguments have shown that numerous empirical studies demonstrate that corruption 
reduces investment. But, how robust is this relationship? Although corruption is rarely justified on 
                                                 
57 See also UNCTAD (2006: 31-32) about the gains from South- South FDI, pp.31-32, 
58 See for example reviews by Brewer (1993), Caves (1996), Ensign (1996). 
59 This has been noted also by Tanzi (1998). 
60 Wei (1998) demonstrated, for instance, that if India’s corruption level were reduced to Singapore’s, its effect on attracting foreign 
investment would be the same as reducing its marginal corporate tax rate by 22 percentage point. 
61 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in 
international business transactions and provides for a multitude of related measures that make this effective. This Convention has 
been adopted by the 30 OECD member countries and eight non-member countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, Israel, 
Slovenia and South Africa. 
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ethical foundations, some scholars (Lui, 1985; Leff, 1964) view corruption in positive terms as 
“grease in the wheels of commerce”. Corruption is seen as facilitating transactions and speeding up 
procedures that would otherwise not happen or happen with more difficulty (Huntington, 1968), as 
we have largely discussed in Paragraph 3.1. Though scarce, some empirical researches have not 
found a negative relationship between corruption and FDI. Wheeler and Mody (1992), for example, 
in a study of foreign investment of U.S. firms, failed to find a significant correlation between the 
size of FDI and the host country’s risk factor, a composite measure that includes perceptions of 
corruption as one of its components, but this may be an imperfect measure of corruption. Similarly, 
Hines (1995) found that corruption in the host country does not appear to affect the flood of FDI, 
with the exception of US investors. He interpreted this conclusion as a result of the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
62
. Actually, according to Wei (2000), in spite of their Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, American investors are averse to corruption in host countries, but not 
necessarily more than average OECD investors. In effect, also Henisz (2000) found that corruption 
tends not to affect the investments of US multinational enterprises. Furthermore, Egger and Winner 
(2005) found a clear positive relationship between corruption and FDI, for a sample of 73 
developed and less developed countries and for the time period 1995-1999, hazarding the 
conclusion that corruption is a stimulus for FDI.  
 
More recently, Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) demonstrated that transition economies show high levels of 
corruption and also high levels of FDI. Then, he argued that it is not the level but rather the type of 
corruption that affects FDI in transition economies. Actually, the Cuervo-Cazurra’s (2008) empirical 
example of the anomaly is just the most recent, but not the only one in the literature. Before than 
him, and more significantly, different authors
63
 have tried to explain the so-called “East Asian 
paradox”: the combination of high-corruption, high growth and high-inflow of FDI. The next 
section will better analyze this paradox, summarizing the plausible explanations of the 
phenomenon, and trying to understand if, in effect, this paradox is a serious challenge to the 
hypothesis that corruption reduces FDI and slows economic growth. 
 
3. The East Asian Paradox                                                                                        
 
3.1. What the paradox consists? Some possible explanations 
 
Since now, we have seen that most of the theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated that 
corruption reduces investment and slows economic growth, and that the pioneering theories in favor 
of corruption have been strongly contradicted. However, there remain a certain degree of 
ambivalence among scholars about the impact of corruption on economic growth and on FDI. This 
is in part due to the so-called “East Asian paradox”64: the achievement of very high growth rates in 
                                                 
62The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted in 1977 and substantially revised in 1988. The provisions of the FCPA 
prohibit the bribery of foreign government officials by U.S. persons and prescribe accounting and record-keeping practices. The U.S. 
has stood alone for many years in its legislation against the bribery of foreign government officials. Paradoxically, in some other 
countries, “commissions” paid by their enterprises to foreign politicians were both legal and tax deductible, and such “commissions” 
were often calculated as percentages of the total cost of the projects. However, in early 1996, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) adopted new "Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery" and in so doing encouraged companies 
worldwide to adopt the conduct rules and incorporate them into their employee guidelines. Additionally, in December 1996, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a "Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions". Finally, in 1997, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established the Anti-Bribery 
Convention, discussed in note 62. 
63 For example, Wei (1997) and Campos et al. (1999). 
64 The term was introduced for the first time by Wedeman (2002: 34). 
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real per capita income over relatively long time periods and very high flows of FDI, in spite of 
rather high levels of corruption. The Transparency International (2002-2008) has ranked China, 
Viet Nam, Indonesia, and Thailand among the most corrupt countries
65
 and yet, as Table 1 shows, 
these countries have been growing and have continued to grow at very high rates, and to attract 
considerable flows of foreign capitals (See Figure 1 for Corruption and Growth, and Figure 2 for 
Corruption and FDI). 
 
Table 1. Growth rates and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI 2002-07). 
 
 
Average corruption ratings 2002-07 
Average GDP growth rate (%) 2000-
07 
China 3,6 9,42 % 
Viet Nam  2,7 6,37 % 
Thailand  3,5 4,22 % 
Indonesia 2,6 3,97 % 
India 3,4 5,64 % 
Egypt 2,8 2,74 % 
Kenya 2,1 1,33 % 
Brazil 3,5 2,02 % 
Mexico 3,6 1,88 % 
 
Data Figure 1   
East Asia 3,5 7,92 % 
South Asia and Philippines 2,5 4,24 % 
Latin America &Caribben 3,4 2,17 % 
Sub-Sahara Africa 2,7 2,23 % 
Middle East and North Africa 3,1 2,44 % 
Source: Corruption data are from Transparency International (CPI average 2002-2007). Data on per capita GDP growth (% annual) 
are from World Development Indicators 2009  (average 2000-2007).See note 67. 
 
 
Figure 1. Corruption and Growth (2000-2007). 
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Source: Elaboration of the author. Corruption data are from Transparency International (CPI average 2002-2007),  data on per 
capita GDP growth (% annual) are from World Development Indicators 2009  (average 2000-2007). 
East Asia: China, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Viet Nam; SASIAP: South Asia and Philippines; LAC: Latin America and 
Caribbean; SSA=sub-Saharan Africa; MENA= Middle East and North Africa66. 
                                                 
65 For the 2008 corruption rating (CPI) see also Table 5 in Appendix. 
66 Here and in the next tables and figures for East Asia we intend: China, Thailand, Indonesia, Viet Nam. For Latin America and 
Caribbean: Argentina; Belize; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El 
Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; St. Lucia; St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Uruguay; Venezuela. For Middle East and North Africa: Algeria; Djibouti; Egypt, Arab Rep.; 
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Corruption and FDI inflows (2002-2007)
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This observation contrasts with the conventional thought that corruption impedes economic 
performance: it is inconsistent with the theory that weak institutions, of which corruption is a 
concrete manifestation, discourage investments and thus limit growth. Wei (1997) has attempted the 
first empirical analysis that more expressively addresses the East Asian Paradox. The author 
showed that, controlling for other factors such as per capita GDP, the impact of corruption on the 
flow of FDI is not different in East Asia relative to other countries. The implication is that in East 
Asia other factors “swamp” the negative effect that corruption has on FDI. This offers a possible 
explanation of why East Asian countries have grown more rapidly despite significantly high levels 
of corruption. In fact, other empirical studies of Wei (1999) found that ethnic connections lead to 
higher flows of FDI, and in particular that much of the FDI that flows into China comes from 
overseas Chinese
67
. This suggests that informal institutions may be an important omitted variable 
which affects the nature of corruption and thus its impact on investment. It supports the thesis that 
in East Asia, informal norms inseparably connected to illicit exchanges help enforce intertemporal 
transactions that facilitate relatively larger inflows of FDI.  
 
Figure 2. Corruption and FDI inflows ( 2002-2007). 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author. Corruption data are from Transparency International (CPI average 2002-2007),  data on FDI net 
inflows (billions $) are from World Development Indicators 2009  (average 2002-2007). 
 
 
This view is consistent with the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who analyzed different types of 
corruption regimes, namely: monopolistic vs. independent “suppliers” of bribe, an approach that is 
also evident in Kaufmann (1997). Usually, as we will see later, monopolistic regimes are more 
predictable than independent regimes. Following the same line, Campos et al. (1999), attempting to 
solve the paradox, argued that it is not only the level of corruption that affects economic growth and 
investment, but also the nature of corruption. Corruption regimes that are more predictable, in the 
sense that those seeking favors from government do obtain those favors, have less negative impact 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Iran; Iraq; Jordan; Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; Syria; Tunisia; Yemen. For South Asia: Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; India; 
Maldives; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka. For Sub-Sahara Africa: Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Cape 
Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Côte d'Ivoire; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia, 
The; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mayotte; 
Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; São Tomé and Principe; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Africa; 
Sudan; Swaziland; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
67 This has been confirmed also by UNCTAD (2006, 2008), World Investment Reports.. 
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on investment than those that are less predictable
68
. The authors categorized countries into three 
broad types: (i) those with high levels of corruption and low predictability are the worst off in terms 
of attracting private investment; (ii) those with high levels but greater predictability are better of 
than the previous; and (iii) those with low levels of corruption and high predictability are the best 
off. East Asia’s “puzzling economies” are likely to be in the second category. In many of East Asia’s 
economies, in fact, corruption is said to be very well organized so that the degree of predictability is 
relatively high. This can explain why, despite high levels of corruption, these “miracle” economies 
still have high levels of growth and manage to attract significantly higher levels of investment than 
other developing countries. On the other hand, sub-Saharan countries are likely to be in the first 
category, it means that they are the worst off in terms of attracting private investment and also in 
terms of economic growth.  
 
More recently, the importance of the predictability of corruption in influencing economic growth 
has been underlined also by Rock and Bonnett (2004), as we will see soon. Here, however, we want 
to concentrate on another important conclusion of the same authors, who found that the relationship 
between corruption and investment and growth appears to be different for small and large 
countries
69
. More specifically, they argued that corruption slows growth and/or reduces investments 
in most developing countries, particularly small developing countries, but increases growth in the 
large East Asian Newly Industrialized countries (NICs), namely: China, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Thailand, and Japan.
70
 According to the authors, there are several reasons which could explain why 
the relationship between corruption and investment and growth appears to be different for small and 
large countries. Firstly, large countries have relatively large internal markets and likewise large 
supplies of labor: this means that foreign investors are more likely to accept corruption as a way of 
doing business, if doing so enables them to gain unrestricted access to local markets and labor 
markets.  Similarly, small domestic markets and small pools of labor may mean that foreign 
investors are likely to be less understanding of local corrupt business practices. This combination 
may explain why some East Asian large countries, particularly China, with relatively high levels of 
corruption are attracting such FDI and have such high growth rates. It may also at least partly 
explain why small countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, with high levels of corruption 
are attracting low FDI and have experienced such poor performances in terms of economic growth 
(Figure 1, 2 and 3). 
 
 
3.2. The different experience between East Asian NICs and sub-Saharan African countries 
 
The UNCTAD (2007) survey on World Investment Prospects for the period  2007-2009
71
 seems to 
confirm the Rock and Bonnett’s (2004) view. In fact, according to the survey, the most important 
factors which are attracting the attention of foreign investors in East Asian countries are the growth 
of domestic markets, followed by the size of those markets, the access to the regional market and  
the low labor costs. On the other hand, the investment environment and government efficiency, 
which are largely influenced by corruption, are not affecting the attraction for investors. In sub-
                                                 
68 Cuervo-Cazurra (2008), mentioned at the end of the last section, used an opposite argument to explain the paradox of transition 
economies (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Mongolia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Uzbekistan), arguing that corruption that is widely present, “pervasive corruption”, 
acts as a disincentive to FDI since it increases the known costs of investing, while corruption that is uncertain, “arbitrary 
corruption”, does not have such a deterring influence because it becomes part of uncertainty of operating in transition economies. 
69 Small countries are defined as those with population less than 20 million while large countries are those with more than 20 million 
people. 
70 Japan was included in the group of  East Asian NICs, given the importance of a Japanese model of development of those countries 
and similarities in domestic political economies of corruption with Japan. 
71 The survey aims to provide an understanding of the outlook for future trends in FDI by the largest transnational corporations 
(TNCs) for the period 2007 to the end of 2009, on the basis of the responses of a sample of companies regarding their investment 
strategies. Such surveys have been carried out by UNCTAD regularly since 1995. 
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Saharan African countries, instead, the investment environment and government efficiency largely 
influence the investors’ decisions; in fact, the 12% of respondents (versus 3% and 1% for East Asia 
) mentioned them as important factors influencing their decisions (Table 2) 
 
Figure 3. FDI net inflows (current US $) in developing countries (2002-2007). 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author. Data are from World Development Indicators 2008. 
 
 
Table.2 Factors attracting investment by region in developing countries 2007-2009. 
(Per cent of the total number of responses for all factors in the region). 
 
Host 
region/Location 
criteria 
Skilled 
labour 
Low-cost 
labur 
Size of 
local 
market 
Access to 
capital 
market 
Access to 
natural 
resources 
Access to 
regional 
market  
Growth of 
local 
market  
Government 
effectiveness 
Investment 
environment 
North Africa 4 17 17 - 25 13 21 - 4 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
- 6 15 - 23 9 18 12 12 
West Asia 3 3 27 7 15 5 25 5 7 
South, East and 
South-East Asia 
4 8 25 1 5 12 31 1 3 
Latin America 12 6 16 1 10 11 21 7 7 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2007),  World Investment Prospects Survey 2007-2009. 
 
According to the UNCTAD (2007) survey, East Asia is increasingly considered a preferred location 
by enterprises, and the region is set to maintain its leading position among host regions for 
investments until the end of 2009, and could even reinforce its lead over the next preferred regions 
(the EU-15 and North America). While West Asia, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa continue to 
feature lowest among companies’ preferences. Also for Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
investment prospect is less promising (see Figure 4). Interestingly, investors identified other 
attractive destinations in Asia: Malaysia, Thailand and, in particular, Viet Nam, which in spite of its 
high levels of corruption, has been ranked sixth in the countries preferred by investors, as it has a 
very good reputation in terms of quality and cost of labor.  
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Figure 4.  Investment Preferences by host region, 2006 and 2007-2009 
(Average score)
*
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2007),  World Investment Prospects Survey 2007-2009. *( 0= not all important; 4=very important). 
 
Importantly, East Asia include the leading host country for FDI location until 2009, namely China. 
According to the UNCTAD (2008) World Investment Report, China is the sixth largest FDI host 
economy in the world (preceded by USA, UK, France, Canada and Netherland), and the first largest 
FDI host economy among developing countries. Location experts for the UNCTAD (2007) survey 
expressed optimism for investment prospects in this country, stressing the fact that China is among 
the few developing countries in the world where it is possible to find three major kinds of locational 
advantages (low costs, markets and technological capabilities). On the other hand, however, 
according to investors, this country still presents constraints in terms of its investment environment, 
government effectiveness and access to capital markets, all strongly influenced by corruption. This 
may mean a difficult sustainable attractiveness of FDI in the long period, negatively impacting the 
country in terms of sustainable development. We will return to this later. 
 
Summarizing, we have shown the trueness of the Rock and Bonnett’s (2004) theory, according to 
which corruption slows growth and/or reduces investments in most developing countries, 
particularly small developing countries, but increases growth in the large East Asian NICs. 
Effectively, in fact, foreign investors are more likely to accept corruption as a way of doing 
business, if doing so enables them to gain unrestricted access to large and growing local markets 
and cheap and skilled labor supplies. This theory can be a first plausible explanation of the “East-
Asian paradox”.  
 
However Rock and Bonnett (2004) also found that country size is not the only thing that matters. In 
fact, they argued that “the empirical relationships between corruption, growth and investment also 
depend on both the industrial organization of corruption and the time horizon of those who control 
corruption networks” (p.1004). The importance of the impact of industrial organization of 
corruption networks on growth has been initially underlined by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who 
claimed that when corruption networks are organized and managed by a strong centralized state, as 
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in a monopoly industry, corruption is likely to be less corrosive to investment and growth than when 
it is organized by numerous government officials acting as independent monopolists. In fact, when 
the latter happens, “bribes rise to infinity and growth and investment collapse” (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993: 606). So, here the question is: How might these differences in the organization of corruption 
networks explain the “East Asian paradox”, and more generally all the different patterns observed in 
Figure 1 and 2 ? Probably, “the high-investment and high-growth outcomes of the largely corrupted 
East Asian NICs reflect monopoly control of corruption networks by strong over-centralized states. 
While the low-investment and low-growth outcomes of corrupted sub-Saharan African countries 
reflect control of corruption networks by competing monopolists in the government” (Rock and 
Bonnett: 1003). 
 
However, differences in the industrial organization of corruption may not be able, by themselves, to 
completely explain the East Asian Paradox. According to Olson (1993), in fact, something else 
matters, particularly the time horizon of those who control corruption networks, namely 
governments. As Olson (1993: 568) put it, rational (and successful) “stationary bandits” 
(government officials) will monopolize the “theft” (corruption) in their “domain”(country) while 
limiting what they steal because they know they will be able to extract more in the long run if their 
subjects have an incentive to invest and produce additional income and wealth. Furthermore, the 
prospect of a future income from the monopolization of theft may even encourage governments of 
stationary bandits to provide the public goods that allow economic agents in stationary bandit’s 
countries to generate even higher incomes and more wealth. On the other hand, instead, since 
“roving bandits” have short time horizons, they have few incentives to limit corruption and no 
incentives to provide the public goods necessary to entice residents in their countries to invest and 
increase their incomes. Because of this, Olson (1993) suggested that investment and growth should 
be lower in countries governed by roving bandits than in countries governed by stationary bandits.   
 
Rock and Bonnett (2004: 1004) have unified these two theories and argued that “the empirical 
relationships between corruption, growth and investment depend on both the industrial organization 
of corruption and the time horizon of those who control corruption networks”. Their findings are 
summarized in Table 3, which presents four possible growth-investment-corruption outcomes based 
on differences in the industrial organization of corruption and in time horizons of those who control 
corruption networks.  
 
As shown in the table, corruption networks can be either monopolized by a strong centralized state 
or fragmented and controlled by a significant number of independent monopolists. Government 
officials can be either roving bandits with short time horizons or stationary bandits with long time 
horizons.  
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Table 3. Corruption and growth regimes. 
 
 
 
Industrial organization of 
corruption networks 
 
Time horizon of governments officials (bandits) 
 
 
 Short for roving government officials (bandits) Long for stationary government officials 
(bandits) 
Strong centralized governments, who 
exert monopoly control over corruption 
networks 
1.1)  Business politicians in hyper-presidential 
regimes in Latin America (as in Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico) 
1.2)  East Asia’s developmental states (China, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand)establish 
beneficial relations with capitalists by providing 
promotional privileges in exchange for bribes and 
kickbacks. 
 Effects of corruption on growth (-) Effects of corruption on growth (+) 
   
Weak and fragmented governments 
with multiple independent monopolists 
controlling corruption networks 
1.3)  Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes, particularly 
those with substantial political instability 
1.4)  India, Philippines in the late Marcos and 
post-Marcos era, and in several regimes in sub-
Saharan Africa, such as in Zambia under president 
Kaunda and Kenya under president Moi. 
 Effects of corruption on growth (-) Effects of corruption on growth (-) 
 
Source: Rock and Bonnett (2004: 1004). 
 
 
In each of the combinations in Table 3, excluding the combination 1.2), corruption reduces 
investment and slows growth
72
. When corruption networks are controlled by a significant number of 
roving bandits who act as independent monopolists, as it is typical in at least some of the countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa, extremely weak states have been sustained by multiple patron-client 
networks controlled by one or more ethnic groups with extremely short time horizons (1.3 in Table 
3). In this case, “each independent monopolist within the state extracts as much as they can and as 
fast as possible, from both the private sector and the state. Additionally, because those who control 
corruption networks expect to be replaced in a relatively short period of time, then there is little 
incentive to invest in public goods or develop mutually beneficial relationships with anyone in the 
private sector” (Rock and Bonnett, 2004: 1004).  
 
However, this is not the only way in which corruption can reduce investment and slow growth. 
Corruption networks, especially the costly high-level corruption networks that predominate in a 
number of countries in Latin America, can also be monopolized by business-politicians turned 
presidents with short time horizons (1.1 in Table 3). These presidents, especially in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico, have routinely demonstrated a lack of interest in public investment, except to 
the degree that it provides an additional opportunity for corruption, and they have routinely used 
their presidential powers to enrich themselves as quickly as possible. It means that these presidents 
used to act as roving bandits  reducing investment and slowing growth (p. 1005). 
 
                                                 
72 The authors specified that, except for the East Asian NICs, the classification of countries and regions into one of the four cells in 
Table 3 is meant to be illustrative rather than definitive. 
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Additionally, corruption networks can be controlled by a significant number of independent 
monopolists in governments who tend to have long time horizons (1.4 in Table 3). This condition 
exists in India, Philippines, and in several regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, such as in Zambia under 
President Kaunda and Kenya under President Moi. Governments in these conditions tend to be 
weak and easily penetrated by their clients in civil societies who regularly use their clients in civil 
society to their patrons in government to extract unproductive re-distributive rents. Sometimes those 
rents go to some in the emerging middle classes, particularly when they are offered jobs in the 
public sector. Sometimes these rents go to capitalists and landlords who use their ties to their 
patrons in governments to gain and keep protection. In neither instance corruption is likely to exert 
a positive effect on investment or growth (p. 1004).    
 
In only one of the four possible combinations, namely the combination of stationary officials and 
strong centralized governments (1.2 in Table 3), corruption should have a positive effect on 
investments and growth. This combination appears to “capture the essence of the role of corruption 
in East Asia’s large developmental states. In this states, relatively strong, stable and autonomous 
central governments have used their discretionary power to create, allocate and protect new 
property rights (promotional privileges) for new groups in civil societies (capitalists and 
entrepreneurs). These governments’ developmental orientation appears to have led them to take a 
long-run view of corruption. Because of this they have invested heavily in public goods and they 
exercise near monopoly control over the corruption networks they have created. This allows them to 
offer promotional privileges in exchange for bribes and kickbacks that they use to consolidate their 
political power and enrich themselves” (p. 1005).  
 
So, we have seen that the impact of corruption on FDI and on economic growth differs among 
different countries, depending on the country size and on the industrial organization of corruption 
and the time horizon of those who control corruption networks. These observations lead us to better 
understand the “East Asian paradox”. But, does this paradox undermine the hypothesis that 
corruption reduces the flows of FDI and slows economic growth? Our answer is no, because 
“whatever its nature, more corruption necessarily means less investment and lower growth”. In fact, 
as noted by Campos et al. (1999: 1065), also “...East Asia’s miracle economies to move on their 
next stage of economic development would have to reduce the level of corruption”. The problem is 
that, to completely understand the impacts of corruption on developing countries, and especially on 
East Asian NICs, we have to consider the quality of growth and not just the size of the GDP per 
capita growth. It means that we have to consider the effects of corruption on economic 
development, and not just on economic growth.  
 
3.3. The relevance of the distinction between economic growth and economic development  
 
Although the term economic development is sometimes used as a synonymous for economic 
growth, generally it is employed to describe a change in a country’s economy involving quantitative 
as well as qualitative improvements. It means that although the level of per capita income is an 
important indicator of economic growth, it has considerable limitations as a comparative measure of 
economic development between countries and over time. In fact, according to the New Economic 
View, economic development is a multidimensional concept and it has to be redefined in terms of 
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the “reduction or elimination of poverty, inequity, and unemployment within the context of a 
growing economy” (Seers, 1969). As Sen (1999) post it: “Economic growth cannot be sensibly 
treated as an end in itself. Development has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead 
and the freedoms we enjoy”. It means that although corruption might have positive effects on the 
GDP per capita rates of growth of the East Asian NICs , this doesn’t necessary imply that the 
phenomenon has the same positive effects on the economic development of those countries. Thus, 
in presence of high levels of corruption, also the good effects of economic growth could disappear, 
or anyway, have a less positive impact than that which they could have without corruption. 
 
In effect, if we look at the Gini coefficient and at the Human Development Index (HDI) of East 
Asian countries, we can see this
73
. Figures below clearly show that if we consider these measures 
instead of GDP per capita growth, the East Asian paradox disappears. Actually, East Asian countries 
have higher inequality than North African and South Asian countries. Moreover, like most of the 
other developing countries, they have a “medium human development”, that is higher than that of 
sub-Saharan Africa, but lower than that of Latin America (see Table 4, Figures 5 and 6).  
 
Table 4. Corruption, Gini Coefficient and HDI 
 
 CPI  2008 Gini Index 2007-8
1
 HDI 2007-8
2
 
China 3.6 46.9 0.777 
Viet Nam 2.7 34.4 0.733 
Thailand  3.5 42.0 0.781 
Indonesia 2.6 34.0 0.728 
India  3.4 36.8 0.619 
Pakistan 2.5 30.6 0.511 
Mexico 3.6 46.1 0.829 
Peru 3.6 52.0 0.774 
Brazil 3.5 57.0 0.800 
Kenya 2.1 42.5 0.362 
Malawi 2.8 39.0 0,437 
Ghana 3.9 40.8 0,384 
Egypt 2.8 34.4 0.708 
Morocco 3.5 39.5 0.646 
    
Data Figures 5-6 CPI  2002-07   
East Asia 3.5 39.4 0.771(medium) 
South Asia and Philippines 2.5 37.6 0.611(medium) 
Latin America &Caribben 3.4 52,6 0.803(medium-high) 
Sub-Sahara Africa 2.7 45.9 0.493(low) 
Middle East and North Africa 3.1 37.7 0.699(medium) 
    
 
 
1. Gini index: a value of 0 represents absolute equality, and a value of 100 absolute inequality. 
2. Human Development Index (HDI): it ranges from 0 to 1, with the higher-scoring countries having "high human development" and the 
lower ones having "medium human development” or "low human development”. 
Source: Elaboration of the author. Data on Gini index and HDI are from UNDP (2007-08): Human Development Report. CPI data are from 
Transparency International (2008 and average 2002-07). 
 
 
In China, for example, the total costs of corruption are huge. The direct economic loss owing to 
                                                 
73 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of income and wealth. The HDI is a measure of human development among these 
three dimensions: longevity (approximated by life expectancy), knowledge (approximated by the literacy rate), and living standard 
(approximated by the “log” of real GDP per capita based on PPP).  
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corruption represents a large transfer of wealth, at least 3 percent of GDP per year, to a tiny group of 
elites (Minxin Pei, 2007: 5). This annual transfer, from the poorer to the richer, is fuelling China’s 
rapid increase in socioeconomic inequality and the public’s perception of social injustice. Second, 
the indirect costs of corruption, efficiency losses, waste and damage to the environment, public 
health, education, the credibility of key public institutions are incalculable. The high price China is 
already paying is ample evidence that the toll of corruption is not theoretical. For example, the bill 
for bailing out China’s state-owned banks, prime victims of corruption in the financial sector, is 
close to $ 500 billion (Minxin Pei, 2007: 6). Corruption at the local level sparks uncountable 
insurrections and violent collective protests each year, undermining social stability and 
necessitating extra spending on internal security.  
 
Figure 5. Corruption and the HDI (2007-08). 
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Figure 6. Corruption and Gini Coefficient (2008). 
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Corruption has also contributed to China’s massive environmental degradation, deterioration in 
social services, and the raising costs of housing, health care, and education. As noted by Minxin Pai 
(2007: 5), “so far, high savings, strong trade performance, and favorable demographics have 
allowed Beijing to counterbalance the direct costs of corruption and maintain growth. But 
corruption has lowered the quality of China’s economic growth because its economic expansion has 
been accompanied by assorted social ills, many of which will require heavy investment to correct. 
With a lower level of corruption, China would have achieved growth of a higher quality, with much 
less damage to the economic efficiency, public health, social stability and environment. High-
quality growth is more sustainable than low-quality growth “(Minxin Pei, 2007: 5). 
 
Moreover, also the other East Asian countries, namely Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and 
Indonesia, have all paid an high price for corruption. South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia 
experienced spectacular financial collapses during the Asian financial crises a decade ago, in part 
due to the substantial corruption in their financial and corporate sectors. Japan’s economy stagnated 
for a decade, and corruption scandals have caused financial strains in the banking sector and 
contaminated the entire political establishment.  
 
Therefore, as underlined by Campos et al. (1999: 1065), “whatever the degree of predictability 
(dependent on industrial organization of corruption and the time horizon of governments), more 
corruption necessarily means less investment and less economic growth. Hence, to justify 
corruption on the basis of the East Asian paradox is misleading. There still is much to learn about 
corruption and economic development. Research on this matter is very much in a nascent stage
74
. 
One issue that certainly needs studying is the implication of highly organized (and thus more 
predictable) forms of corruption for sustaining high rates of growth….The implication here is that 
for East Asia’s miracle economies to move on their next stage of economic development, they would 
have to reduce the level of corruption”. 
 
Summarizing, we have argued that high economic growth, such as that of East Asian NICs, does not 
necessary mean economic development. In fact, the research into the consequences of corruption on 
growth in GDP per capita and the constituents of growth have provided many useful and important 
insights, but there still remains a lot to learn about the links among welfare, sustainable 
development and corruption. Ultimately, development is about sustainable improvements in human 
welfare, and it is widely recognized that GDP per capita is not a complete measure of this. 
 
In recent years, progress has been made in constructing empirical measures of sustainability and in 
developing the underlying theory (Dasgputa, 2001; Hamilton and Clemens, 1999). Sustainable 
development is related to an economy’s ability to maintain living standards through time. More 
precisely, Arrow et al. (2004) suggest that an economy is sustainable at a given point in time if its 
intertemporal social welfare at that time is not decreasing. The most important determinant of 
intertemporal social welfare is an economy’s productive base. This base consists of all its capital 
                                                 
74 The authors have written this in 1999, but also today the research on this matter is scarce.  
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assets, including manufactured capital, human capital, natural capital, and the knowledge base, and 
its institutions. The change in the productive base is called genuine investment. It can be express as 
the sum of values of investment or disinvestment in the underlying capital assets, where the assets 
are priced at the social opportunity cost
75
. As shown by Dasgputa and Maler (2000), intertemporal 
social welfare is non-decreasing if and only if genuine investment is non-negative. “Thus, if one can 
in someway measure empirically genuine investment or, equivalently, the change in an economy’s 
genuine wealth over time, then one can start asking questions about sustainable development and 
its links to corruption” (Aidt, 2009: 284). Based on the recent work of Dasgputa (2001) on genuine 
wealth, Aidt (2009) took the first step in that direction and presented some new results that show a 
strong negative correlation between corruption and growth in genuine wealth per capita. “This 
correlation is surprisingly robust. In particular, it applies equally to perceived corruption and to 
managers’ actual experience with corruption76… moreover it demonstrates the fact that corruption 
is a likely source of unsustainable development” (Aidt, 2009: 272).  
 
4. Corruption and Organized Crime  
We believe that nowadays more than ever, it is important to admit that corruption is not an isolated 
phenomena, but it is strongly related to organized crime. Because of weak institutions and fragile 
laws, in countries where corruption is widespread, also organized crime is widespread. 
Consequently, differently from what has been done until now, it is necessary to study the effects of 
the two phenomena jointly considered, rather than the effects of each phenomenon singularly 
considered.  
 
 
4.1. Review of the theoretical literature on organized crime 
 
Organized crime is present in almost every country in the world. In addition to the well-known 
Italian and American mafias, examples include the Yakuza in Japan, the Triads in Hong Kong, 
Green Gang in Shanghai, Colombian and Mexican drug cartels, numerous grouping in post-Soviet 
states, youths gangs in Los Angeles, New York, Soweto an San Paolo
77
. 
 
As with corruption, one of the difficulties of studying organized crime is how to define it. 
Organized crime is, in fact, complex to define and measure because it is usually carried out 
clandestinely and away from the public eye and records. A good starting point to define and 
measure organized crime is to think about the nature of its economic activity and its relationship 
with the legal economy and the political process
78
.  
                                                 
75 Based on the work of Hamilton and Clemens (1999), the World Bank has for the last 10 years published measures of genuine 
investment. See World Development Indicators (various years). The World Development Indicators use the term “genuine saving”. 
Here, we follow Arrow et al. (2004) and Aidt (2009) and use the term “genuine investment”. 
76 We have discussed the difference between perceived-indices and WBES in Section 2. 
77 For the Italian mafias see Arlacchi (1986); Hess (1993) and Gambetta (1993). For the American Mafias see Reuter (1995) and 
Jacobs et al. (1999). For the Russian and Japanese mafias see Varese (2001) and Hill (2006), respectively.  All cited in Kumar and 
Skaperdas (2008). 
78 An  anthology of definitions on organized crime, together with a rich bibliography on the subject, can be found in Lampe (2006, 
2008), cited in Daniele 2009. 
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The economic activity of organized crime varies from the manufacturing and sale of illegal goods 
and services (such as drugs, arms, gambling, prostitution, etc..) to the trade of legal goods and 
services (such as, for example, construction, rubbish collection, food distribution, etc..), to 
protection and extortion (Konrad and Skaperdas, 1998: 461). The United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime adopts a wide-ranging definition to describe an organized 
criminal group, defining it as “a structured group, committing serious crimes for profit”.79  
 
With the term organized crime we refer here to the definition accepted by the majority of 
criminologists who describe organized crime as criminal activities for material benefit by groups 
that engage in extreme violence, corruption of public officials, including law enforcement and 
judicial officers, penetration of the legitimate economy (e.g. through extortion and money-
laundering) and interference in the political process (Kenney and Finckenauer, 1995; Levi, 2002, 
cited in Van Dijk, 2007). These elements are used as operational definitions by the European police 
community (Levi, 2002), and they are also incorporated in anti-Mafia laws of some countries, 
including Italy, USA, and Hungary (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). 
 
To date, there has been relatively little theoretical work on the economics of organized crime. This 
could be partially related to the old debate on the utility of economic models for understanding 
individuals’ choices in non traditional areas, such as in crime80. On one hand, there were the 
economists of American tradition who were generally more persuaded about the possibility to 
develop economic models based on rational choice also for “non traditional” activities. European 
economists, on the other side, have normally been skeptical to adopt the typical economic tools 
outside traditional areas of research. This was due to the prevalent belief that individual’s behaviors 
in those areas could not truly be understood using the economic model of rational choice. 
Consequently, according to this view, individuals’ behaviors in illegal activities, not being 
economically rational, had to be left to a sociological analysis of pathologies and deviations 
(Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995:2-4). 
 
However, Becker’s (1968) pioneering article showed that even individuals who are involved in 
illegal activities, i.e. criminal activities, behave rationally. In fact, according to the Becker’s (1968) 
standard economic model of crime, an individual rationally decides whether or not to commit crime 
and how much crime to commit, by comparing benefits and costs of crime with those of alternative 
(legitimate) activities. Consequently, crime becomes less attractive if the government enhances the 
probability and severity of punishment. Or alternatively, crime becomes less attractive if there is an 
increase of opportunities in the legal market
81. Becker’s key result was that given that imposing a 
                                                 
79 This very broad definition was favored over the list of the most common types of organized crime such as trafficking in drugs, 
arms, persons, stolen cars or protected species and terrorism (Van Dijk, 2007). 
 
80 Notice that, clearly, this  debate has also influenced the economic analysis of corruption. 
81As put by Becker (1968: 390)”: some individuals become criminals because of the financial and other rewards from crime 
compared to legal work, taking account of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity of punishment. The 
amount of crime is determined not only by the rationality and preference of would-be criminals but also by the economic and social 
environment created by public policies, including expenditure on police, punishments for different crimes, and opportunities for 
employment, schooling, and training programs”. 
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fine is costless, this fine should equal an individual’s total wealth and be complemented by a 
probability of punishment to optimally deter crime. Summarizing, Becker’s (1968) main 
contribution was “to demonstrate that optimal policies to combat illegal behavior are part of an 
optimal allocation of resources” and that “the economic framework becomes applicable to, and 
helps enrich, the analysis of illegal behavior”. 
 
Following the Beckerian approach, most of the economic analysis of crime have been focused on 
individual agents’ optimal allocative choice between legal and illegal activities in different 
deterrence systems and with different opportunity costs. More specifically, as underlined by 
Garoupa (1997), the economic discussion on crime has been concentrated on different descriptions 
of optimal penalties and enforcement strategies in the context of partial equilibrium models where 
the normative criteria is to minimize a given welfare function which measures the social loss 
resulting from crime. For example, Stigler (1970), Ehrlich (1973) and Polinsky and Shavell 
(1979,2000), confirming Becker’s(1968) result, showed that it is essential to increase enforcement 
efficiency and sanction severity in order to increase expected punishment and consequently reduce 
criminal activity.  
 
Focusing on organized crime as a group rather than on a single criminal, the economic literature has 
also stressed welfare comparisons between monopoly and competitive supply of illegal activities. 
For example, Buchanan (1973) argued that monopoly in the supply of illegal activities is socially 
desirable. Backhaus (1979), instead, distinguished various cases in which Buchanan’s (1973) 
argument is certainly not applicable.
82
  
Shelling (1971-1984a,b) provided accurate descriptions and analysis of how a well-organized 
criminal group (such as the mafia) may be able to extort payments from firms in return for 
providing protection from other criminals and enforcement of property rights. In this sense, the 
mafia can be seen as an alternative tax collector and provider of public goods (i.e.: property rights 
protection and contract enforcement), which deprives the government of some of its tax revenues 
(cited in Alexeev et al., 2004:376).  
 
Grossman (1995) studied a model of a “kleptocratic” State which aims to maximize political rent by 
imposing taxes and supplying public services.  As in Shelling (1984a,b)  the criminal organization, 
i.e. the Mafia, competes in providing such services and in collecting taxes. According to the model, 
the competition between the State and the Mafia has the positive effect of increase net social 
welfare, due to the fact that in order to face the Mafia’s competition the State reduces its taxation 
and increases the quantity of public services provided. However, the Mafia has a disruptive effect 
on the State’s provision of public goods. If the disruption is reasonably small, its only effect is to 
decrease the amount of rents collected by the State. On the other hand, if the disruption is 
sufficiently large, the State does not collect rents and the Mafia controls the whole economy
83
.   
                                                 
82
  Dick (1995) presented an analysis in which transaction costs, better than monopoly command, principally determine the 
activities of organized crime.   
83Similarly to Grossman (1995), Alexeev et al. (2004) analyzed the taxation behavior of a revenue-maximizing government in the 
presence of the Mafia as a competing tax collector, and in the presence of tax evasion. The authors assume that firms choosing to 
avoid taxes must shift some of their sales underground, sustaining some costs. However, differently from Grossman (1995), in the 
presence of Mafia the government’s optimal tax rate and revenues depend on how important public goods are for the firms. In 
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Although, Shelling (1984a,b)  and Grossman (1995) have significantly contributed to the literature 
on organized crime, however they have under evaluated an important distinctive aspect of organized 
crime: the violence. This aspect has, instead, been analyzed by Konrad and Skaperdas (1997). 
 
Konrad and Skaperdas (1997, 1998) studied the activity of extortion of productive enterprises by 
organized crime, arguing that: “the main harm of extortion comes from the long-run erosion and 
distortion of useful production, as well as from the destruction of property that can occur in 
equilibrium” (1998:461). The authors found also that “ gangs may increase their activity in 
response to increased police protection”, moreover: “often, but not always, forward-looking gangs 
induce lower resource waste than myopic gangs”  (1998:461). 
 
Following Konrad and Skaperdas (1997), Garoupa (1997) analyzed a model in which the criminal 
organization is a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through 
extortion. The author introduced asymmetric information, arguing that on the basis of the principal’s 
information set, threats may or may not be credible. If the principal is sufficiently informed, his 
threats are credible and he can fully extract rents from the agents. In this case, a tougher policy 
should be chosen against organized crime, as argued by the standard theory. However, when the 
principal is not completely informed, his threats are not credible and he cannot fully extract rents 
from the agents, then he reacts violently. In this particular case, a tougher law enforcement policy 
might not be the best policy applicable against organized crime. In fact a tougher policy may induce 
more destruction, as “in a sense there is competition between the government and the criminal 
organization to decide who is tougher, who is more frightful. As a consequence, the loss in welfare 
can be large” (Garoupa, 1997: 14).  
 
More recently, Kumar and Skaperdas (2008) argued that organized crime emerges in areas of weak 
state control (anarchy) or in areas with power vacuums created by geography, political, ethnic, and 
social distance, as well as in areas with legal vacuums that might be created by the prohibition of 
certain goods and services within modern states. According to the authors, though competition is 
good in economics, in the case of organized crime the predatory competition that is more likely to 
take place is harmful. The costs of organized crime include the resources expended on appropriation 
and predation, instead of production; investment distortions; contractual problems; and the 
incentives for the development of human skills that are biased towards appropriation instead of 
towards production (p:13). 
 
Among the few macroeconomic studies which have provided a formalization of the impact of 
organized crime on local income, there are those of Centorrino and Signorino (1993, 1997). In their 
first work the authors used a simple model of Keynesian derivation in which, commencing from an 
equation of aggregate demand, a “multiplier of the criminal expenditure” was obtained. The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
particular, if public goods are significant, either the state’s tax rate or income from taxes are lower in the presence of Mafia than 
without it. On the other hand, when public goods are irrelevant, the government gains from the mafia’s taxation of the firms’ 
underground activities. In this case, in fact, the economies exhibit high official tax rates and low government supplying of public 
goods.  
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analysis showed that an increase in consumption of illegal goods has a depressive effect on income. 
In fact, illegal consumption (considered as imports) removes income from other categories. In the 
same paper, Centorrino and Signorino (1993) analyzed also the case in which income deriving from 
illegal sector is ascribable to people resident within the economy and such income represents a 
fraction of the consumption of illegal goods. In this case, the total impact on aggregate income 
depends on the value of spending of the illegal income preceptors within the economy, and on their 
propensity to consume. The limits of this  model consist not only of the difficulties of estimating the 
parameters, but also of the fact that the illegal sector was made to coincide with the drug market, so 
that the model resulted difficult to empirically apply in the case of Italy and other States in which 
organized crime tends to assume different forms (extortion, for example). 
 
Taking into account these limitations, Centorrino and Signorino (1997) developed a more advanced 
model, in which they analyzed the impact of the “mafia tax” on the economy’s financial and credit 
systems, and they propose estimates of money-laundering. The results showed that organized crime 
generates a “fiscal gap” due to lack of revenues. Additionally, the presence of organized crime 
reduces legal income, because of the depressive effects it produces on the local economy. 
Centorrino and Signorino (1997) estimated an equation of the impact of criminality on total fiscal 
revenues, accounting also for the income not produced in the economy because of the mafia’s 
presence. The results showed that, in Italy, the loss of revenues due to income not produced in the 
economy because of the mafia presence,  in that year was equal to the 0.7% of GDP. To this should 
be added the lost fiscal revenue due to evasion induced by the same mafia presence (cited in 
Daniele 2009). 
 
 
4.2. Review of the empirical literature on crime and organized crime 
 
The micro-theory we have summarized above has served as a framework for the majority of the 
empirical works on crime.  
 
One of the first and most significant empirical analysis of crime has been that by Ehrlich (1973). 
The author presented a regression analysis of variations of index crimes across US states in 1940, 
1950 and 1960. Precisely, the estimated log-linear equation is the following: 
 
Where the dependent variable is the number of reported crimes (C) of a particular type divided by 
the population of the state (N) in the same year.
84
 Two deterrent variables were included in the 
structural equation for each type of crime: the number of  imprisonments (I) divided by the number 
of reported crimes (C), and the average time (T) spent by offenders in jail for each category of 
crime. The three other variables included are socioeconomic variables which do not change for 
different types of crime: the median income of families in the state (W), the percentage of families 
                                                 
84 Notice that seven different types of crime were examined: assault, rape, murder, burglary, larceny and auto theft. 
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who are below the half  of the median income (X), and the percentage of nonwhite people in the 
population (NW)
85
.  
 
As predicted by the Beckerian theoretical models of crime, the two deterrent variables were found 
to be negatively correlated to the rate of crime. Additionally, for most of the seven different types of 
crime, the impact of a more certain punishment on the rate of crime is greater than that of a more 
severe punishment.
86
 The three socioeconomic variables, were generally found to be significant and 
positively correlated to the rate of crime, as expected. 
 
Some other interesting studies based on aggregative cross-section data can be found in Sjoquist 
(1973), Carr-Hill and Stern (1973), Phillips and Votey (1975), Avio and Clark (1976), and 
Mathieson and Passell (1976)
87
. Notice that despite widely different datasets, these investigations 
have shown very similar results. The finding that punishment deters crime, in fact, is reasonably 
robust for different geographic areas and using different statistical techniques.  However, as noted 
by Taylor (1978), not all the statistical findings about particular types of crimes and punishments 
are equally robust. In fact, a number of statistical results in this area have been shown to be 
particularly sensitive to the chosen data set and the way the data set is employed to obtain statistical 
estimates (p: 66).  After the evaluation of  the cross section studies discussed above and some time 
series studies ( i.e.: Ehrlich, 1975; Passel and Taylor, 1977; and Forst et al., 1977), Taylor (1978) 
concluded that :”..much additional research is required to clarify a number of important issues 
before the results can be used with any confidence. To mention a few: the theoretical rationale for 
including or excluding variables and for using a particular functional form
88
, the estimation of 
efficient trade-offs using complete models, the quality of the data and the quantitative importance of 
measurement error
89
, and a reconciliation of time-series and cross-section results” (p: 75). Notice 
that we cite Taylor (1978) not only because his work is a complete review worth to be mentioned, 
but also because we think that his criticisms are still valid after more than 30 years, and they still 
represent important inputs for further research. 
 
Another interesting, even if dated, survey of the economics of crime deterrence can be found in 
Cameron (1988), from which emerged that previous empirical studies could not provide evidence 
that policy reduce crime, probably due to simultaneity issues. The problem of simultaneity is due to 
the fact that usually the criminal justice system does respond to observed crime levels. This means 
that higher level of control by the criminal justice system can increase following an increase of the 
                                                 
85Notice that Ehrlich’s (1973) analysis considered also other explanatory variables, however his basic empirical results were based on 
these five.   
86 This means to say that the magnitude (in absolute terms ) of the estimated coefficient b1 exceeds that of b2. 
87 All cited in Taylor (1978). Notice that these analyses represented a wide geographic range of data: states and cities in the U.S, 
provinces in Canada, police districts in the U.K, counties in California, and policy precincts in New York City. Moreover, some of 
them examined only the total crime rate, while others disaggregated by categories of crime. Approximately all the studies utilized 
some kind of simultaneous equation technique (generally two stage last squares), but report also ordinary last squares estimates.  
88Specifically, Taylor (1978) accused a lack of theory in most of the empirical works he had reviewed. In fact, the author noticed that 
some studies included variables that other studies excluded, and that sometimes this inconsistency was evident even in studies by the 
same author. As the accurate exclusion of predetermined variables is crucial for identifying structural equations, the lack of a formal 
theory had convinced some critics that the empirical results were unreliable.  
89 We relay on recorded crime, but, as well recognized, many crimes are not reported. This is why the set of observations for crime is 
affected by serious measurement problems. 
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crime rate. Then the resulting estimate may reflect the behavior of the criminal justice system rather 
than that of criminals, as first observed by Taylor (1978: 59-62).  
 
Levitt (1996, 1997, 1998) tried to solve the simultaneity problems, founding that: i) increases of 
prison populations seem to substantially reduce the crime rate (1996); ii) increases in the size of 
police forces considerably reduce violent crime, but have a smaller impact on property crime 
(1997); iii) juvenile offenders appear to be at least as responsive to criminal sanctions as adults 
(1998). 
 
Lately, Marselli and Vannini (1997) estimated a crime equation using a panel dataset of Italian 
regions for the period 1980-1989. The authors considered four different categories of crime: 
robbery, theft, murder and fraud. The results relative to the first three categories contrasted with the 
predictions of the Beckerian economic model of crime, while those concerning fraud supported the 
traditional hypothesis. Interestingly, the authors introduced organized crime into the estimated crime 
equation
90
. Note that until then, the empirical literature on crime had usually ignored the 
phenomenon of organized crime.  
 
At this point it’s important to specify that complex crime (i.e. organized crime as defined at the 
beginning of this paragraph) must be analyzed separately from volume crime (i.e. common crime, 
such as robbery, theft, fraud,..). The world map of organized crime, in fact, differs fundamentally 
from that of common crime.
91
 While in many western countries the level of common crime has 
declined, that of corruption and organized crime has not (Lambsdorff, 2006; Van Dijk, 2007). As 
noticed by Van Dijk and Nevala (2002), organized crime and common crime are determined by 
different factors at the macro level. These observations confirm that it is necessary to use different 
indexes in order to measure organized crime and common crime. More specifically, while it is now 
well-accepted that the level of common crime across countries can be effectively estimated by using 
standardized victimization surveys among the public (i.e: the International Crime Victim Survey, 
ICVS)
92
, the level of complex crime cannot be correctly measured using the ICVS. Some 
international organizations, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Europol, 
have suggested the use of administrative data, such as the number of arrests or convictions for 
involvement in organized crime, as indicators of the level of these type of crimes across countries. 
However, number of arrests or convictions for involvement in organized crime are likely to reflect 
police performance rather than the true extent of criminal activities, as appropriately observed by 
Van Dijk (2007: 40). The case of measuring levels of crime independently of the police is even 
stronger with regard organized crime than regarding common crime (Van Dijk, 2007: 40). Van Dijk 
(2007), specified three defining characteristics of organized crime: instrumental violence, 
corruption of public officials and money laundering. Consequently, he constructed a Composite 
Organized Crime Index (OCPI) combining five interrelated proxy indicators of perceived 
                                                 
90
 Organized crime is proxied by the total number of homicides. Even if this is not the best measure for criminal 
organizations, however the authors have been the first to empirically investigate the determinants of organized crime. 
91
 See Figures 8 a) and 8 b) in appendix for the World and European Maps of Organized Crime presented by Van Dijk 
(2007).  
92
 See for example: Van Dijk et al, 1990; United Nations, 1999; Kury, 2001; Nieuwbeerta, 2002; Lynch, 2006. All cited in Van Dijk 
(2007). 
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prevalence of organized crime, specifically: racketeering, unsolved homicides, grand corruption, 
money-laundering and the extent of the black economy. The author found that the overall ICVS 
rates of victimization by common crime and the perceived prevalence of organized crime (measured 
by OCPI) were not significantly related (r=0.02).
93
 As clearly shown in the scatter plot in next page. 
 
Now that we have clarified the distinction between crime and organized crime, we can continue 
with the literature review of empirical work on organized crime. The empirical studies we have 
reviewed above, starting from Erlich (1973), had mainly been conducted in order to test the validity 
of the Beckerian economic model of crime, more specifically to test if effectively punishment deters 
crime. Additionally, a large number of empirical studies aimed at examining the socio-economic 
determinants of crime. Many studies, for example, have focused on the relationship between 
unemployment and crime or on the influence of social and cultural variables on crime rates (see, 
e.g.: Gordon, 1971; Freeman, 2000; Levitt, 2001).  However, those studies have paid less attention 
to the socio-economic effects of crime, and they have ignored the phenomenon of organized crime. 
Here, instead, we want to review the empirical analyses which have been concentrated on organized 
crime and on its effects on economic growth and development. 
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 See Figures 8 a) and 8 b) in appendix for the World and European Maps of Organized Crime presented by Van Dijk 
(2007). 
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Here, instead, we want to review the empirical analyses which have been concentrated on organized 
crime and on its effects on economic growth and development. 
 
Some recent studies have shown that high levels of organized crime can obstruct development and 
weaken the economy (see, e.g.: Peri, 2004; Centorrino and Ofria, 2008, Caruso, 2008; and Ciaccio, 
2009 for the case of Italy; Brand and Prise, 2000 for UK; United Nations, 2007 for Central 
America). For example, Peri (2004) analyzed the effects of organized crime on long-term economic 
growth of the Italian provinces for the period 1951-1999. The roles of several variables were 
examined, among which a proxy of “social capital” (civic involvement as defined by Putnam, 1993) 
and the level of crime proxied by murder rates. The author found strong evidence that the presence 
of organized crime is associated with low economic development, even after controlling for other 
economic and geographic factors. According to the econometric estimate, some provinces in Sicily 
and in Calabria had seen a growth in employment lower than 1.2% per year for forty years, because 
of the high crime rate. 
 
Clearly, the presence of organized crime imposes significant economic and social costs. The costs 
are varied: there are those sustained by the victims (private costs), those relative to the expenses of 
protection and prevention or those for the police and judicial apparatus (public costs). Such costs 
are monetary costs and fall directly on both private individuals and on the community.  In a wider 
sense, organized crime imposes also a different type of costs that, differently from those discussed 
above, are not monetary payments but consist of “notional costs” that society as a whole sustains in 
the form of lost opportunities for development, a reduction in the rates of growth or lost investment. 
Such costs can be compared to “negative externality” that bear on everyone, not only those directly 
interested by criminal phenomena (Daniele, 2009: p.3). For example, in the case of mafia, “external 
costs” derive from the infiltration of the mafia into the Institutions, from the appropriation of part of 
public expenditure, from the distortion of markets or from the creation of a local socio-institutional 
climate that is unfavorable to investment by legitimate firms. These costs can translate into lower 
productivity, loss of investments, the flight of companies or, more generally, on a rate of 
productivity growth lower than the potential (Daniele, 2009: p.3)
94
. Estimates of the social costs of 
organized crime have been obtained for some countries: for UK by Brand and Price (2000), and  for 
Central America by United Nations (2007).  
 
Caruso (2008) presented a panel analysis of the twenty Italian regions for the period 1997-2003. 
The author showed that there exist: i) a significant positive association between public investments 
and the index of organized crime; ii) a significant positive association between investments in real 
estate and the index of organized crime; iii) a significant negative association between social 
protection and the index of organized crime; iv) a significant negative association between private 
investment and the index of organized crime. Of particular interest for our empirical research, is the 
index of organized crime used by the author. In order to measure the extent of complex crime (i.e. 
organized criminality), Caruso (2008) adopted the index developed by the Italian National Institute 
                                                 
94  Briefly, the total costs that crime imposes include: i) private costs sustained directly by  private citizens; ii) public costs 
which are the payments for the collective measures of  prevention and suppression; iii) “external”, “notional” or “social 
costs”(Daniele, 2009: p.3) 
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of Statistics (ISTAT). This index has been calculated accounting for the number of murders 
attributable to the Italian biggest criminal associations (Mafia, Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta”), the 
number of bomb attacks, arsons, thefts and “serious” robberies. Notice that this index is based on 
events through which the organized criminality has manifested its presence. Clearly, this kind of 
index does not “capture” the activities which don’t have a violent materialization (Caruso, 2008: 
15). 
 
In a recent paper, Ciaccio (2009) examined the major effects of organized crime on the economy of 
South Italy, focusing in particular on the effects on local public services costs. The econometric 
analysis confirmed the hypothesis that criminal associations increase the cost of local public 
services, especially those of collection and disposal of waste material.  
 
A criminal cost, which is rarely considered, derives from the fact that the criminal presence tends to 
discourage both domestic and foreign investment. If we think about one of the most prosperous 
activities of the organized criminality, which is extortion racket, we can easily understand why it 
increases the risks and costs of doing business (possible attacks, intimidation and the destruction of 
property). According to the World Economic Forum survey (WEF 2004), business executives in 
many high crime countries mention crime as the most or second most important impediment to 
doing business in their countries (cited in Daniele and Marani, 2010). Basile (2001), Pazienza et al. 
(2005), Daniele (2007) and Daniele and Marani (2010) using data on certain crimes, have shown 
how crime negatively influences FDI in Italian regions (cited in Daniele, 2009). Kumar and 
Skaperdas (2008) have shown that criminality lowers the quantity of productive investment. 
 
Daniele and Marani (2010), for example, have examined the impact of crime on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows in the Italian provinces, showing that crime represents a deterrent for 
foreign investors, suggesting that high levels of crimes may be perceived as a signal of a local 
socio-institutional environment unfavorable for FDI. This confirms the negative impact of 
organized crime on investments.  
 
As argued before, one of the main difficulties of studying organized crime, is that it is not easy to 
quantify. In fact, data are often lacking and, for certain crimes, the number of complaints tends to 
under-report the effective dimension of the phenomenon.
95
 In spite of these limitations, Daniele and 
Marani (2010) based their calculations on official data in order to estimate the incidence of different 
crimes. Note that not all offences are typical of organized crime: some, such as theft, corruption or 
sexual violence generally are not typical of criminal organizations. For these reasons, and on the 
basis of studies on the subject, the authors constructed an index of organized crime given by the 
sum of only four crimes: extortion, bomb attacks, arson and criminal associations.
96
 To estimate the 
impact of crime on FDI, Daniele and Marani (2010) use panel data (observations for 103 Italian 
                                                 
95 For this reason, most of the scholars use perception indexes, based on surveys, to measure organized crime. See, e.g. Van Dijk and 
Terlouw (1996);  Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003) and Van Dijk (2007). 
96 Criminal associations is measured by considering the number of people denounced for criminal association (type of crimes as 
specified by Italian Penal Code). The sum of the four indexes is constructed per 10,000 inhabitants. All data on crime is collected by 
the Italian national institute of statistics (Istat). 
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provinces for the period 2002–2006) and different estimation procedures. The empirical study uses 
a log-linear equation with the following form:  
 
where i represents province, t time and wit =ei+uit is the error term. The dependent variable is the 
log of FDI inflow in the provinces
97
, Xi,t−1 is a set of lagged control variables
98
, while Crime is a 
measure of the incidence of crime (as illustrated above). 
 
Economic empirical analyses on organized crime at a cross country level are almost inexistent, this 
is due to the fact that there are not many measures to consistently quantify the phenomenon at an 
international level. Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003), Van Dijk (2007) and Sung (2004) have 
empirically analyzed criminal organizations for a cross-section of countries.
99
 Notice that all these 
studies focus on the determinants of the phenomenon rather than on its effects on economic growth. 
Particularly, Van Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003) and  Van Dijk (2007) concentrate  on the common 
determinants of corruption and organized crime, and empirically test the correlation between an 
index of OC and measures of the rule of law and development. Sung (2004)
100
, instead, evaluates 
two hypothesis of predatory organized crime: the State failure hypothesis and the economic failure 
hypothesis. The finding that a corrupt  judiciary deprives a nation of effective institutional defense 
against organized crim, and an active underground economy provides criminal sindacates with 
ample opportunities to expand their influence and legitimacy among ordinary citizens. However, 
denial of political freedoms and high unemployment seem to do not contribute to the diffusion of 
OC. 
 
In Figure 8 we show the World Map and the European Map of the Composite Organized Crime 
Index built by Van Dijk (2007). As specified above, this index combines five interrelated proxy 
indicators of perceived prevalence of organized crime, specifically: racketeering, unsolved 
homicides, grand corruption, money-laundering and the extent of the black economy.
101
  
The World Map clearly shows that in Asia rates are the worst in parts of South Asia (Pakistan, 
Bangladesh), but also China and India are rated unfavorably. In the international literature India is 
rarely the focus of attention. Research on Chinese organized crime is mainly focused on Chinese 
expatriates. Relatively to homeland China, the limited research that is available concentrates on the 
collusion between corrupt communist party members and local gangs in remote areas (i.e.Zhang, 
2001). This seems to show that more research on the role of organized crime-corruption in these 
two emerging superpowers is needed. With regard to Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique have 
the highest scores.Nigerian organized crime activity has been well-documented, both at a national 
level as well as at regional level (see, e.g. Shaw, 2003; UNODC, 2005); while a detailed analysis of 
                                                 
97The data on FDI inflow in the Italian provinces are collected by UIC (the Italian Office of Exchange) 
98 Control variables related to the economic dimension of the province are: market size as approximated by two variables: the log of 
the resident population in each province and the share of provincial GDP of that of the region;  log of GDP per capita; a measure of 
the degree of openness of the provincial economy, calculated by exports of GDP and a proxy of R&D activities. Control variables 
related to the economic structure of the province are: share of medium and large firms (with more than 50 employees) of the total 
number, and the number of firms in nonagricultural sectors per 1000 people; an index of total infrastructural endowment. 
99
 Notice that Sung (2004) has analyzed the determinants of organized crime, but not its effects on economic growth.  
100
 The OC index used by Sung (2004) is that provided by the World Economic Forum. The same we use for some 
simple statistical analyses whose results are shown in Appendix (Figure 9 and following). 
101
 The map is drown for 112 countries, however Van Dijk (2007) does not clearly specify the period of time for which 
the index has been buit.  
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how criminal organizations penetrate state and businesses in southern Africa, notably in 
Mozambique, is given by Gastrow (2003).  As we would expect, in Latin America, the countries 
with the highest scores are: Haiti, Paraguay, Venezuela and Colombia. Within Europe,  organized 
crime prevalence increases diagonally from the north west to the south east, with low levels in 
United Kingdom and Germany, and higher levels in Spain and Italy. The highest scores, however, 
are in Russia, Albania and Ukraine. The annual surveys of the World Economic Forum point at 
incremental improvements in some of the new members of the European Union. 
 
 
  
The empirical analysis of organized crime at a cross-country level may now  start to develop given 
that the World Economic Forum has been publishing the Organized Crime Perception Index since 
1997. This index is based on the perceptions of leading business executives about the country in 
which they operate. Organized Crime is ranked in a 1-to-7 scale survey question that askes whether 
the respondent perceives that racketeering and extortion are imposing significant costs on 
businesses.  In Table 7 in Appendix we show the OC perception index ranking for 152 countries for 
the period 1997-2012.  We  also use this index in order to run important preliminary statistical 
analyses that  confirm the positive correlation between corruption and organized crime and the 
negative effect that criminal organizations have on the economy (see Figure 9 and following in 
Appendix). From the simple correlation between the perception index of organized crime and the 
GDP pc, as shown in the scatterplot in Figure 9, it can clearly been seen that Italy is an outlier, 
carachterized by a widespread criminal organizations and a rather high level of GDP pc. For this 
reason, and given the availability of data on Mafia-related crimes at a regional level, we will 
empirically investigate the effects of OC and corruption on economic growth for the case of Italy 
(Chapter 3).  
 
4.3. Corruption and Organized Crime: Some previous microeconomic and empirical studies  
 
Given the secretive nature of both corruption and organized criminal activities, it is difficult to 
produce data on the extent of corruption attributable to organized crime. However, evidence shows 
that in many parts of the world there are deep interdependent links between organized crime, 
politics and the public sector, developing, in extreme cases, a form of symbiosis between the state 
and criminal organizations.
102
 Organized crime, in fact, usually involves the complicity or direct 
participation of the public sector.  A lot of cases and examples suggest strong linkages between 
organized crime and public sector corruption, with criminal networks deeply depending on 
corruption to ensure the circulation of illicit goods, facilitate money laundering and racketing, and 
minimize the risks of prosecution. In most countries, corruption of public officials, including law 
enforcement and court officers, is a common activity of organized crime that consents to criminal 
organizations to ensure endurance and reduce the risk of being arrested and prosecuted (Van Dijk, 
2007).
103
 
 
                                                 
102  Italy, for example, is a country traditionally known for deep interdependent links between organized crime, politics and the 
public sector. 
103   See also Shelley (1995), Buscaglia and Gonzalez-Ruiz (2002). 
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Shaw (2002) noted that the weakening and criminalization of the State is often a component of 
organized crime, with government actors (politicians) also involved in criminal activities. This can 
be observed in countries like Nigeria, Liberia and Ghana. More recently, Mazzitelli (2007) explored 
the different factors that contribute to criminal activities in West Africa, founding that organized 
crime is determined by inequalities in wealth, high population growth, rapid and uncontrolled 
urbanization, natural resources economies and “patrimonial” conception of the state. Moreover, the 
author affirmed that West Africa is an ideal place for structured criminal networks since risks are 
reduced as a result of poor governance: weak state institutions, weak rule of law and enforcement 
agencies. Sergi and Querimi(2007) studied the relationships between corruption and socio-
economic development and between organized crime and socio-economic development, in the 
context of South-East Europe. The authors noted that both corruption and organized crime are 
prevalent in the region, stressing that the key problem is a weak rule of law (i.e. inefficient judicial 
systems and weak enforcement control). 
 
From what we have argued above, the connections between organize crime and corruption seems to 
be very clear; although most experts highlight their interdependent nature, the research explicitly 
focusing on the links between the two phenomena is still poor and incomplete (especially from a 
macroeconomic point of view), as well as the research focused on their combined effects on 
economic growth and development. Most of the literature, in fact, focus on the microeconomic 
aspects of the problem or empirical evidence.  
 
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the literature on crime has emphasized the deterrence 
ability of the justice system on criminal activities (e.g. Becker 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Polinsky and 
Shavell, 1979). However, expected penalty depends not only on the strictness of sentences but also 
on the probability of conviction once crime is committed. The last depends on detection by the 
police, prosecution by legal representatives and the deliberation of judges and juries. As long as 
these three activities are carried out transparently and efficiently, sanctions will deter criminal 
activities. However, if corruption is pervasive, the efficiency in law enforcement can be very much 
reduced (Kugler et al., 2003: 3). 
 
In fact, as firstly recognized by Becker and Stigler (1974), the effectiveness of the enforcement 
system is reduced if the amount of bribes paid by the criminal to corrupted public enforcers is 
significantly less than the monetary equivalent of punishment to which the criminal would incur if 
convicted. Clearly, this means that bribes reduce punishment and therefore deterrence. Following 
this result the authors made two proposals in order to improve the quality of enforcement: rising the 
salaries of public enforcers
104
 or  paying private enforcers for performance
105
. 
 
                                                 
104 Becker and Stigler (1974) suggested to increase the salaries of enforces above what they could get elsewhere, by an amount that is 
inversely related to the probability of detection, and directly related to the size of bribes and other benefits from malfeasance (pag.6). 
105 Landes and Posner (1975) and Polinsky (1980) argued that the use of private enforcers might generate excessive enforcement. 
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After Becker and Stigler’s (1974) preliminary work, the literature on crime has started to consider 
the problem of bribed officials.
106
 Some other authors have also proposed the payment of efficiency 
wages to prevent bribe taking (see, e.g. Besley and McLaren, 1993; Mookherjee and Png, 1995). 
 
Bowles and Garoupa (1997) complemented the ideas developed by Becker and Stigler (1974) by 
extending Becker’s (1968) standard economic model of crime and allowing for complicity between 
an arresting officer and the criminal at the expense of the police department. However, differently 
from Becker and Stigler (1974), they focused on the effects of bribery on the optimal allocation of 
resources (accounting for social costs of both crime and corruption). Their result is that in the 
presence of corruption some of the Becker’s (1968) outcomes may no longer be valid. In particular, 
they showed that the maximum fine may no be optimal.  
 
More recently, Chang et al. (2000) revisited Bowles and Garoupa’s (1997) model by introducing 
subjective psychological costs and by including among these the social norms in the police officer 
community. The authors demonstrated that when corruption is widespread, social norms are no 
longer a sufficient sanction against corrupt officers, and the rise of fines can actually result in more 
crime.  Kugler et al.(2003) adopted a different approach, focusing on the relationship between 
organized crime, corruption and punishment in the context of imperfect competition. They analyzed 
“the role of corruption not only in reducing deterrence but also as a strategic complement to crime 
and therefore a “catalyst" to organized crime” (p:4). The main result of this analysis was that if 
corruption is costly due to law enforcers being well-paid, hard to bribe and easily detected when 
accepting payments, then stronger policies or tougher sanctions are always effective in reducing 
crime, as predicted by the standard literature. However, when bribing costs are low, that is badly-
paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak government, and the rents from criminal activities 
are sufficiently high compared to those from legal activities, increasing policing and sanctions can 
actually generate higher rates of crime. 
  
The literature we have just reviewed focuses on microeconomic aspects of the interdependent 
nature of organized crime and corruption. However, there are also some empirical studies which 
have analyzed the issue. One of these studies is that developed by Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003), 
who confirmed the link between organized crime and public sector corruption by analyzing 
qualitative and quantitative information on a large sample of countries. The authors constructed a 
composite index of organized crime which included indicators of five core activities (trafficking in 
persons, arms, stolen vehicles, cigarettes and fraud) and four secondary factors (costs for 
businesses, extent of the informal economy as a proportion of GDP, violence and money 
laundering). Based on statistical analysis
107
 of a sample of countries, this study indicates that 
organized crime is more prevalent in countries where the rule of law is weak, with only few 
exceptions to this rule. According to this study, critical determinants of organized crime are the 
quality, independence and integrity of the institutions safeguarding the rule of law, including police 
services and the judiciary, at all levels of development. Independently of these institutional 
                                                 
106 For a  survey on law enforcement, see Polinski and Shavell (2000), cited in Kugler et al. (2003).  
 
107
 Simple correlations between the indexes. 
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determinants, high levels of corruption and organized crime are consistently linked to low levels of 
human development.  
 
A further study by Van Dijk (2007) confirms and refines the initial findings. A composite index of 
organized crime was constructed, combining data on the perceived prevalence of organized crime, 
unsolved homicides, grand corruption, money laundering and the extent of the black economy as 
markers of organized crime presence.
108
 The findings seem to confirm the interrelations between 
organized crime, law enforcement, rule of law and economic development. When organized crime 
is prevalent, law making tend to serve the interests of few instead of the general interest, 
undermining market efficiency and public reliance in the legal and regulatory functions of the state. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 5. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)* 
 
    1996 1997 2006 2007 2008 2012   
Rank 
2008 
              Rank 
2012 
1 Denmark 9.3 9.9 9.5 9.4 9.3 90 1 
1 New Zeland  9.4 9.2 9.6 9.4 9.3 90 1 
1 Sweden 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.3 9.3 88 4 
4 Singapore  8.8 8.7 9.4 9.3 9.2 87 5 
5 Finland  9.1 9.5 9.6 9.4 9 90 1 
5 Switzerland  8.8 8.7 9.1 9 9 86 6 
7 Iceland - - 9.6 9.2 8.9 82 11 
7 Netherlands 8.7 9 8.7 9 8.9 84 9 
9 Australia 8.6 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.7 85 7 
9 Canada 9 9.1 8.5 8.7 8.7 84 9 
11 Luxemburg - - 8.6 8.4 8.3 80 12 
12 Austria 7.6 7.6 8.6 8.1 8.1 69 25 
12 Hong Kong 7 7.3 8.3 8.3 8.1 77 14 
14 Germany 8.3 8.2 8 7.8 7.9 79 13 
14 Norway 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.7 7.9 85 7 
16  Ireland 8.5 8.3 7.4 7.5 7.7 69 25 
16 United 
Kingdom 
8.5 8.3 8.6 8.4 7.7 74 17 
18 Belgium   6.8 5.3 7.3 7.1 7.3 75 16 
18 Japan 7.1 6.6 7.6 7.5 7.3 74 17 
18 USA  7.7 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.3 73 19 
21 Saint Lucia - - - 6.8 7.1 71 22 
22 Barbados - - 6.7 6.9 7 76 15 
23 Chile 6.8 6.1 7.3 7 6.9 72 20 
23 France 7 6.7 7.4 7.3 6.9 71 22 
23 Uruguay - - 6.4 6.7 6.9 72 20 
26 Estonia - - 6.7 6.6 6.9 64 32 
27 Slovenia - - 6.4 6.6 6.7 61 37 
28 Qatar - - 6 6 6.5 68 27 
28 St. Vincent & 
Grenadines 
- - 6 6.1 6.5 62 36 
28 Spain  4.3 5.9 6.8 6.7 6.5 65 30 
31 Cyprus  - - 5.6 5.3 6.4 66 29 
32 Portugal  6.5 7 6.6 6.5 6.1 63 33 
33 Dominica  - - 4.5 5.6 6 58 41 
33 Israel  7.7 8 5.9 6.1 6 60 39 
74 
 
35 United Arab 
Emirates  
- - 6.2 5.7 5.9 68 27 
36 Botswana  - - 5.6 5.4 5.8 65 30 
36 Malta  - - 6.4 5.8 5.8 57 43 
36 Puerto Rico  - - - - 5.8 63 33 
39 Taiwan  5 5 5.9 5.7 5.7 61 37 
40 South Korea  5 4.3 5.1 5.1 5.6 56 45 
41 Mauritius  - - 5.1 4.7 5.5 57 43 
41 Oman  - - 5.4 4.7 5.5 47 61 
43 Bahrain  - - 5.7 5 5.4 51 53 
43 Macao  - - 6.6 5.7 5.4     
45 Bhutan  - - 6 5 5.2   63 
45 Czech 
Republic  
5.4 5.2 4.8 5.2 5.2 49 54 
    1996 1997 2006 2007 2008 2012   
Rank 
2008 
                
  
47 Cape Verde  - - - 4.9 5.1 60 39 
47 Costa Rica  - - 4.1 5 5.1 54 48 
47 Hungary  4.9 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.1 55 46 
47 Jordan  4.9 - 5.3 4.7 5.1 48 58 
47 Malaysia  5.3 5 5 5.1 5.1 49 54 
52 Latvia  - - 4.7 4.8 5 49 54 
52 Slovakia  - - 4.7 4.9 5 46 62 
54 South Africa  5.7 5 4.6 5.1 4.9 43 69 
55 Italy  3.4 5 4.9 5.2 4.8 42 72 
55 Seychelles  - - 3.6 4.5 4.8 52 51 
57 Greece  5 5.4 4.4 4.6 4.7 36 94 
58 Lithuania  - - 4.8 4.8 4.6 54 48 
58 Poland  5.6 5.1 3.7 4.2 4.6     
58 Turkey  3.5 3.2 3.8 4.1 4.6 49 54 
61 Namibia  - - 4.1 4.5 4.5 48 58 
62 Croatia  - - 3.4 4.1 4.4 46 62 
62 Samoa  - - - 4.5 4.4     
62 Tunisia  - - 4.6 4.2 4.4 41 75 
65 Cuba  - - 3.5 4.2 4.3 48 58 
65 Kuwait  - - 4.8 4.3 4.3 44 66 
67 El Salvador  - - 4 4 3.9 38 83 
67 Georgia  - - 2.8 3.4 3.9 52 51 
67 Ghana  - - 3.3 3.7 3.9 45 64 
70 Colombia  2.7 2.2 3.9 3.8 3.8 36 94 
70 Romania  - - 3.1 3.7 3.8 44 66 
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72 Bulgaria  - - 4 4.1 3.6 41 75 
72 China  2.4 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.6 39 80 
72 Macedonia  - - 2.7 3.3 3.6 43 69 
72 Mexico  3.3 2.7 3.3 3.5 3.6 34 105 
72 Peru  - - 3.3 3.5 3.6 38 83 
72 Suriname  - - 3 3.5 3.6 37 88 
72 Swaziland  - - 2.5 3.3 3.6 37 88 
72 Trinidad and 
Tobago  
- - 3.2 3.4 3.6 39 80 
80 Brazil  3 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.5 43 69 
80 Burkina Faso  - - 3.2 2.9 3.5 38 83 
80 Morocco  - - 3.2 3.5 3.5 37 88 
80 Saudi Arabia  - - 3.3 3.4 3.5 44 66 
80 Thailand  3.3 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.5 37 88 
85 Albania  - - 2.6 2.9 3.4 33 113 
85 India  2.6 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.4 36 94 
85 Madagascar  - - 3.1 3.2 3.4 32 118 
85 Montenegro  - - - 3.3 3.4 41 75 
85 Panama  - - 3.1 3.2 3.4 38 83 
85 Senegal  - - 3.3 3.6 3.4 36 94 
85 Serbia  - - 3 3.4 3.4 39 80 
92 Algeria  - - 3.1 3 3.2 34 105 
92 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
- - 2.9 3.3 3.2 42 72 
92 Lesotho  - - 3.2 3.3 3.2 45 64 
96 Sri Lanka  - - 3.1 3.2 3.2 40 79 
96 Benin  - - 2.5 2.7 3.1 36 94 
                  
    1996 1997 2006 2007 2008 2012   
Rank 
2008 
              Rank 
2012 
96 Gabon  - - 3 3.3 3.1 35 102 
96 Guatemala  - - 2.6 2.8 3.1 33 113 
96 Jamaica  - - 3.7 3.3 3.1 38 83 
96 Kiribati  - - - 3.3 3.1     
102 Mali  - - 2.8 2.7 3.1 34 105 
102 Bolivia  3.4 2.1 2.7 2.9 3 34 105 
102 Djibouti  - - - 2.9 3 36 94 
102 Dominican 
Republic  
- - 2.8 3 3 32 
118 
102 Lebanon  - - 3.6 3 3 30 128 
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102 Mongolia  - - 2.8 3 3 36 94 
102 Rwanda  - - 2.5 2.8 3 53 50 
102 Tanzania  - - 2.9 3.2 3 35 102 
109 Argentina  - - 2.9 2.9 2.9 35 102 
109 Armenia  - - 2.9 3 2.9 34 105 
109 Belize  - - 3.5 3 2.9     
109 Moldova  - - 3.2 2.8 2.9 36 94 
109 Solomon 
Islands  
- - - 2.8 2.9   
  
109 Vanuatu  - - - 3.1 2.9     
115 Egypt  2.8 2 3.3 2.9 2.8 32 118 
115 Malawi  - - 2.7 2.7 2.8 37 88 
115 Maldives  - - - 3.3 2.8     
115 Mauritania  - - 3.1 2.6 2.8 31 123 
115 Niger  - - 2.3 2.6 2.8 33 113 
115 Zambia  - - 2.6 2.6 2.8 37 88 
121 Nepal  - - 2.5 2.5 2.7 27 139 
121 Nigeria  0.7 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.7 27 139 
121 Sao Tome 
and Principe  
- - - 2.7 2.7 42 
72 
121 Togo  - - 2.4 2.3 2.7 30 128 
121 Viet Nam   - - 2.6 2.6 2.7 31 123 
126 Eritrea  - - 2.9 2.8 2.6 25 150 
126 Ethiopia  - - 2.4 2.4 2.6 33 113 
126 Guyana  - - 2.5 2.6 2.6 28 133 
126 Honduras  - - 2.5 2.5 2.6 28 133 
126 Indonesia  2.7 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.6 32 118 
126 Libya  - - 2.7 2.5 2.6 21 160 
126 Mozambique  - - 2.8 2.8 2.6 31 
123 
126 Uganda  2.7 - 2.7 2.8 2.6 29 130 
134 Comoros  - - - 2.6 2.5 28 133 
134 Nicaragua  - - 2.6 2.6 2.5 29 130 
134 Pakistan  1 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.5 27 139 
134 Ukraine  - - 2.8 2.7 2.5 26 144 
134 Liberia  - - - 2.1 2.4 41 75 
138 Paraguay  - - 2.6 2.4 2.4 25 150 
138 Tonga  - - - 1.7 2.4     
141 Cameroon  2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 26 144 
141 Iran  - - 2.7 2.5 2.3 28 133 
141 Philippines  2.7 3.1 2.5 2.5 2.3 34 105 
141 Yemen  - - 2.6 2.5 2.3 23 156 
145 Kazakhstan  - - 2.6 2.1 2.2 28 133 
145 Timor-Leste - - 2.6 2.6 2.2 33 113 
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147 Bangladesh  - - 2 2 2.1 26 144 
    1996 1997 2006 2007 2008     
Rank 
2008 
              Rank 
2012 
147 Kenya  2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 27 139 
147 Russia  2.6 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.1 28 133 
147 Syria  - - 2.9 2.4 2.1 26 144 
147 Belarus  - - 2.1 2.1 2 31 123 
147 Central 
African 
Republic  
- - 2.4 2 2 26 
144 
147 Cote d’Ivoire  - - 2.1 2.1 2   
  
151 Ecuador  - - 2.3 2.1 2 32 118 
151 Laos  - - 2.6 1.9 2 21 160 
151 Papua New 
Guinea  
- - 2.4 2 2 25 
150 
151 Tajikistan  - - 2.2 2.1 2 22 157 
158 Angola  - - 2.2 2.2 1.9 22 157 
158 Azerbaijan  - - 2.4 2.1 1.9 27 139 
158 Burundi      2.4 2.5 1.9 19 165 
158 Congo 
Republic  
- - 2.2 2.1 1.9 21 
160 
158 Gambia  - - 2.5 2.3 1.9 34 105 
158 Guinea  - - - 1.9 1.9 24 154 
158 Sierra Leone  - - 2.2 2.1 1.9 31 
123 
158 Venezuela  2.5 2.8 2.3 2 1.9 19 165 
171 Congo 
Democratic 
Republic 
- - 2 1.9 1.7 26 
144 
166 Kyrgyzstan  - - 2.2 2.1 1.8 28 133 
166 Turkmenistan  - - 2.2 2 1.8 17 
170 
166 Uzbekistan  - - 2.1 1.7 1.8 17 170 
166 Zimbabwe  - - 2.4 2.1 1.8 20 163 
166 Cambodia  - - 2.1 2 1.8 22 157 
171 Equatorial 
Guinea  
- - 2.1 1.9 1.7 20 
163 
173 Chad  - - 2 1.8 1.6 19 165 
173 Guinea  - - 1.9 1.9 1.6 24 154 
173 Sudan  - - 2 1.8 1.6 13 173 
176 Afghanistan  - - - 1.8 1.5 8 
174 
177 Haiti  - - 1.8 1.6 1.4 19 165 
178 Iraq  - - 1.9 1.5 1.3 18 169 
178 Myanmar  - - 1.9 1.4 1.3 15 172 
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180 Somalia  - - - 1.4 1 8 174 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author. Data are from Transparency International. 
 
* A country or territory’s CPI Score indicates the degree of public sector corruption as perceived by business people and 
country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). As you can notice, the CPI 2012 ranks 
176 countries on a scale from 100 (very clear) to 0 (highly corrupt). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. World Map of Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI, 2012) 
 
 
 
Source: Transparency International (2012), http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 
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Table 6. The Organized Crime Perception Index (Global Competitiveness Report-World 
Economic Forum) 1997-2012 
 
 
 1997 1998 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Finland 6.59 6.84 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.7 
Norway 6.6 6.83 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.4 6.2 
Denmark 6.59 6.71 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.8 6.1 
Sweden 6.19 6.62 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.7 6.6 6 
Austria 6.59 6.59 5.9 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.4 6.4 
Singapore 6.76 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 
United Kingdom 6.14 6.44 6.2 5.7 5.3 5.6 6 5.9 6 
Portugal 6.64 6.28 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 
Jordan 5.88 6.26 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.2 6.2 
France 6.44 6.24 5.6 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.8 
Iceland 6.33 6.17 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.5 
Switzerland 6.5 6.16 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.4 
Spain 6 6.13 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 
Australia 5.68 6.11 6 6.1 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.3 
Chile 6.12 6.07 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.3 5.8 5.6 5.6 
New Zeland 5.95 6.04 6.5 6.4 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.6 
Canada 6.17 5.97 5.4 5.6 5.9 6 5.8 5.7 5.8 
Israel 6.31 5.87 6 5.8 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.6 
Malaysia 5.62 5.7 5.4 5.7 5.2 5 5.2 5.5 5.4 
Germany 5.51 5.64 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.3 5.9 6 
Greece 5.83 5.63 5.9 6.2 6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.3 
Hong Kong SAR 5.72 5.56 6 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 
Egypt 6 5.53 5.5 5.9 6.3 6.6 6.6 6.8 5 
Luxemburg 6.4 5.5 6.2 6.1 6.5 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.8 
Belgium 5.41 5.47 5.7 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.1 
Netherlands 5.26 5.43 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.9 6 6.1 6.3 
Korea 5.43 5.38 5.1 5.4 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.2 5.5 
Turkey 4.68 5.16 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.6 
United States 4.95 5.13 5.6 5 5.2 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.9 
Vietnam 4.7 5.1 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.7 5 
Zimbabue 4.95 4.91 5 5.2 5.5 5.8 6.1 5.9 5.8 
Taiwan 4.25 4.86 5.1 5.3 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.7 5.8 
Ireland 4.87 4.83 5.8 6 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.3 
India 5.05 4.74 5 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.3 5 5 
Japan 5.43 4.67 5.2 5.1 4.9 5 5.3 5.6 5.4 
Thailand 4.38 4.63 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.2 
Indonesia 5.35 4.4 3.7 5.7 5.4 5 4.7 4.2 4.1 
China 4.58 4.39 4.5 4.2 4.9 5.3 5.2 4.9 4.7 
Brazil 4.5 4.35 3.9 3.3 4.1 4.2 3.9 4 4 
Argentina 4.98 4.26 3.6 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.2 3.5 4.1 
Hungary 3.61 3.84 5 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.4 
Philippines 3.33 3.81 3.3 4.3 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.7 
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Poland 3.5 3.75 3.1 4.1 4.5 5.1 5.7 5.7 5.7 
Venezuela 3.22 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.5 3 2.5 2.7 
Czech Republic 4.61 3.59 4.6 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.4 
Peru 4.06 3.58 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.9 
Italy 3.73 3.13 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.5 
Mexico 3.53 2.83 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.9 
Slovakia 4.64 2.8 4.3 5 5.4 5.4 5.2 4.7 4.6 
Russia 2.26 2.45 3.5 4 4.3 4.4 4.3 4 4.2 
Ukraine 3.75 2.42 3.1 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.8 
South Africa 2.35 2.09 3.8 3.9 3.6 3.8 4.3 4.2 4.3 
Colombia 2 1.9 2.5 3.3 3.3 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.8 
Mauritius   4.6 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 
Costa Rica   5 5 5.2 5.2 4.7 4.1 4.9 
Bolivia   4.3 4.8 4.4 4 4.2 4 3.9 
El Salvador   3.7 2.3 2 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8 
Ecuador   3.6 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.6 
Bulgaria   3.1 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Uruguay   5.7 6.1 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.3 6 
Tunisia   5.7 5.6 5.8 6.3 6.6 5.6  
Slovenia   5.6 5.7 5.9 6 6 5.8 5.8 
Estonia   5.5 5.9 6 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.6 
Sri Lanka   4.8 4.5 4.8 4.9 5 5.5 5.8 
Botswana   5.5 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.3 
Panama   5 5 5.2 5 4.5 4.5 4.8 
Morocco   5.5 5.2 4.9 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.8 
Namibia   4.7 4.8 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.3 
Trinidad and Tobago   3.4 3.4 3.7 4.4 4.7 4.1 4.1 
Nicaragua   4.8 5.1 5.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.2 
Croatia   3.8 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.3 4.9 5.2 
Dominican Republic   4.9 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.3 
Romania   4.4 4.6 5 5.7 5.9 4.9 4.6 
Latvia   4.8 5.7 6.2 6.3 6 5.5 5.7 
Lithuania   4.1 5.3 5.9 5.9 6 5.7 5.7 
Nigeria   3.8 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.2 4 3.5 
Paraguay   3.7 3.9 4 4.2 4.1 3.9 4 
Bangladesh   2.8 3.6 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.5 
Honduras   3.7 4 4.1 3.5 3.2 3 2.7 
Jamaica   2.5 2.5 3.1 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.2 
Haiti        3.1 3.5 
Guatemala   2.3 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2 2 2.1 
Malta   6.3 6.4 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.4 
Gambia   5.3  5.9 6 5.8 5.5 5.8 
Mali   5.4 4.9 4.7 4.7 5.2 5 4.4 
Malawi   4.8  5.5 5.9 5.9 5.4 5.4 
Ethiopia   5.4 5.4 5.6 5.5 5.7 6 6.2 
Algeria   4.9 5 4.8 4.5 5.1 4.5 3.3 
Ghana   5.5  5.7 5.6 5.3 5.2 5.1 
Zambia   4.6 5.6 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.8 
81 
 
Tanzania   4.5 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.3 4.8 4.8 
Angola   4.5    6 5.2  
Senegal    5.1 5.5 6.1 6 5.8 5.3 
Madagascar   4.1 4 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.1 4 
Pakistan   4.9 4.1 4.1 4 3.9 3.5 3.4 
Serbia   4.2 4.3 4.5 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.1 
Uganda   4.6  4.4 4.4 4.7 4.6 4.2 
Kenya   3.4 3.8 4 3.8 4 3.8 4.2 
Mozambique   3.2 3.9 4.3 4.4 4 3.9 4.1 
Cameroon    4.5 4.7 4.4 5.2 5 4.7 
Chad   2.9 2.9 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.8 3.5 
Macedonia   2.7 3.4 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.5 
United Arab Emirates   6.5 6.2 6.3 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.8 
Bahrain   6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.2 6.4 6.5 
Cyprus   5.8 5.9 6.3 6.3 6 5.6 5.7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   4 4.6 4.8 5.1 4.8 4.2 5.2 
Georgia   3.7 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.2 
Qatar    6.3 6.5 6.8 6.3 5.8 6.4 
Kuwait    6.3 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.2 
Armenia    5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 
Mongolia    5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.3 
Azerbaijan    5.3 5.3 5 5 5.2 5.3 
Tajikistan    4.6 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.2 5 
Kazakhstan    4.6 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.9 
East Timor    NA      
Benin    3.9 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.8 4.6 
Kyrgyz Republic    3.8 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.5 
Moldova    4.6   5.3 5.1 5 
Cambodia    4.3 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.6 4.9 
Guyana     4.2 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.5 
Albania    3.9 4.4 4.9 5.2 5.2 4.7 
Libya    6.6 6.6 6.4 5.8  6 
Syria    6.6 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.7  
Barbados    6.1 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.3 
Saudi Arabia    5.7 5.6 6 6.6 6.8 6.6 
Mauritania    5.3 5.1 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.7 
Oman    5.2 6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.7 
Montenegro    5.2 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.6 5.2 
Suriname    5 5.1 5.7  5.6 5.5 
Uzbekistan    4.6      
Lesotho    4.4 4.2 4.4 4.9 5 4.9 
Burkina Faso    4.2 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Uganda    4.1      
Burundi    4 3.7 3.5 3.9 4.2 3.9 
Timor-Laste    3.6 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.6 5.3 
Nepal    3.6 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.8 
Brunei     6.4  6.5 6.5 6.4 
Moldova     5.4     
82 
 
Cote d'Ivoire     2.3 2.7 3.4 3.3 3.5 
Rwanda       6.9 6.3 5.8 
Swaziland       5.7 5.4 5.1 
Lebanon       5.6 5.4 5.3 
Capo Verde       4.8 4.7 4.5 
Iran       4.6 4.8 4.9 
Yemen        4.9 4.9 
Liberia        4.9  
Sierra Leone         5.1  
Guinea        4.1  
Belize        4.3  
Gabon        6  
 
 
                  Source: Elaboration of the author. Data are from :World  Economic Forum (WEF), The Global Competitiveness 
Report, various years. Most recent report: http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2011-2012 
 
 
* The organized crime perception index has been published since 1997. This index is based on the perceptions of leading 
business executives about the country in which they operate. Organized Crime is ranked in a 1-to-7 scale survey question 
that askes whether the respondent perceives that racketeering and extortion are imposing significant costs on businesses.  
1=high level of OC; 7= no OC. 
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Figure 8. a)World Map of Organized Crime Perceptions Index  
b)  European Map of Organized Crime Perception Index*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Source: Van Dijk (2007): “Mafia Makers”. The author  constructed a Composite Organized Crime 
Index (OCPI) combining five interrelated proxy indicators of perceived prevalence of organized crime, specifically: 
racketeering, unsolved homicides, grand corruption, money-laundering and the extent of the black economy. The Index 
ranks countries on a scale from 1to 7 (1=no OC 7=high presence of Organized Crime). Sources used by the author: 
Organized crime perception (World Economic Forum, World Competitiveness Reports, Business Executive Surveys, 
1997–2003; Merchant International Group 2004; BEEPS 1996); Money-laundering and Informal sector (World 
Economic Forum Business Executive Survey, 2004); High Level Corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2003), Unsolved 
Homicides (8th UN Survey on Crime and Justice 2002: www.UNODC.or. 
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Figure 9. Organized Crime and Corruption: Preliminary Statistical Analyses for a cross-
section of countries 
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Sources: Elaboration of the author. Data on Organized Crime perception index are taken from the World 
Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum)  and data on GDP pc are taken from the World Development 
Indicators. This graph refers to 57 developed and developing countries in the period 1997-2010. See table below for the 
complete list of the countries included in the dataset. The scale has been inverted in order to obtain an OC Index 
according to which higher values correspond to an higher presence of the phenomenon (1=no OC 7=high OC). 
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Sources: Elaboration of the author. Data on Organized Crime perception index are taken from the World 
Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum)  and data on Corruption Perception Index (CPI) are taken from 
Transparency International (TI). This graph refers to 57 developed and developing countries in the period 1997-2010. 
See table below for the complete list countries included in the dataset. The scale has been inverted in order to obtain an 
OC Index according to which higher values correspond to an higher presence of the phenomenon (1=no OC 7=high 
OC), the same for the CPI. 
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         List of countries 
 
   1 Finland 20 Germany 39 Venezuela, RB 
2 Norway 21 Greece 40 Czech Republic 
3 Denmark 22 
Hong Kong , 
China 41 Peru 
4 Sweden 23 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 42 Italy 
5 Austria 24 Luxembourg 43 Mexico 
6 Singapore 25 Belgium 44 Slovak Republic 
7 United Kingdom 26 Netherlands 45 
Russian 
Federation 
8 Portugal 27 Korea, Rep. 46 Ukraine 
9 Jordan 28 Turkey 47 South Africa 
10 France 29 United States 48 Colombia 
11 Iceland 30 Vietnam 49 Ireland 
12 Switzerland 31 Zimbabwe 50 India 
13 Spain 32 Indonesia 51 Japan 
14 Australia 33 China 52 Mauritius 
15 Chile 34 Brazil 53 Costa Rica 
16 New Zealand 35 Argentina 54 Bolivia 
17 Canada 36 Hungary 55 El Salvador 
18 Israel 37 Philippines 56 Ecuador 
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Abstract 
 
There exist some studies focusing on the links between corruption and organized crime, 
however most of them focus on microeconomic aspects or empirical work. Much less 
research, instead, has been concentrated on analyzing the macroeconomics of the two 
phenomena jointly considered. We develop a simple framework in order to formally explain 
the interdependent nature of corruption and organized crime, and their combined effect on 
the economy. Criminal organizations co-exist with law-abiding productive agents and 
potentially corrupt law enforcers.  The crime syndicate obstructs the legal operations of 
agents through extortion, and may pay bribes to law enforcers in order to avoid detection. 
All the agents behave rationally, they are risk neutral and take their decisions in order to 
maximize their profit/ payoff.  We find that the amount of extortion would be higher under 
corruption since the mafia needs to pay bribes.  In this way, the presence of both organized 
crime and corruption increases the costs to society by deterring more individuals from 
setting up business. Moreover, a possible implication of our analysis is that strengthening the 
fight against corruption (e.g., by increasing the probability of detection) could raise police 
officers’ demands for bribes and thereby increase the amount of extortion even further.  The 
suggestion, then, is to evaluate alternative strategies for combating crime and corruption. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Almost everybody is aware of the fact that criminal organizations typically involve collusion or 
direct participation of the public sector. In 1994, the United Nation’s Naples Declaration officially 
recognized that Organized Crime (OC) has a “corrupting influence on fundamental social, 
economic and political institutions”, and that OC uses “violence, intimidation and corruption to 
earn profit or control territories or markets”.  More recently, a survey conducted by the 
Eurobarometer (2004), based on public perceptions of the links between corruption and OC, 
revealed that more than half of European citizens (54%) believe that most corruption in their 
country is caused by organized crime.  It is not difficult, in fact, to realize that criminal systems 
strongly depend on corruption to carry out their activities (transport of illicit goods, money 
laundering, extortion, and so on) and to reduce the risk of detection and prosecution.
109
 In 2010, a 
research conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy focused on the links between 
Organized Crime and corruption in 27 European Member States. This investigation, based on 
statistical analysis of 14 indicators and on interviews, showed that criminal organizations - 
especially those involved in prostitution and drugs traffics- are strictly related to police forces. More 
specifically, throughout Europe Organized Crime (OC) uses corruption in order to have access to 
undisclosed information on investigations, to guarantee endurance of operations, or to develop and 
maintain monopoly in local markets.  
The report underlined also the significant role played by political corruption, which is identified as 
OC’s most powerful tool. Some Nations (included Italy, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria) have 
experienced cases of organized crime-related corruption amongst members of Parliament or other 
                                                 
109
 This means that corruption by OC targets on different agents: police, politicians, custom officers and judiciaries (as 
analyzed in detail by a research conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy in 2010).  
UN GA Resolution 49/159 Naples Political Declaration and Global Action against Organized Transnational Crime 
23.12.1994 
UN GA Resolution 1996/27 Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against 
Organized Transnational Crime 24.07.1996 
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high-level politicians. However, local level political corruption seems more common. In fact, there 
are cases of mayors or city councilors sentenced for associations with organized and white-collar 
criminals in different countries, included: Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. In these cases, organized criminals use 
their “legitimate face” to sustain and finance politicians or directly participate to local politics. 
Judicial corruption by criminals, instead, seems to be less frequent than police and political 
corruption.  
 
The report summarized above concentrates on European Member States; however, there is no doubt 
that there exist strong linkages between OC and corruption also in other parts of the world, 
included: US, Russia, Nigeria
110
, Mozambique, South Africa and Western Balkans
111
   In some 
countries criminal organizations have become so influential that they have developed the worst type 
of connection with corruption, by “capturing” the state.  This is the case for various ex-Soviet 
states, parts of Latin America and China (as acknowledged by the UD Director of National 
Intelligence, Dennis Blair and reported by TI in 2010)
112
. Also Shaw (2002), has underlined that the 
weakening and criminalization of the State is a component of organized crime, with politicians 
often involved in criminal activities, as it can be observed in countries like Nigeria, Liberia and 
Ghana. 
 
From what we have seen above ” there is no question that because of corruption the scale of 
organized crime is much higher than it would be otherwise”, therefore “it is vital to attempt to 
increase our knowledge and understanding of collusion” (Holmes, Transparency International 
                                                 
110
 Shaw (2002), for example, has underlined that the weakening and criminalization of the State is a component 
of organized crime, with politicians often involved in criminal activities, as it can be observed in countries like 
Nigeria, Liberia and Ghana. 
111
 (see examining the links between corruption and OC for papers). 
112
 Annual Threat Assessment of US Intelligence Community; cited in Holmes 2010 for TI in Organized Crime and 
Corruption.  
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2010). Until now, in fact, the research on OC has been conducted independently from that on 
corruption, and the number of specific studies focused on the links between the two phenomena is 
very limited. Only recently the subject has attracted the attention of international institutions, such 
as the European Commission and the European Police Office (Europol).  Few theoretical and 
empirical studies have shown the interdependent links between the political, socio-economic, 
criminal justice and legal systems
113
, recognizing that OC and corruption are both prevalent in an 
environment of bad governance, as confirmed by Buscaglia and Van Djik (2003).  More recently, 
Mazzitelli (2007) explored the different factors that contribute to criminal activities in West Africa, 
founding that this area is an ideal place for structured criminal networks since risks are reduced as a 
result of poor governance. Sergi and Querimi (2007) studied the relationships between the two 
phenomena and socio-economic development in the context of South-East Europe.  The authors 
noted that both corruption and organized crime are prevalent in the region, stressing that the key 
problem is a weak rule of law (i.e. inefficient judicial systems and weak enforcement control). 
Nevertheless there is still large room for further investigation, especially from the economic side. 
So far, in fact, the economic literature, with the exclusion of some microeconomic and empirical 
studies, has almost ignored the issue.  
 
We develop a simple framework in order to formally explain the interdependent nature of 
corruption and organized crime, and their combined effect on the economy. Criminal organizations 
co-exist with law-abiding productive agents and potentially corrupt law enforcers.  The crime 
syndicate obstructs the legal operations of agents through extortion, and may pay bribes to law 
enforcers in order to avoid detection. All the agents behave rationally, are risk neutral and take their 
decisions in order to maximize their profit/ payoff.  We find that the amount of extortion would be 
higher under corruption since the mafia needs to pay bribes.  In this way, the presence of both 
                                                 
113 Louise I. Shelley, “Transnational organized crime: an imminent threat to the nation-state?”, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 48, No. 2 (winter 
1995), pp. 463-489. 
Samuel Gonzalez-Ruiz and Edgardo Buscaglia, “How to design a national strategy against organized crime in the framework of the United Nations’ 
Palermo convention”, The Fight against Organized Crime (Lima, United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 2002), pp. 23-26. All cited 
in Buscaglia Van Dijk 2003 
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organized crime and corruption increases the costs to society by deterring more individuals from 
setting up business. Moreover, a possible implication of our analysis is that strengthening the fight 
against corruption (e.g., by increasing the probability of detection) could raise police officers’ 
demands for bribes and thereby increasing the amount of extortion even further.  The suggestion, 
then, is to evaluate alternative strategies for combating crime and corruption. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model without corruption. 
Section 3 describes the model with corruption and Section 4 recapitulates and concludes with some 
remarks. 
 
 
2. The model without corruption 
2.1.  Agents  
We first consider an economy free of corruption, in which law-abiding productive agents coexist 
with a criminal organization (i.e. the Mafia) and non-corruptible law enforcers. Individuals can 
choose to run a business (become entrepreneurs) or to be employed in some other routine 
occupation. We assume that, for some individuals, running a business is more profitable than other 
regular activities; however it exposes them to extortion by the Mafia. Individuals who choose to 
become entrepreneurs, in fact, will have to pay a sort of tax to the criminal group, with a probability 
p. We refer to this illegal payment as “black tax” (the so called pizzo in Italian), and we indicate it 
with x, where 0<x<1. The entrepreneurs’ probability of being approached by the Mafia, indicated 
by p, is, in other words, a measure of the criminal organization’s strength in the economy. Clearly, 
the higher is p, the stronger is the criminal group in the economy, and vice- versa. Businessmen, 
who refuse to pay the so-called “black tax”, x, will be subject to damage, d, by the Mafia, with a 
probability p. This damage can be a total or partial destruction of entrepreneurs’ properties (through 
bomb attacks or arsons), or it can be a physical attack on the individual or on his closest relatives. 
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The nature of the damage is not relevant; however it makes sense to assume that there is a cost of 
not paying the Mafiosi. This, in fact, explains why individuals pay the pizzo in an economy 
characterized by the mafia presence, in our model as in the real world.  
 Notice that, differently from the Beckerian approach, we do not analyze the individual choice 
between legal and illegal activities, but our interest is focused on the individual choice between two 
legal activities (business activity or routine occupation) when a Mafia-type group is present in the 
economy.  In our model, then, individuals are potential victims of the criminal organization rather 
than potential members of it
114
.  Importantly, we also assume that agents who decide to start an 
entrepreneurial activity can only operate above ground, so there are not underground businesses 
(shadow economy). This obviously implies that the Mafia can extort money only from above 
ground operations. These assumptions distinguish our analysis from previous studies which have, 
instead, assumed that individuals can choose to operate underground and that for the criminal group 
it s easier to tax underground transactions (e.g. Shelling, 1984; Alexeev et al. 1999)
115
.  
In our model we assume that the population of law-abiding productive agents is normalized to one 
and uniformly distributed, and agents are risk neutral. We indicate with A the total output/revenues 
from the business activity and with e the cost/effort to produce this output. We assume that some 
individuals are more productive than others, meaning that the cost of business e is not the same for 
all individuals, but it is lower for some of them. This explains why not everyone becomes 
entrepreneur, but only those who have lower costs e, for which running a business is more 
profitable than some other routine occupation. In fact, if we indicate with a the income from other 
routine occupations (exogenously fixed), it is clear that, in the absence of the Mafia, only 
individuals for which A-e> a, will decide to start a business. Note that we are assuming that the 
alternative occupations do not imply costs, not start-up costs (e) and not mafia costs (x), meaning 
                                                 
114 Also when we examine the Mafia behavior, even if we follow the Beckerian approach when assuming that the Mafia is rational in its choices, the 
type of choices we are interested in is not the individual choice between legal and illegal activities. However, we have to underline that, since we 
assume that there exists a mafia group with a probability p, and since when the criminals’ probability of being detected and the severity of the penalty 
to which they are subject if convicted are really high, p can be equal to zero, we are effectively analyzing the individual rational choice to engage in 
illegal activities, even if we don t take into account the alternative occupations for criminals.  
115 Schelling's argument was that underground firms cannot ask the state to protect them  against criminals. Therefore, underground firms had both 
greater need for the mafia's services (protection against other criminals) and less opportunity to resist extortion by the mafia itself. 
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that other activities are not subject to extortion by the criminal group, as it is often (if not always) 
the case in reality. We also assume that all the other possible activities offer the same income to 
agents, which means that a is the same for all possible occupations
116
 . 
 
Given the above, we can see that, under conditions of uncertainty, the participation constraint for 
the representative law-abiding agent who intends to engage into business in an economy 
characterized by the mafia presence is given by:  
                                            (1) 
 
where the left hand side represents the expected net gain from business activity. In fact, if the agent 
has to pay the “black tax” to the criminal organization (with probability p), he/she gets , 
which is total output minus the cost of producing that output minus the Mafia tax.  If the agent does 
not have to pay the “black tax” (with probability ), then he/she gets , second term in 
the left hand side.  The right hand side of (1), a, represents instead the certain income from a regular 
activity, which does not imply any type of costs, as indicated  before. 
We have seen that, if individuals refuse to pay the “black tax” to the criminal organization they will 
be victims of some damage, d,  and then the participation constraint for the representative agent 
who intends to engage into business  and to do not pay the Mafia, is given by:                                   
          (2) 
where the left hand side represents the expected net gain from business activity when the  illegal 
payment is not made.  In fact, if the agent has to pay the “black tax” to the criminal organization 
(with probability p), he/she gets , which is total output minus the cost of producing that 
output minus the damage inflicted by the mafia when the pizzo is not paid.  If the agent is not 
approached by the Mafia,  he/she gets , second term in the left hand side.  As before, the 
                                                 
116 If we account for different values of a , meaning that different routine occupations can provide different levels of income, we will have different 
optimal values of extortion, as it will become clearer in the next paragraph. 
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right hand side of (2), a, represents instead the certain income from a regular activity, which does 
not imply any type of costs. 
Intuitively, an entrepreneur  will pay the tax imposed by the Mafia, x, only if  the expected net gain 
from doing so is higher than the expected net gain from not doing so , in analytical terms: 
 
                               (3)                                                          
 
To be more precise, according to (3), the representative agent, who has made the choice to become 
entrepreneur, will pay the pizzo only if the expected net gain obtained when pizzo is paid (left hand 
side of 3) is higher or equal to the expected net gain perceived when the illegal tax is not paid, and 
damage is inflicted by the criminal group as a consequence (right hand side of 3). 
Simplifying, constraint (3) can be written as :     , and obviously implies that 
the amount of extortion must be lower or equal than the damage inflicted by the crime syndicate  
when  the “black tax” is not paid, which is:  
                                                                                                       (4) 
 otherwise  entrepreneurs would prefer to be subject to damage rather than pay.  
 
The constraint expressed by (1) gives the critical value of the cost to which agents will decide to 
start a business, that is given by: 
                                                                                  (5) 
only individuals with an effort (cost) lower or equal to this critical value, e
c
, will set up business.  
Since we have assumed that the population of agents is normalized to one and uniformly distributed 
this value e
c
 represents also the maximum number of businesses in the economy. 
 
2.2.  The Criminal Organization (the Mafia) 
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As it can easily been understood from the above paragraph, in the absence of corruption, the 
criminal organization undertakes two activities:  i) it extorts money (what we have called “black 
tax” or pizzo or illegal payment) from businesses; ii) it imposes its power on entrepreneurs through 
the credible threat of violence, since businessmen who refuse to pay the pizzo are subject to 
damage. Notice that the idea of organized crime taking the form of extortion is not new in the 
theoretical literature (see e.g. : Shelling, 1984; Kugler et al., 2003 and Alexeev et al., 1999,2004). 
Notably, our formalization of the mafia reflects (almost totally) the definition of criminal 
organization accepted by the greater part of criminologists who describe organized crime as 
criminal activities for material benefit by groups that engage in: extreme violence, corruption of 
public officials, including law enforcement and judicial officers, penetration of the legitimate 
economy (e.g. through extortion and money-laundering) and interference in the political process
117
 
(Kenney and Finckenauer, 1995; Levi, 2002, cited in Van Dijk, 2007). In fact, the only aspects not 
represented in our model are money-laundering, corruption of judicial officers, and criminal 
interference in the political process. Corruption is considered later in the analysis, when we assume 
that law-enforcers are corruptible. 
Notice that here, following the Beckerian approach, we treat the criminal group as a rational agent, 
however our main interest is not on the individual choice to engage in illegal activity or not
118
. The 
rational behavior of interest is that of the mafia in seeking to maximize its net expected income by 
choosing how much money to extort, x, and how much damage, d, to inflict, subject to the 
participation decision of individuals.  
Before than present the problem in analytical terms, we need to introduce few new probabilities and 
variables.  We indicate with q the Mafia’s probability to do not be detected in relation to its activity 
of extortion, and with ɣ the penalty to which it is subject if detected and convicted, with a 
                                                 
117
 These elements are used as operational definitions by the European police community (Levi, 2002), and they are also incorporated in anti-Mafia 
laws of some countries, including Italy, USA, and Hungary (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004).  
 
118
 Though, since we assume that the mafia group exists with a probability p, and since this probability can be equal to zero (when the criminals’ 
probability of being detected and the severity of the penalty to which they are subject if convicted are really high), then we indirectly analyze the 
individual rational choice to engage in illegal activities or not, even if we do not take into account the alternative occupations for criminals. 
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probability 1-q. Notice that we are making the strong assumption that once criminals are discovered 
they are inevitably prosecuted and convicted
119
. Moreover, as common in the literature, we assume 
that the punishment ɣ is proportional to the gravity of the offence, which in our case is the level of 
extortion x. The nature of the penalty is not relevant, it can be pecuniary or a number of years to 
spend in prison, or a combination of the two. What it is significant for our analysis is the deterrence 
effect of this punishment
120
, the fact that it is commensurate to the magnitude of the crime and the 
fact that it is exogenously determined by public officials (judges at highest level)
121
. From this last 
assumption we can see that in our model the parameter ɣ reflects the effectiveness of the law 
system
122. With regard to the Mafia’s probability to do not be discovered in his illegal operations, 
we can easily see that it is related to the strength of the criminal syndicate in the economy, the 
probability p discussed in the previous paragraph. In fact, the stronger is the Mafia in the economy 
(i.e. the higher is p), the higher will be his probability to avoid detection q and, clearly, the lower 
will be its probability to be detected and then convicted, 1-q. This last probability, 1-q, can been 
seen as a measure of the law-enforcement efficiency. 
 
Given the above, the  expected income resulting from extorting a single entrepreneur, will be equal 
to:  
                             (6) 
In fact, with a probability q, the Mafia will not be detected and then will receive the full illegal 
payment, x. With a probability 1-q the Mafia will be detected and convicted, then it will still receive 
x but will be also subject to a penalty ɣ  proportional to the amount extorted, x. 
Simplifying and multiplying by e 
c 
(total number of businesses in the economy) and by p (measure 
of the strength of the Mafia in the economy)  the expression above (6), we find the Mafia’s expected 
                                                 
119 This assumption results particularly important in the model with corruption, since it implies that corruption takes place only at law-enforcement 
level and not at the judicial level.  
120
 ɣ cannot be equal or smaller than zero (true??). 
121 ɣ can be smaller than 1, equal to 1 or higher than 1. If ɣ is smaller than 1, it means that the Mafia will still gain something even in the case it is 
caught. If ɣ equals to 1, the Mafia will not gain or lose anything in the case of detection, since the penalty will be exactly equal to the amount 
extorted. If ɣ is higher than 1, the Mafia will lose more than the amount extorted. 
122 In an economy in which judges and laws are strong, this parameter is high (higher or at least equal to 1). 
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income derived from extorting all the entrepreneurs in the economy:  
   pexq c  11
                              (7) 
Furthermore, if we assume that causing damage to entrepreneurs who refuse to pay the pizzo is not 
free of charge, but implies some costs and if we assume that these costs are proportional to the 
amount of damage inflicted, , the total expected net income that the criminal organization wishes 
to maximize will be given by: 
   dpexq c   11
                                    (8)
 
Which is expected revenues from extortion minus the total cost of inflict damage, . 
As indicated earlier, we assume that the
 
Mafia is a rational agent that seeks to maximize its net 
expected income by choosing how much money to extort, x, and how much damage, d, to inflict, 
subject to the participation decision of individuals.
 
Analytically, the problem is then the following:
 
 
                                           
   dpexqMax cdx   11,                                               (8) 
                                            s.t.           pxaAe
c                                                             (4) 
                                           s.t.                  xd                                                                    (5) 
 
Notice that the two constraints (4) and (5), which represent individuals’ preferences, are the two 
participation constraints we found in the previous paragraph.  
The solution to the above maximization problem gives the optimal size of extortion and damage 
(respectively  and  given by equation 9) and the maximum number of individuals setting up 
business ( ce  given by equation 10), when there is no corruption: 
                                 

qpp
aA
dx




1122 2                                                    (9)
 
              
98 
 
                                   

qp
aA
ec




1122                                                          (10) 
As we can see, these optimal values are functions of important variables in the model, such as: i) the 
mafia's probability of being caught ( 1-q, which depends on the quality of the law-enforcement 
system); ii) the penalty inflicted to the mafia if it is actually caught (ɣ, which depends on the quality 
of the law and judiciary system); and iii) the shop owners' probability of being approached by the 
mafia (p, which depends on the extent of police protection-law enforcement system). 
More specifically, from equation (9) we can see that in equilibrium the optimal level of extortion 
must be equal to that of damage ( ). From the same equation, we can also notice that when 
the mafia’s probability of being detected  and the size of punishment to which criminals are 
subject when detected ( ) increase, the optimal size of extortion (x*) decreases. This is because in 
the presence of a strong judiciary system and incorruptible police system- in analytical terms when 
 is high- the mafia does not exist at all (p=0) or if it exists, it has a really week power (low 
p) and it cannot ask for high “black taxes”.  This result agrees with the findings of the Beckerian 
literature, which has stressed the deterrence effect that an increase in the certainty and the severity 
of the penalty has on crime activity (e.g.:Becker, 1968;  Stigler, 1970; Ehrlich, 1973; and Polinsky 
and Shavell 1979,2000; Witte, 1980; Grogger, 1991; Marselli and Vannini, 1997).
123
  
Additionally, it can be seen that when private individuals’ probability of being approached by the 
mafia  increases, then the size of extortion (x*) increases as well. This is obvious, given the 
above considerations and assumptions. In fact, we have noticed that the probability  can be 
understood as a measurement of the mafia’s strength in the economy. Clearly, the higher is , the 
higher is the power of the criminal organization,  even in terms of “black taxes”.  
It can also been seen that, as we would logically expect and as confirmed by the empirical literature 
                                                 
123 Notice that, even if we do not analyze the individual choice between legal and illegal activity, we however find that an increase of the certainty and 
severity of punishment decreases Mafia’s activity (extortion). The main difference between our analysis and those of Beckerian derivation, is that we 
are interested in the rational choice of the optimal level of the illegal activity (extortion), rather than on the rational choice of become a criminal or 
not. 
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(e.g. Peri, 2004; Kroska and Robeck 2006; Daniele and Marani, 2010), entrepreneurs perceive 
extortion by a criminal organization as an extra risk/cost to do business, meaning that there exists a 
negative relationship between the level of criminal activity and the total number of businesses in the 
economy. In our model, in fact, we have that the higher the level of the Mafia’s activity, in terms of 
“black tax” x extorted to entrepreneurs, the lower the number of individuals who will decide to start 
a business.  This can been seen in equation (10) above, according to which the total optimal number 
of entrepreneurs in the economy is a negative function of the probability, p (measure of the criminal 
organization’s strength in the economy). And from equation (9) we know that the higher is this 
probability the higher will be the level of optimal extortion, meaning a lower number of businesses 
in the market. 
 
Interestingly, when the mafia’s probability of detection  and the severity of punishment ( ) 
increase, the optimal level of extortion (x*) decreases, consequently we would intuitively expect a 
larger number of businesses in the economy, ce . And this is exactly the case, as it can be observed 
in equation (9). Moreover, we have underlined above that when private individuals’ probability of 
being approached by the mafia  increases- which means that the mafia’s power in the economy 
becomes stronger- the size of extortion increases as well, then the total number of businesses in the 
economy decreases, as we logically would expect and as confirmed by equation (9). 
 
3. The model with corruption 
3.1. Agents 
We now consider a model in which law-abiding productive agents co-exist with a criminal 
organization and potentially corrupt law-enforcers. As in the previous model, we assume that 
individuals can choose to run a business (become entrepreneurs) or to be employed in some other 
routine occupation. Running a business is more profitable than other regular activities; however it 
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exposes agents to extortion or damage by the mafia. 
We again assume that law-abiding agents are risk neutral and they will pay x only if the amount of 
extortion is lower or at least equal than the damage d inflicted by the crime syndicate when the 
“black tax” is not paid: 
 
The critical value of the cost to start a business is again given by: 
     (11) 
which also represents the total number of businesses in the economy, since we assume that the 
population of agents is normalized to one and uniformly distributed. Note that, in this case, p 
(which is the probability of being approached by the mafia) is equal to 1, for assumption. 
Remember that this probability reflects the strength of the criminal group in the economy; assuming 
that it is equal to one, we are assuming that the Mafia certainly exists in the economy. This makes 
sense in the model in which we suppose that law-enforcers are corruptible. 
 
3.2.  Law-enforcers 
Law enforcers (i.e. the police) are supposed to protect shop owners against extortion by the mafia 
and prosecute criminal activity. Differently from the model analyzed before, here we assume that  
police officers are corruptible in the sense of being potentially willing to accept bribes from the 
mafia in return for turning a blind eye to the mafia’s activities (i.e. extortion). Notice that, as 
previously, we are making the strong assumption that once criminals are discovered they are 
inevitably prosecuted and convicted. In an economy characterized by the presence of corruption, 
this assumption results to be very important, since it implies that corruption takes place only at law-
enforcement level and not at the judicial level. 
If we indicate with r the police’s probability of not being caught when corrupt, with w the legal 
income paid to the police by the government, with b the bribes which mafia is willing to pay to 
corrupt law enforcers, and with f the penalty imposed to corrupt policemen when detected, the 
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participation constraint of the representative potentially corrupt law-enforcer will be the following:    
     (12) 
The right hand side of the above represents the certain income received by the police officer when 
he/she is not corrupt, which is the legal income paid by the government. The left hand side, instead, 
represents the law-enforcer’s expected payoff from being corrupt. In fact, with a probability r, he/ 
she will not be detected and will receive the whole legal payment w, plus the illegal payment b 
(bribes). With a probability 1-r,  the police officer will be detected and convicted, then he/she will 
still receive the legal and illegal payments (w+b), but will be also subject to a penalty f. This 
punishment might take the form of a certain amount of money to pay or a certain number of years to 
spend in prison, or a combination of the two. For instance, f may be equal to , or to 
, meaning that law-enforcers who are caught and convicted might lose both the 
legal income and the bribes, and they might have to pay an additional penalty  c, which can be 
pecuniary or not (e.g. arrest), or both. As in the case of the penalty inflicted to the member of the 
criminal organization, we assume that the magnitude of f, which is exogenously determined, 
depends on the strength of the judicial and law-system in the economy
124
.  
Clearly, according to the participation constraint expressed by (12) police officers are willing to 
accept bribes only if their expected payoff from doing so (left hand side) is greater or at least equal 
to their payoff from not doing so (right hand side). By simplifying the constraint (11), we obtain:  
          (13) 
according to which the amount of bribes necessary to persuade law enforcers to be corrupt,  must be 
higher or equal to  , that is  the product of their probability of being caught, , 
multiplied by the penalty at which they are subject when caught, f. As we will see later, this 
relationship is very important in our final findings. 
 
                                                 
124
 Meaning that in an economy in which judges and laws are efficiently strong, this penalty will be very  high. 
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3.3. The Criminal Organization (the Mafia) 
In the presence of corruption, the criminal organization undertakes three activities:  i) it extorts 
money (what we have called “black tax”) from businesses; ii) it imposes its power on shop owners 
through the credible threat of violence; and iii) it chooses whether to bribe law enforcers in return 
for avoiding prosecution. This means that in the model with corruption, the mafia rationally seeks to 
maximize its income not only by choosing how much money to extort and how much damage to 
inflict to shop owners, but also by choosing the amount of bribes needed to persuade law-enforcers 
to be corrupt, subject not only to the participation decision of individuals but also to that of police 
officers. In the mafia’s maximization problem we have now an additional constraint – namely, the 
participation constraint of law-enforcement agents who are willing to accept bribes only if their 
expected payoff from doing so is greater than their payoff from not doing so, as seen in the previous 
paragraph (constraint 13).  
Before than present the problem in analytical terms, we need to introduce few new probabilities and 
variables. We indicate with q’ the Mafia’s probability to do not be detected in relation to its activity 
of extortion, and with ɣ the penalty to which it is subject if detected and convicted, with a 
probability 1-q’. Notice that we are making the strong assumption that once criminals are 
discovered they are inevitably prosecuted and convicted
125
.  We also assume that the Mafia’s 
probability of not being detected in an economy characterized by the presence of the mafia, which 
we have indicated with q’, is higher than the corresponding probability, q, in the model with no 
corruption. If low-enforcers agents are corruptible, in fact, it makes sense to assume that the 
criminals’ probability of avoid detection will be higher. Interestingly, the Mafia’s probability of 
being detected and convicted, 1-q’, depends on the behavior (in terms of loyalty and conspiracy of 
silence) of the corrupt police officers when they are uncovered and convicted (with probability 1-r). 
These agents, in fact, once detected can decide to unmask the Mafia or not. Obviously, if the corrupt 
officials are not discovered, with probability r, the criminal organization will certainly not be 
                                                 
125 This assumption results particularly important in the model with corruption, since it implies that corruption takes place only at law-enforcement 
level and not at the judicial level.  
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detected as well. This means that the criminal organization can be revealed in the actuation of their 
illegal activities, only if the corrupt enforcement agency is detected first. This assumption will 
become clearer later in the paragraph, when w analyze the Mafia’s expected net income.  
Moreover, as common in the literature, we assume that the punishment ɣ is proportional to the 
gravity of the offence, which in our case is the level of extortion x. The nature of the penalty is not 
relevant, it can be pecuniary or a number of years to spend in prison, or a combination of the two. 
What it is significant for our analysis is the deterrence effect of this punishment
126
, the fact that it is 
commensurate to the magnitude of the crime and the fact that it is exogenously determined by 
public officials (judges at highest level)
127
. From this last assumption we can see that in our model 
the parameter ɣ reflects the effectiveness of the law system128.  
 
Given the above, the expected income resulting from extorting a single entrepreneur, will be equal 
to:  
    (14) 
In fact, with a probability r, the law enforcers, and consequently also the Mafia, will not be detected 
and then the criminal syndicate will obtain the full illegal payment extorted to entrepreneurs, x, 
minus the cost of bribing, b. With a probability 1-r, instead, the police officers will be detected, 
however with a probability q’ he/she will not reveal the identity of the Mafia members, meaning 
that with a probability q’ the criminal syndicate will not be detected, and then it will still collect the 
entire illegal payment, x, minus the cost of bribing, b.  Conversely, with a probability (1-q’), the 
police officers who have been detected and convicted will reveal the identity of the criminal group’s 
components, meaning that the criminal syndicate will have to subtract to the illegal payment made 
by entrepreneurs, x, not only the cost of bribes, b, but also  a penalty ɣ  proportional to the amount 
                                                 
126
 ɣ cannot be equal or smaller than zero (true??). 
127 ɣ can be smaller than 1, equal to 1 or higher than 1. If ɣ is smaller than 1, it means that the Mafia will still gain something even in the case it is 
caught. If ɣ equals to 1, the Mafia will not gain or lose anything in the case of detection, since the penalty will be exactly equal to the amount 
extorted. If ɣ is higher than 1, the Mafia will lose more than the amount extorted. 
128 In an economy in which judges and laws are strong, this parameter is high (higher or at least equal to 1). 
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extorted, x. 
 
Simplifying and multiplying by e 
c 
(total number of businesses in the economy)
129
 the expression 
above, we find the Mafia’s expected income derived from extorting all the entrepreneurs in the 
economy:  
       (15)
 
Furthermore, if we assume that causing damage to entrepreneurs who refuse to pay the pizzo is not 
costless, but implies some expenses and if we assume that these costs are proportional to the 
amount of damage inflicted, , the total expected net income that the criminal organization wishes 
to maximize will be given by: 
     debxqr c  111
    (16)
 
Which is expected revenues from extortion (net of bribes paid to corrupt police officers) minus the 
total cost of inflict damage, .  
 
As indicated earlier, the mafia rationally seeks to maximize its expected net income (expression 16 
below) not only by choosing how much money to extort and how much damage to inflict to 
entrepreneurs, but also by choosing the amount of bribes needed to persuade law-enforcers to be 
corrupt, subject not only to the participation decision of individuals (respectively equation 11 and 
constraint 5 below), but also to that of police officers. It can been seen that in the mafia’s 
maximization problem there is now an additional constraint – namely, the participation constraint of 
police officers who are willing to accept bribes only if their expected payoff from doing so is 
greater than their payoff from not doing so, as seen in the previous paragraph (constraint 13 below). 
In analytical terms: 
 
                                                 
129
 Remember that p is assumed to be equal to one in the model with corruption. 
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     debxqrMax cbdx  111,,                                      (16) 
                                      s.t.            xaAec                                                                  (11) 
                                   s.t.                  xd                                                                            (5) 
                                     s.t.        frb  )1(                                                                         (13) 
 
The solution to the new Mafia’s maximization problem provides the optimal size of extortion and 
damage (respectively  and  given by equation 17), the optimal size of bribes that must 
be paid to persuade officials to be corrupt ( given by equation 18), and the optimum total number 
of individuals setting up business in the economy (
corrce
*
 given by equation 19): 
 
                                

qr
baA
dx corr
corr





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                          (17) 
                                                       (18) 
                                         

qr
baA
e
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




11122
*
                               (19) 
 
We can see that also in this case the optimal values of ,  , and 
corrce
*
are functions of 
important variables in the model, such as: i) the mafia's probability of being caught ( , which 
depends on the quality of the police enforcement system); ii) the penalty inflicted to the mafia if it is 
actually caught ( , which depends on the quality of the law and judiciary system);  iii) the police’s 
probability of  being caught when corrupt ( , which depends on the quality of the law-
enforcement system); iv) the bribes (b) that must be paid in order to persuade law enforcers to be 
corrupt. 
More specifically, from equation (17) we can see that in equilibrium the optimal level of extortion 
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must be equal to that of damage ( ). From the same equation, we can also notice that 
when the mafia’s probability of being detected  and the size of punishment to which 
criminals are subject when detected ( ) increase, the optimal size of extortion (x*) decreases. 
While, the total number of businesses in the economy, , increases, as shown by equation 
(19). 
 By comparing equations (9) and (17) : 
  

qpp
aA
dx




1122 2
                          (9)  Optimum level of extortion and damage 
without corruption 
   

qr
baA
dx corr
corr





11122
**
          (17) Optimum level of extortion and damage with 
corruption 
 
  
we can see that the optimum level of extortion would be higher under corruption, since mafia 
needs to pay bribes to law enforcers ( ). Consequently, also the optimum total number of 
individuals who decide to set up business would be lower under corruption, as it can be seen by 
comparing equations (10) and (19).  It is exactly in this way that the presence of both corruption and 
organized crime increases the costs to society by deterring more individuals from setting up 
business.   
  

qp
aA
ec




1122          (10)  Optimum number of total businesses in the economy 
without corruption
 
   

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e
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




11122
*
   (19) Optimum number of total businesses in the economy with 
corruption
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Interestingly, from equation (18) we can see that the police’s constraint is bidding in 
equilibrium . This means that the optimal level of bribes  is a positive 
function of law enforcers’ probability of being detected when corrupt, , and of the 
punishment at which they are subject when caught, f.  In other words, the higher is the police’s 
probability of being detected and the higher the penalty if they are detected, the higher the level of 
bribes they ask for turning a blind eye to the mafia’s activities. As we can see from equation 17, the 
higher the level of bribes, b, the higher the level of extortion, and we know that the higher the level 
of extortion, the lower the number of businesses in the economy.  Consequently, we can affirm that 
in an economy characterized by the presence of both the phenomena, corruption and organized 
crime, strengthening the fight against corruption (e.g., by increasing the probability of detection) 
could do more than good by raising police officers’ demands for bribes and thereby increasing the 
amount of extortion even further, and therefore decreasing the number of businesses in the 
economy. 
 
4) Conclusions 
 
Summarizing, we have developed a simple structure in order to explain the interdependent nature of 
corruption and organized crime, and their combined effect on the economy. In this framework, 
criminal organizations co-exist with law-abiding productive agents and potentially corrupt law 
enforcers. The crime syndicate obstructs the legal operations of agents through extortion, and may 
pay bribes to law enforcers in order to avoid detection. All the agents behave rationally, are risk 
neutral and take their decisions in order to maximize their profit/ payoff.  In agreement with the 
empirical literature (e.g. Peri, 2004; Kroska and Robeck 2006; Daniele and Marani, 2010), 
according to which organized crime creates an unfavorable climate for business, in our model there 
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is a negative relationship between extortion and the number of businesses in the economy. 
Moreover, we find that strong policies against criminal associations, in terms of probability of 
detection and severity of the penalty if detected, discourage the mafia’s activities (i.e. extortion), in 
accordance with the findings of the Beckerian literature. More remarkably, the optimal level of 
extortion is higher under corruption, given that the mafia needs to pay bribes to law enforcers. In 
this way, the presence of both corruption and organized crime increases the costs to society by 
deterring more individuals from setting up business.  
 
In our analysis, in addition, we have that strong policies against law enforcers’ corruption, in terms 
of probability of detection and severity of the penalty, increase the level of bribes asked by the same 
police officers to the mafia in order to turn a blind eye to their activities. As a consequence of this, 
if the government increases its effort on fighting corruption (e.g., by increasing the probability of 
detection or the severity of the penalty), the optimal size of bribes increases, determining higher 
extortion (since extortion is a positive function of bribes) and decreasing the total number of 
businesses in the economy. This means that strengthening the measures against corruption would 
have exactly the opposite effect than that desired (by increasing the criminal activity and deterring 
individuals from becoming entrepreneurs). For this reason we can conclude that, in the presence of 
both the phenomena, the government should evaluate alternative strategies, by concentrating on 
fighting organized crime rather than corruption.  
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Without corruption 
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Substituting the value of     in  Equation 1): 
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From which we can find x: 
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Substituting the value of x in the first constraint we can find the value of e:  
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So we have found the optimal values of x (optimal size of extortion (“black tax”)) and ec (maximum 
number of individuals who set up business) when  there is a criminal group (mafia) but no 
corruption:  
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When the mafia’s probability of be caught and punished 
increases, the optimal size of extortion decreases. How can we explain this? A possible explanation 
is that in the presence of a strong judiciary system and incorruptible police system (in analytical 
terms when (1-q)γ is high), the mafia does not exist at all or if it exists it has a really weak power 
and it cannot ask for high “black taxes”. Another possible explanation is that when the probability 
of been caught and punished is high then, since the size of punishment is assumed to be 
proportional to the size of extortion, the mafia keeps “black taxes” low. 
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 When mafia’s cost of inflict damage to private individuals increases, 
the optimal size of extortion decreases (how can we explain this?) 
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    When mafia’s cost of inflict damage to private individuals 
increases, then the number of individuals who decide to set up a business increases. 
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 When mafia’s probability of being caught increases, 
the number of individuals who decide to set up a business increases, as we logically would expect. 
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From which we can get the optimal size of “black tax” x when there is corruption: 
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Notice that the optimal size of x is higher when there is corruption than when there is no 
corruption; in fact, x without corruption has been fund to be equal to:  
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The amount of extortion would be higher under corruption since the mafia needs to pay bribes to 
law enforcers. Consequently, the total number of individuals who decide to set up business would 
be lower under corruption.  
 
 
In fact, substituting the value of x
corrupt 
in the first constraint we can get the value of e
c
corr (the 
maximum number of individuals who set up business)in the presence of corruption: 
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Notice that the number of individuals who decide to set up business when there is corruption is 
lower than that when there is no corruption, which has been found to be equal to:  
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Important relationships if there is an Organized Criminal group and Police Corruption 
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When bribes that mafia needs to pay to the police in order to 
avoid detection increase, the optimal level of extortion increases as well. 
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 When police and mafia’s probability of being 
caught increases, and when the penalty inflicted to mafia if caught increases, then  the level of 
extortion increases as well. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of corruption on economic growth in the presence of organized 
criminal activities. Using a panel of 19 Italian regions for the period 1983-2009, the analysis reveals 
(i) a growth-inhibiting effect of both corruption and organized crime, and (ii) that in the presence of 
organized crime the growth-inhibiting effect of corruption is less severe. This finding offers support 
to the argument that with organized corruption arrangements and better coordination in the 
bureaucrat’s rent-seeking behavior, corruption is less distorting for economic growth. The results 
are robust to different specifications, measures of organized crime, and estimation methods. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Almost everybody is aware of the fact that criminal organizations typically involve collusion or 
direct participation of the public sector. In 1994, the United Nation’s Naples Declaration officially 
recognized that Organized Crime (OC) has a “corrupting influence on fundamental social, 
economic, and political institutions”, and that OC uses “violence, intimidation and corruption to 
earn profit or control territories or markets”. More recently, a survey conducted by the 
Eurobarometer (2006), based on public perceptions of the links between corruption and OC, 
revealed that more than half of European citizens (54%) believe that most corruption in their 
countries is related to organized crime. It is not difficult, in fact, to realize that criminal systems 
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strongly depend on corruption in order to carry out their activities and to reduce the risk of detection 
and prosecution. There exist a number of studies focused on the links between corruption and OC, 
however most of them analyze the phenomena from a sociological point of view (e.g.: Shaw, 2002; 
Mazzitelli, 2007; Sergi and Querimi, 2007), or from a theoretical microeconomic point of view 
(e.g.: Becker and Stigler, 1974; Bowles and Garoupa, 1997; Chang et al., 2000; Kugler et al., 2003). 
To the best of our knowledge, there are not empirical analyses of the two phenomena jointly 
considered in the context of a growth regression. The study we present in this paper intends to fill 
this gap and to underline the importance of considering the two illegal phenomena at the same time. 
In the following paragraphs we review the existing literature which has analyzed the effects of 
corruption and organized crime, separately considered, on economic growth. 
 
Since the middle 1990s, a large body of literature has shown that corruption has significant adverse 
effects on economic growth (e.g. Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Knack and 
Keefer, 1995; Li et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1997)
130
.  These and other 
investigations have also indicated a variety of ways in which corruption may affect growth, such as 
lowering investment rates (e.g., Mauro, 1995), reducing the flood of inward foreign direct 
investments (e.g. Wei, 2000; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004), decreasing the effectiveness of foreign 
aid flows (IMF, 1995; World Bank, 1998) and determining misallocations of government 
expenditure (e.g., Mauro, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Gupta et al., 2001). Besides, it has been 
shown that: corruption might determine a misallocation of talent and skills away from productive 
activities towards rent-seeking activities (see for e.g. Acemoglu, 1995; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; 
Murphy et al., 1991); corruption may weaken the protection of property rights, create obstacles to 
doing business and obstruct technological progress and transfer (see North, 1990; Hall and Jones, 
1999; World Bank, 2002); corruption might cause firms to expand slower, to implement inefficient 
                                                 
130
 We refer to the most common definition of public sector corruption, which describes the phenomenon as the abuse of 
public office for personal gain. See Aidt (2003), Bardhan (1997) and Jain (2001) for some surveys on corruption 
literature.  
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technologies and to move their activities to the informal sector (see Sarte, 2000; Svensson, 2005); 
corruption may lead to costly concealment and detection of illegal income, resulting in a 
deadweight loss of resources (see Blackburn et al., 2006; Balckburn and Forgues Puccio, 2007); 
corruption may increase the government’s reliance on seignorage finance (Blackburn et al., 
2008).
131
  
 
However, it must be recognized that the phenomenon seems to have different effects on different 
countries. In fact, some countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and especially China have 
attracted very high floods of FDI and achieved very high growth rates in per capita income over 
relatively long time periods, in spite of rather high levels of corruption
132
. An early branch of the 
literature has tried to explain the beneficial effects of corruption with the so-called “speed money” 
hypothesis, according to which the phenomenon can be positive to growth by helping to circumvent 
regulations in the bureaucratic process (e.g. Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Lui, 1985). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993), instead, have emphasized the importance of the extent to which public officials are 
organized in their extraction of bribes, since this may have an important influence on the 
consequences of bribes. The idea is that if bureaucrats are organized and act as a joint monopoly 
rather than independent monopolists in the collection of bribes, then they will try to maximize their 
total income, rather than the individual one, and will internalize any externalities. More recently, 
Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) followed this approach in the contest of a dynamic general 
equilibrium model in which growth occurs endogenously through the invention and manufacture of 
new intermediate goods that serve as inputs in the production of final output. Inventive activity 
(research and development) is undertaken by entrepreneurs who require various licenses from 
                                                 
131
 Among the few empirical studies that have analyzed the effects of corruption on the economic growth of the Italian 
regions, Del Monte and Papagni (2001) have shown that effectively corruption has a negative impact on the 
productivity of public investment, and that this effect is distinct from a direct negative one on the growth rate. 
132
 Since the most prominent examples of countries with high-corruption and high-growth rates are to be found in 
South-East Asia, the anomaly has been called “East Asian” paradox. The term was introduced for the first time by 
Wedeman (2002), but also studied by Wei (1997) and Campos et al. (1999). 
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public officials in order to embark on this activity. All bureaucrats are corrupt and each one of them 
exploits his monopoly over the issue of a license by demanding a bribe in exchange for it. The 
authors studied the implications of this when bureaucrats act either individualistically (disorganized 
corruption) 
or collectively (organized corruption). Given this, the study shows that bribe payments are 
lower, innovation activity is higher and growth is higher when corrupted behavior is organized than 
when it is disorganized. In this way the analysis shaded light on the issue of why the effects of 
corruption on growth appear to be so different across countries.   
 
The argument just discussed seems to explain the experience of the large newly East Asian 
industrialized economies better than the so called “speed-money” theory. In fact, for these countries 
it has been empirically found that corruption reduces investment by less and that the correlation 
between corruption and investment is positive (e.g. Campos et al., 1999; Rock and Bonnet, 2004), 
and effectively they are all characterized by centralized (organized) corruption networks. 
Interestingly, such networks are also a feature of some developed economies that have relatively 
high corruption ratings, such as Italy. An important aspect, often ignored by the literature on 
corruption, is that Italy is also characterized by the presence of organized crime (OC).  
 
The channels through which the phenomenon of criminal organization affects economic growth 
have been widely studied. For the case of Italy, it has been found that OC: i) has a negative impact 
on factor productivity, especially labor productivity (i.e.: Felli and Tria, 2000 and Centorrino and 
Ofria, 2008) ii) inhibits the accumulation of human capital both directly (reducing the incentive to 
invest in formal education) and indirectly by increasing migration outflows (Coniglio et al., 2010) 
iii) increases public investment whereas reduces that from the private sector (Caruso, 2008) iv) 
raises the total amount of public funding (Barone and Narciso, 2011) v) is a deterrent for foreign 
investors (Daniele and Marani, 2010) vi)   increases the cost of local public services, especially 
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those of collection and disposal of  waste material (Ciaccio, 2009) viii) reduces the access to credit 
by increasing  the cost of loans and the amount of collaterals required by the banks (Bonaccorsi di 
Patti, 2009). Daniele and Marani (2010), for example, have examined the effect of OC on FDI 
inflows, using data for 103 Italian provinces for the period 2002-2006. OC is proxied by the sum of 
official data on four different crimes that are traditionally related to the presence of criminal 
organization of the mafia-type (i.e.: criminal association, mafia-criminal association, extortion, 
bomb attacks and arsons). The authors found that a higher presence of mafia-type crimes 
significantly reduces foreign investment inflows. The existence of OC, in fact, not only increases 
the risks and the costs of business, but can also be perceived as a signal of a socio-institutional 
system unfavorable for business activities.  The result is still valid even after controlling for 
financial incentives granted to firms that invest in the less-developed areas, suggesting that criminal 
organizations tend to reduce the effectiveness of development policies. Bonaccorsi di Patti (2009), 
instead, analyzed the relationship between the terms on bank loans and local crime rates, employing 
a sample of over 300,000 bank-firm relationships in Italy. The results showed that where the crime 
rate is higher, access to credit is more difficult and borrowers pay higher interest rates and pledge 
more collaterals. The author stressed the fact that the offences which influence the loan market are 
those that exogenously increase firm fragility, such as extortion and OC. More recently, Barone and 
Narciso (2011) have provided evidence that the presence of mafia affects the allocation of public 
transfers in the sense that firms located in municipalities with mafia activity receive larger public 
funds (mafia averted around 35% of the total amount of public transfers on average over the period 
2004-2009)
133
. Also in this analysis, OC presence is measured by the number of cases provided by 
Art.416-bis of the Italian Penal Code.  
 
Peri (2004), instead, has analyzed the effects of social variables on long-run provincial economic 
                                                 
133
 As a measure of public transfers/funds, the authors have used the Law 488/92 data set provided by the Italian 
Ministry of Industry, which regulates the issuance of project-related capital grants. This Law 488/92 has been used as 
the main policy instrument for reducing territorial disparities in Italy, by offering subsidies to firms willing to invest in 
less developed areas. 
124 
 
performance during Italy’s era of economic take-off (1951-1991). The author found strong evidence 
that the presence of OC (proxied by murder rates at the beginning of the period) is associated with 
low economic development, even after controlling for other economic and geographic factors
134
.  
More recently, Pinotti (2011), has examined the post-war economic growth of two Italian regions in 
southern Italy (Basilicata and Puglia) exposed to mafia activity after the 1970s and has applied 
synthetic control methods to estimate their counterfactual economic performance in the absence of 
organized crime. OC is measured by the number of cases provided by Art.416-bis of the Italian 
Penal Code (mafia-type criminal organization) reported by the police to the judiciary authority. The 
author uses also the murder rate as an alternative indicator for the presence of criminal 
organizations, in order to measure the evolution of OC across regions for the period before 1983, 
when Art. 416-bis had not been introduced yet. The comparison of actual and counterfactual 
development showed that the presence of mafia lowers GDP per capita by about 16%
135
. 
 
As we can see, the literature on the effects of OC on economic growth at a cross-regional level for 
the case of Italy is vast; however this is not the case at a cross-country level because of the limited 
availability of reliable data.
136
 Moreover, an interesting aspect that has been almost ignored by the 
existing literature concerns the link between corruption and OC and their joint effect on growth.  
 
                                                 
134
 Peri (2004) mostly uses employment rates and employment growth as indices of economic activity. To validate the 
use of employment rates as a measure of economic activity, the author refers to several models that imply a positive 
relationship, in equilibrium, between employment rates and productivity. He also calculates the correlation between 
employment rates and value added per capita across Italian provinces for the period (1971-1991), finding that this 
correlation is positive and very high. Regarding the use of murder rates to proxy for the presence of OC, the same 
author acknowledges that “…murder rates are interpreted as an imperfect index capturing the presence of powerful 
criminal organizations”. 
135
 Historical series of electricity consumption suggest that lower GDP reflects a net loss of economic activity, rather 
than a mere reallocation from the official to the unofficial sector. Electricity consumption, in fact, is often used to 
estimate the size of the black/shadow economy, since it depends on the demand by both the official and the unofficial 
sector (see also, e.g., Johnson et al., 1997 and Del Bocca and Forte, 1982). 
136
One of the few cross-country analyses of the effects of organized crime on growth is presented by Kroska and 
Robeck (2006). The authors examined the impact of criminal organizations on the enterprise sector, using a panel data 
of 34 countries in Europe and Asia for the period 2002-05. The main result is that OC is associated with weak 
development of micro enterprises in the service sector, operating in large countries with high unemployment rates. The 
paper also underlined that the presence of OC represents a disincentive for FDI inflows and job creation, particularly in 
less advanced transition countries. 
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There exist a number of studies focused on the links between corruption and OC, however most of 
them analyze the phenomena from a sociological point of view (e.g.: Shaw, 2002; Mazzitelli, 2007; 
Sergi and Querimi, 2007), or from a theoretical microeconomic point of view (e.g.: Becker and 
Stigler, 1974; Bowles and Garoupa, 1997; Chang et al., 2000; Kugler et al., 2003). The 
microeconomic literature on crime has started to consider the problem of bribed officials since the 
preliminary work of Becker and Stigler (1974). The authors first recognized that the effectiveness of 
the enforcement system is reduced if the amount of bribes paid by the criminal to corrupted public 
enforcers is considerably less than the monetary equivalent of punishment to which the criminal 
would incur if convicted. Clearly this means that bribes reduce punishment and therefore 
deterrence. Following this result the authors suggested to improve the quality of enforcement by 
raising the salaries of public officials or by paying private enforcers for performance.
137
 Some 
sociological studies (e.g.: Shaw, 2002), instead, have underlined that the weakening and 
criminalization of the State is often a component of organized crime, with government actors also 
involved in criminal activities, as in the case of some African countries like Nigeria, Liberia and 
Ghana. More recently, Mazzitelli (2007) has explored the different factors that contribute to 
criminal activities in West Africa, emphasizing that the region is an ideal place for structured 
criminal networks since risks are reduced as a result of poor governance, i.e.: weak state 
institutions, weak rule of law and enforcement agencies, which are common institutional 
determinants of corruption as well. Sergio and Querimi (2007) studied the relationship between 
corruption and socio-economic development and between organized crime and socio-economic 
development in the context of South-East Europe. The authors noted that both corruption and 
organized crime are prevalent in the region, stressing that the key problem is a weak role of law (i.e. 
inefficient judicial systems and weak enforcement control). More interestingly with respect to our 
study, Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003) carried out a statistical analysis of a large sample of countries, 
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 Becker and Stigler (1974) suggested to increase the salaries of enforces above what they could get elsewhere, by an 
amount that is inversely related to the probability of detection, and directly related to the size of bribes and other 
benefits from malfeasance.  
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founding that high levels of corruption and OC are consistently linked to low levels of human 
development.
138
 A further study by Van Dijk (2007) corroborated the interrelations between 
organized crime, law enforcement, rule of law and economic development: when OC is prevalent, 
law making tend to serve the interests of few instead of the general interest, undermining market 
efficiency and public reliance in the legal and regulatory functions of the State.
139
  
 
It can be seen that the literature focused on the relations between corruption and organized crime is 
not vast, and this is especially true with regard to the macroeconomic literature, which is practically 
inexistent. Very recently also Transparency International has stressed the importance of better 
understanding the links between the two phenomena as a way of combating corruption (Holmes, 
2010). The contribution we present here moves in this direction, by jointly considering the two 
phenomena in an empirical investigation that focuses on the growth of Italian regions over the 
period 1983-2009. The choice of carrying out our analysis at a cross-regional level for the case of 
Italy and not at a cross-country level is mainly related to the availability of data on crimes 
ascribable to organized criminal groups. The Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), in fact, 
offers a variety of data on mafia-related crimes which are available for a rather long period; this has 
allowed us to construct accurate indexes and to carry out our investigation for an adequate length of 
time. Given the lack of appropriate and reliable data on organized crime at an international level, 
such an analysis would have not been possible at a cross-country level. The main aim of our 
analysis is to empirically examine the effects of corruption and organized crime (OC) on economic 
growth, and to test if the presence of organized crime influences the impact of corruption. As 
largely discussed above, there is no doubt that there exists a link between the two phenomena, and it 
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 The authors constructed a composite index of OC which includes indicators of five core activities  of OC (trafficking 
in persons, arms, stolen vehicles, cigarettes and fraud) and four secondary factors (costs for businesses, extent of the 
informal economy as a proportion of GDP, violence and money laundering). The study also finds that critical 
determinants organized crime are the quality, independence and integrity of law institutions. 
139
 The author constructed a composite index of OC combining data on the perceived presence of OC, unsolved 
homicides, grand corruption, money laundering and the extent of the black economy. Data are taken from the World 
Economic Forum annual survey (Global Competitiveness Report), official crime statistics, and World Bank governance 
indicators. 
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is reasonable to believe that in the presence of OC also corruption among bureaucrats may be 
organized. More specifically, we start from the hypothesis that criminal groups may play a 
significant role in organizing corruption. Therefore, in our study we interact the measures of 
corruption and OC in order to actually test for the effect of organized corruption on economic 
growth.  Confirming past studies, our findings show that corruption and OC have both a growth-
inhibiting effect, but also that in the presence of OC the negative impact of corruption on growth is 
smaller in magnitude. The latter result seems to support the argument that when corruption operates 
within an organized environment it is less distorting for growth (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 
2009). Consequently, our analysis suggests to further investigate the two phenomena from a 
theoretical point of view. The model presented by the two authors cited above, in fact, compares 
organized corruption versus disorganized corruption, but it does not account for OC. It may be the 
case that the organization among bureaucrats in the presence of OC leads to an even lower level of 
bribes. It is important to emphasize that we are not giving a prescription for organized crime, but we 
are trying to give an explanation to the fact that corruption seems to have a less harmful effect in 
Italy rather than in other countries. Then, the suggestion for policy makers when deciding new anti-
corruption policies is that to better understand the nature of the phenomenon of corruption and to do 
not ignore the possible links with other illegal phenomena present in the economy.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the estimation strategy and 
the methodology employed in our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data set in use. Section 
4 reports the benchmark results, whereas Section 5 tests the baseline findings using different 
specifications and measures of organized crime. Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary and 
some final comments. 
 
2. Estimation Strategy and Methodology 
The main aim of our investigation is to empirically analyse the effects of corruption and organized 
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crime (OC) on economic growth, and to test if and how the presence of organized crime influences 
the impact of corruption.  
In order to do so, we first estimate the effect of corruption on the growth rate of GDP per capita by 
also checking if this effect differs for regions with a higher presence of organized crime (this is 
done by interacting the measure of corruption with a dummy variable for regions with high OC). 
The regions have been chosen on the base of data on Mafia criminal association (as defined by art. 
416 bis of the Italian penal code) for the period 1983-2009.
140
 The regions with the highest rates of 
this kind of crime are: Sicily, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Molise, Lazio, and Liguria (as 
it can be seen also in the map presented by Pinotti, 2011). To conduct our preliminary estimations, 
we use the following specification: 
         
 
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita real GDP of region i in period t;  
represents a set of explanatory variables typically included in growth regressions (e.g. Barro, 
1991;  Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995);   is a measure of corruption; 
HighOCi,t is a dummy variable for the regions where the presence of OC is more widespread;  
is the interaction term between corruption and the dummy variable just 
discussed;  captures unobserved time-invariant region-specific effects; and ε i,t is the time-varying 
error term. 
    The set  includes a baseline group of control variables comprising the log of initial real 
GDP per capita, the ratio of investment to GDP, the rate of inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator, and the secondary school enrolment rates. In addition to these baseline variables, extended 
group of controls includes the rate of population growth, the ratio of trade to GDP, and share of total 
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 See Figure 4 in Appendix for more details on the renking of the Italain regions for the Mafia criminal association 
rate and other Mafia-related crimes.  
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public spending to GDP. 
Differently from the existing literature at a cross-country level, which relies on perception indexes 
of the phenomenon, our measure of corruption is the official number of crimes against public 
administration per 100,000 inhabitants reported to the police and published by the Italian National 
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
141
 The crimes against public administration that we consider are 
based on Statutes no.286 through 294, which include crimes of peculation and embezzlement. Other 
crimes against public administration, such as insulting a public officer (Statute 279) and neglect or 
refusal of an official duty (Statute 295), are excluded.  This measure has already been used by Del 
Monte and Papagni (2001, 2007) in empirical analysis for the case of Italy.
142
 Since the index is not 
a measure of actual corruption crimes, but only of the crimes reported to the police, it might 
underestimate the phenomenon. Moreover, as pointed out by the authors, it could also be affected 
by a systematic bias due to differences among regions in reporting crimes
143
. However, by 
regressing the statistics on reported crimes of corruption and an index of the length of the judicial 
processes, Del Monte and Papagni (2007) found that we should not expect large systematic 
differences among regions in the proportion of reported and detected crimes to actual ones.
144
 
When estimating equation (1) we expect a growth-inhibiting effect of corruption, as usually found 
                                                 
141
 Official data on crimes against public administration are published by ISTAT since 1961 (ISTAT-Annals of Judicial 
Statistics). The most common measures of perceived corruption used in empirical cross-country analyses are: the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI published by Transparency International); the International Country Risk Guide 
index (ICRG); the index calculated by Kaufmann et al. (2006); the measure given by Dreher et al. (2007). 
142
 We thank Erasmo Papagni for kindly sharing the data for the years 1961-2001. Data from 2002-2005 can be found in 
the online ISTAT website. For the most recent data on corruption (2005-2009), we thank ISTAT officers for the 
collection and transmission of the data. 
143
 In fact, it is reasonable to expect that the probability of being caught and charged is lower in regions where the 
judicial efficiency is worse. This may determine a lack of trust in the police and judges and discourage people in 
reporting crimes. Additionally, the lower probability to be detected could increase the number of corruption crimes in 
regions where judicial efficiency is lower. 
144
 The authors discussed two additional criticisms that might arise regarding the index of corruption we use. First, due 
to the fact that many crimes are reported in a year different from the year when they were actually committed, the legal 
circumstances may have changed over time. However, this does not apply for the case of Italy, as the low on corruption 
is not changed since 1961, apart from changes in penalties after 1993. The other criticism refers to the fact that an 
increase in the number of reported and detected crimes may reflect an increase in the willingness to report crimes or an 
improvement in the efficiency of the police rather than an increase in the actual number of crimes. Del Monte and 
Papagni (2007), however, compare the dynamics of the index of corruption based on official data against the CPI 
(Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International) for the last two decades, showing that the two indexes 
have similar trends and are highly and positively correlated. As argued by the authors, this suggests that the index based 
on official data actually captures the phenomenon of corruption.  
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in the existing literature. Additionally, given our main thesis according to which organized 
corruption is less harmful than disorganized corruption, we expect the coefficient on the interaction 
term, β2, to be positive and significant, meaning that the negative effect of corruption on the rate of 
GDP pc growth is mitigated in regions where there is a high presence of OC. 
To better understand these preliminary findings, and to consider whether OC exhibits an 
independent effect on growth, we consider the following specification:  
 
   
where compared to equation (1) we drop the Corr*HighOC interaction term, we include a measure 
of organized crime (OCi,t), and an interaction term between corruption and organized crime 
(Corr*OCi,t). In this way we are able to study the effect of the two phenomena independently of 
each other but also jointly through their interaction. 
  If our thesis continues to hold, the coefficients on corruption and organized crime (δ1 and δ2, 
respectively) are expected to be negative and statistically significant. The term Corr*OCi,t is the key 
element in our regression, being used to capture the effect of corruption on economic growth in the 
presence of organized crime. If the negative effect of corruption on the rate of GDP pc growth is 
reduced in regions where there is a high presence of OC, then the coefficient on the interaction 
term, δ3, should come out positive and statistically significant. Given that by interacting the 
measures of the two phenomena we are empirically testing for the impact of organized corruption, 
our findings would actually prove that organized corruption is less distorting than disorganized 
corruption. 
Let us now turn to discuss the main measure of organized crime we use and the methodology we 
employ in order to estimate equations (1) and (2).  
Following the existing literature (Daniele, 2009; Daniele and Marani, 2010; Pinotti, 2011: and 
Caruso, 2008), we construct different indexes of organized crime by considering different 
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combinations of“mafia-related”crimes, and using them alternatively through the analysis. Our 
preferred measure of organized crime, however, is an index built as the sum of official data on five 
different crimes that by definition reflect the presence of criminal organizations, or that are 
indicative of the presence of criminal organizations.
145
 The five crimes we consider are: i) criminal 
association (art. 416 Italian Penal Code) ii) Mafia criminal association (art. 416 bis Italian Penal 
Code)
146
;  iii) homicides by Mafia; iv) extortion and v) bomb attacks.
147
 
Since 1982, the Italian judicial system makes a clear distinction between criminal association (art. 
416) and criminal association of Mafia-type (art. 416 bis).
148
 Common criminal association is 
defined as “the association of three or more people who are organized in order to commit a 
plurality of crimes”. The characteristics of this kind of offence are the following: i) the stability of 
the agreement among the components, i.e. the existence of an associative connection intended to be 
continuous through time even after once the crimes have been committed and ii) the existence of a 
programme of delinquency to commit an indeterminate number of crimes.
149
  On the other hand, an 
association is defined of the Mafia-type “when its components use intimidation, awe and silence 
(omertà) in order to commit crimes, to acquire the control or the management of business activities 
(i.e.: concessions, permissions, public contracts or other public services), to derive profit or 
advantages for themselves or others, to limit the freedom of exerting the right to vote, and to find 
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 In fact, even if it is not always possible to distinguish crimes committed by the Mafia or other criminal organizations 
(Camorra, N'drangheta, Sacra Corona Unita) from those committed by other criminals, it is however possible to 
recognize that some offences are not typically committed by organized groups of the Mafia-type, such as, for example, 
crimes of fraud, theft and sexual violence, as underlined by Daniele and Marani (2010) and La Spina and Lo Forte 
(2006).   
146
 The term Mafia is used to include all the main criminal organizations that are present in the different Italian regions, 
such as Cosa Nostra in Sicily, Camorra in Campania, ‘ndrangheta in Calabria, and Sacra Corona Unita in Puglia. This 
measure of OC has already been used by Pinotti (2011). 
147
 For all the crimes we use rates for 100,000 inhabitants reported by the police to the judicial authority. These data are 
available from the Annals of Judicial Statistics published by ISTAT.  
148
 Until 1982, Article 416 of the Italian Penal Code (“associazione a delinquere”) punished in the same way all the 
groups of three or more people involved in some type of criminal activity. This generic term could not distinguish 
between small groups of bank-robbers and larger criminal networks with a powerful control over the territory.  This 
changed in 1982 with the introduction of the crime: “associazione a delinquere di stampo mafioso” provided by Article 
416 -bis( Law 646/82). 
149
 This definition is similar to that given by the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2004) which 
describes organized crime as a “…structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in 
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences […] in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, 
a financial or other material benefit”.  
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votes for themselves or others during the electoral campaign”.150  
In general all judicial-based measures of crime are subject to under-reporting, as underlined by 
MacDonald (2002). This may be especially true for mafia-related crimes, as intimidation and 
silence (omertà) affect judicial investigations particularly in regions where criminal organizations 
are more influential. At the same time, however, under-reporting is smaller for crimes like 
homicides (Fajnzylber et al., 2002 and Soares, 2004). This is why we include in our baseline index 
the number of homicides attributable to Cosa Nostra, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona 
Unita.  
Another usual crime of the Mafia-type organizations, which we incorporate in our baseline measure 
of OC, is extortion. “The pizzo151 is confirmed to be the typical offence of criminal organizations, 
being used to financially maintain the criminals’ families, the clans, to ensure wages to co-
operators, to support prisoners, and to pay the lawyers. The pizzo ensures the everyday activity of 
criminal organizations, it increases its domain, it confers more prestige to the clans, and measures 
the rate of silence (omertà) in a given area, headquarter, or community” (Confesercenti, 2009: 
14).
152
  In fact, it has been largely documented by the existing literature that almost all the Mafia 
families exercise their power over a territory through the racket of extortion.
153
 Also in this case, 
however, official data often underestimate the phenomenon, since the crimes formally reported to 
the police are less than those actually committed.  This has been regularly pointed out by 
Confesercenti, according to which in 2009 a total of 160,000 commercial activities mainly based in 
Sicily, Campania, Puglia and Calabria have been subject to extortion, with total revenues estimated 
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 The last two typical activities of the Mafia-type criminal organizations have been introduced by the Italian penal 
code only in 1992, in the framework of the measures adopted after the Capaci and Via D’Amelio’s massacres (where 
the judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino were killed).  Besides, art. 416 bis provides the confiscation of 
mafia’s properties, and the application of this law also in the hypothesis of camorra, ‘ndrangheta or other associations 
ascribable to those of mafia-type, that are in any case locally denominated. 
151
 “Pizzo” is the Italian word to indicate the “black tax” imposed by the Mafias to entrepreneurs subject to extortion.  
152
 Confesercenti is the Italian shopkeepers association. 
153
 See, for example, Catanzaro (1991) and Gambetta (1993) with reference to Cosa Nostra, Ciconte (1992) for 
‘ndrangheta and Monzini (1999) for Camorra (all cited in Daniele and Marani, 2010). 
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to be close to nine billions of Euros (Confesercenti, 2009). 
154
  
A recent study conducted by Asmundo e Lisciandra (2008) tried to quantify the average value of the 
extortive request for business activities in Sicily. The source is that of judicial evidence for 2,286 
enterprises, 646 of which have been forced to pay the “pizzo”, monthly or periodically, in the 
period 1987-2007. According to the authors:”...it is reasonable to assume that business activities 
which are similar for dimension and typology and which operate in the same territory, are subject to 
analogous forms of pressure by the criminal organization”. The data show a high variability of the 
“pizzo” depending on business size and on the sector in which the company operates. In general, the 
average Mafia-tax is approximately 300 Euros for month and for nearly 60% of the sample the 
extortion does not exceed 500 Euros for a month.
155
 On the base of these data, the authors estimated 
that in 2009 the annual total revenues from extortion were higher than 1 billion of Euros in Sicily, 
which corresponds to more than the 1.3 percent of the regional GDP in the same year.  
Since we have good reasons to believe that official data may underestimate the effective extent of 
extortion, we include in our OC index another crime which is symptomatic of the presence of the 
phenomenon: bomb attacks. Most of the times, in fact, bomb attacks are used to threaten and 
intimidate businessmen who refuse to pay extortion or politicians who refuse to collaborate. These 
offences, however, differently from those of extortion, cannot be hidden by the victims, so that they 
contribute to better capture the intensity of the phenomenon of extortion and of Mafia-type criminal 
organizations in general. As mentioned earlier, the sum of these five mafia-related crimes composes 
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 More precisely, according to the “XII Report SOS Enterprise” (Confesercenti, 2009) the percentage of shops subject 
to extortion by the Mafia-type organizations is as high as 80% in the cities of Catania and Palermo (Sicily), 70% in 
Reggio Calabria (Calabria), 50% in Naples (Campania) and north of Bari and Foggia (Apulia). However, in the suburbs 
and hinterlands of these cities, the percentages are even higher and almost all the commercial activities are subject to 
extortion (not only shops but also restaurants, construction companies, etc.). 
155
 The “XII Report SOS Enterprise” (Confesercenti, 2009) is even more specific in estimating the average value of the 
pizzo. According to this report, in  fact, the average “black tax” paid by commercial activities (small grocery shops) in 
Palermo (Sicily) is 200-500 Euros a month, whereas is nearly 100-200 Euros a month in Naples (Campania). More 
elegant shops in the city centre pay almost 750-1000 Euros in Palermo and 500-1000 Euros in Naples. The average 
pizzo is even higher for supermarkets, which are forced to pay to the Mafia up to 5000 Euros a month in Palermo and up 
to 3000 Euros in Naples. Construction sites may pay up to 10000 Euros a month in Palermo. 
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our baseline OC proxy (OC Index5).
156
 Nevertheless, as better explained later in the paper, in order 
to test the robustness of our benchmark findings we build a variety of other OC indexes which 
include also crimes of: arsons, “serious” robberies (i.e.: robberies in bank and post offices), and 
kidnappings. Crimes of arsons are considered because, as well as crimes of bomb attacks, they are 
indicative of the presence of extortion and of a more general intimidating activity of criminal 
groups. Robberies in banks and post offices, instead, are included since they are often related to OC 
as they require a high degree of organization and the collaboration of a plurality of individuals.
157
 
Finally, the inclusion of crimes of kidnapping is due to the fact that “historical” Mafias have 
specialized through time in this kind of offence, as also recognized by previous studies (e.g. 
Ciconte, 1992; Pinotti, 2011).
158
 
Our estimation methodology utilises dynamic panel techniques:  difference-GMM and system-
GMM, already used in the empirical growth literature by, among others, Islam, (1995), and Beck et 
al. (2000). 
 These panel estimations seem to be the most appropriate since they are based on techniques that 
control for: i) potential endogeneity of the regressors  ii) region-specific effects (difference-GMM), 
and iii) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within regions in dynamic, lagged-dependent 
variables models such as our growth regressions in equations (1) and (2). 
    More specifically, in the difference-GMM estimation, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
the endogenous variables are instrumented with lags of their levels. While the system-GMM 
estimation, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), accounts for 
possible endogeneity by treating the model as a system of equations in first-differences and in 
levels. The endogenous variables in the first-difference equation are instrumented with the lags of 
their levels, whilst the endogenous variables in the level equation are instrumented with the lags of 
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 Time-series trends of this Organized Crime Index (OC Index5) are presented in appendix. We show the trend for the 
20 italain regions (Figure 2) and the trend of each region relatively to the national trend (Figure 3). 
157
 As we will better see later, “serious” robberies are included also in the OC index proposed by ISTAT.  
158
 According  to Ciconte (1992),  among 620 kidnapping cases that have been registered in Italy in the period  1969-
1989, approximately 200 can be attributed to ‘Ndrangheta (even those committed in North Italy); and only 8 of  more 
than 400 billions that have been paid for kidnapping for extortion have been intercepted.   
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their first differences. An advantage of these GMM estimators is that they avoid a full specification 
of the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity properties of the error, or any other distributional 
assumption. 
A difficulty associated with the two dynamic GMM estimators relates to the choice of the number 
of lags of the endogenous and predeterminated variables. In order to restrict the number of 
instruments
159
 we use a lag length of two and reduce the length of the maximum lags to four for 
difference- GMM and to three for system-GMM
160
.  In all the cases we have to collapse the 
instruments
161
. 
In both, system and difference-GMM we test the validity of the instruments by applying two 
specification tests. The first is the Hansen (1982) J-test of over-identifying restrictions which we use 
to examine the exogeneity of the instruments. The second test is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test 
for serial correlation of the disturbances up to second order. This test is important since the presence 
of serial correlation can cause a bias to both the estimated coefficients and standard errors. The 
appropriate check relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation since first 
differencing induces first order serial correlation in the transformed errors. 
 
3. Data 
    We use a panel of 19 Italian regions for the period 1983-2009.
162
 Depending on the index of 
organized crime we use, however, the period considered in our estimations differs, due to data 
availability. Data on homicides by Mafia, criminal association (art. 416), extortion, arsons, and 
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 An excessive number of instruments can result in an over fitting of the instrumented variables, thereby biasing the 
results towards those of the OLS, as pointed out by Roodman (2006). As a rule of thumb, therefore, the number of 
instruments is suggested not to exceed by far the number of countries/regions.  
160
 As a robustness test, however, we also reduce the length of the maximum lags to two, as suggested by Roodman 
(2006) when the number of instruments exceeds the number of regions. 
161
 The collapse sub option of gmmstyle specifies that the Stata command xtabond2 should create one instrument for 
each variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance. In large samples, 
collapse reduces statistical efficiency; but in small samples, it can avoid the bias that arises as the number of 
instruments climbs toward the number of observations. (When instruments are many, they tend to over-fit the 
instrumented variables and bias the results toward those of ordinary and generalized least squares). [Roodman, 2006]. 
162
 We exclude Valle d’Aosta, since it is the smallest and richest region and it is usually excluded in the existing 
empirical analysis for Italian regions, being treated as an outlier. 
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robberies in banks and post offices are available from 1975, while those on Mafia criminal 
association (art. 416 bis) and bomb attacks are available only since 1983
163
.  Table A in the Data 
Appendix provides definitions, sources and the exact period availability of the data, while Table 1 
presents some summary statistics. 
    Following the standard approach, we construct 7 non-overlapping 4-year period averages (1983-
86, 1981-90, ..., 2007-09) in order to minimize business cycles effects. This implies a maximum 
sample size of 152 observations when we use our baseline measure of organized crime (OC 
Index5), though we end up working with an unbalanced panel of 133 observations due to missing 
data.
164
 
    An initial assessment of the relationship between corruption and  growth is given in the first 
cross-region scatter plot in Figure 1 in the Data Appendix, which shows a negative correlation 
between the two variables, with the correlation coefficient equal to -0.53 (p=0.000). The other 
graphs in Figure 1 display cross-region scatterplots of the level of growth against three alternative 
measures of organized crime (i.e.: extortion, arsons, and OC Index5). All of the scatterplots show a 
negative relationship between organized crime and growth, with the correlation coefficient ranging 
between -0.18 and -0.35. Given this visual support, we are encouraged to pursue a more formal 
analysis of the importance of these variables in influencing growth, both independently of each 
other and jointly trough their interaction. 
 
    Table B in Data Appendix reports the correlation matrix of alternative measures of OC, showing 
that they are highly and significantly correlated (the correlation between our baseline measure of 
organized crime and the index used by Daniele and Marani (2010) is, e.g., equal to 0.841, while 
                                                 
163As mentioned earlier, the crime of “Mafia criminal association” (art. 416 bis) has been introduced in the Italian Penal 
Code only in 1983. Data on the sum of robberies in banks and post offices, kidnapping for extortion, and extortion, 
instead, are available since 1961 from CRENOS. 
164
 When we use the measure of OC available since 1961, we construct 13 non-overlapping 4-year period averages 
(1961-64, 1965-68, ...., 2008-2009) and the maximum sample size is 238, though we end up working with an 
unbalanced panel of 171 because of missing data. 
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with the ISTAT index is equal to 0.596). The same Table B also shows the correlation matrix 
between different Mafia-related crimes. As we can see, Mafia association is strongly and positively 
correlated to homicides by Mafia, criminal association, bomb attacks and extortion. 
 
4. Baseline Results  
We begin our analysis by estimating equation (1) first with fixed effects, in order to account for 
region-specific effects, and then with difference-GMM and system-GMM to account also for the 
endogeneity of all the right-hand side variables.  The results are reported in Table 2. They illustrate 
the typical findings of growth regressions: there is conditional income convergence, a positive 
statistically significant effect of investment, and a negative statistically significant effect of 
inflation.
165
 As already found in the empirical growth literature for the case of Italy (e.g. Di Liberto, 
2008), the coefficient on education is found to be statistically insignificant or negative. 
166
 This may 
be due to the measure we use in order to proxy human capital: secondary school enrolment rates. 
However we rely on the availability of the data, and given the length of the period of time we 
analyze these are the best data we have access to. The last column also shows the significant effects 
of trade and public spending
167
.  
With regard to the variables of interest, confirming past studies we find an inhibiting effect of 
corruption on growth. More interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction term, β2, is found to be 
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 Notice that income convergence is always found when we control for fixed effects.  
166
 Di Liberto (2008) studied the connection between growth and human capital in a convergence regression for the 
panel of Italian regions. The author included measures of average, primary, secondary and tertiary education, finding 
that increased education seems to contribute to growth only in the South. Moreover, by decomposing total schooling 
into its three constituent parts, she finds that only primary education in the South seems to be important. These results 
can be interpreted in terms of distorted structural composition of the labour force and inefficient allocation of human 
capital across sectors. For a more clear view of the effects of human capital on the economic growth of Italian regions 
see also Hirsch and Sulis (2008). At a cross-country level, different studies (e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) have 
found that the change in education is not a determinant of economic growth. For a more precise analysis of the effects 
of education on growth see, for example, Krueger and Lindahl (2001). 
167
 More specifically, trade is found to have a statistically significant positive effect on growth, as we would expect. 
While public spending (i.e.: government purchases) is  found to have a statistically significant negative effect on 
growth, as already established by several empirical studies using cross-national data sets (e.g: Landau, 1983; Kormendi 
and Meguire, 1985; Barro, 1991; for the case of Italy, see e.g. Auteri and Costantini, 2003). The coefficient on 
population growth, instead, is found to be positive but statistically insignificant, differently from what we would expect 
on the base of existing empirical growth analysis, which predict a statistically significant negative sign (e.g. Barro, 
1991).  
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positive and statistically significant (even at the 10% level for most the regressions), suggesting that 
the negative effect of corruption on the rate of GDP per capita growth is smaller, or even positive, in 
regions where there is a high presence of OC. This finding lends support to the claims according to 
which the way how corrupt activities are organized may influence economic growth in a different 
manner.  
Relative to instrumentation, when using GMM techniques (columns 2 to 4 in Table 2) we consider 
all the right-hand side variables of equation (1) as endogenous. Therefore, the small number of 
Italian regions constrains us to reduce the maximum number of lags to five for difference-GMM 
and to three and two lags for system-GMM, in order to maintain the number of instruments at a 
minimum.
168
 For the same reason, we also collapse the instrument set. Even doing so, the number 
of instruments in difference-GMM slightly exceeds the number of regions (column 2 in Table 2), 
while in system-GMM the number of instruments is exactly equal to number of regions (columns 3 
and 4 in Table 2). In each case, however, the instruments are confirmed as valid by the Hansen 
(1982) specification test, which cannot reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity even at 
the 10% level of significance. Additionally, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test does not reject the 
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, at the 10% level.
169
  
To better understand these preliminary findings, we continue our analysis by estimating equation (2) 
with difference-GMM and system-GMM using the baseline set of controls and a variety of 
organized crime measures. Our findings are presented in Table 3. Panel A shows the results based 
on difference-GMM, while Panel B reports those based on system-GMM.  
The five columns show the outcomes obtained using different measures of organized crime. 
Column (1) reports the difference and system-GMM results found by using the simplest index of 
organized crime: data on Mafia criminal association (number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants).  
The following columns, (2) to (5), refer to indexes constructed by adding to the first index the 
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 We have to reduce the number of lags to two when using system-GMM to estimate equation (1) with additional 
control variables (i.e.: population growth, trade, and public spending- Column 4 in Table 2).  
169
 The appropriate check relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation since first differencing induces 
first order serial correlation in the transformed errors. 
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following types of OC: homicides by Mafia, criminal association, bomb attacks and extortion.
170
 
The index used in column (5) is the most complete measure and represents our baseline index of 
organized crime (OC Index5). 
The effects of the controls included in vector confirm those in Table 2. We can also see that 
our main conjecture is strongly supported in each case. The coefficients on corruption and 
organized crime are negative and statistically significant in all the regressions, while the coefficient 
on the interaction term Corruption*OC is always positive and statistically significant. Thus, the two 
phenomena have both a growth inhibiting effect; however the negative impact of corruption on 
growth appears to be less severe in the presence of criminal organizations, as suggested by the 
coefficient on the interaction term. This result points, once again, to the importance of considering 
the organization structure of corruption activities in order to better assess their impact on growth.  
Our findings are qualitatively very strong. Nevertheless, as we would logically expect, the 
magnitude of the three coefficients of interest varies depending on the measure of organized crime 
we consider.  
With regard to instrumentation, when using both GMM techniques we consider all the right-hand 
side variables of equation (2) as potentially endogenous. Because of this, the small number of 
Italian regions forces us to restrict the maximum number of lags to four for difference-GMM and to 
three for system-GMM, in order to keep the instruments at a minimum. For the same reason, we 
also collapse the instrument set. Even doing so, the number of instruments slightly exceeds the 
number of regions, in each case. Nevertheless, our instruments are confirmed as valid by the 
Hansen (1982) specification test, which cannot reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity 
even at the 10% level.  Furthermore, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test does not reject the null of no 
second-order serial correlation, at the 10% level. 
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  The crimes are added to the first index one at a time. All the indexes are expressed in terms of rates per 100,000 
inhabitants. 
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5. Robustness checks 
Having found strong support for our thesis so far, this section tests the robustness of our baseline 
results under various modifications. These include: (i) robustness to different specifications (ii) 
robustness to alternative measures of OC. 
 
5.1. Robustness to Different Specifications. 
As previously discussed, a difficulty associated with the dynamic GMM estimators relates to the 
choice of the number of lags of the endogenous variables. All our previous system-GMM results 
have been obtained by using a length of two to three lags and by collapsing the instruments in order 
to limit their number. As a robustness test, however, we further reduce the length of the maximum 
lags to two, as suggested by Roodman (2006). The results are shown in column (2) of Table 4, while 
column (1) reproduces column (5) of Panel B in Table 3 for comparison purposes. As can be seen, 
our findings remain intact. 
We further check the robustness of our baseline findings by adding (once at a time) additional 
control variables that usually appear in growth regressions: the rate of population growth, the share 
of total public spending to GDP,  the ratio of trade to GDP, and a measure of  financial development. 
The results are reported in columns (3) to (6) of Table 4. Once again, our main results remain 
unaltered, with some of the additional regressors having the expected sign and being statistically 
significant (population growth, trade, and financial development). 
Given that in some regions (i.e.: Puglia, Basilicata, Lazio, Liguria, Molise) OC is a more recent 
phenomenon, it is possible that our results are driven by the variation of OC across time. In order to 
control for these effects we estimate the regression by adding interaction terms between corruption, 
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organized crime and decades dummies.
171
 Results are reported in column (7) of Table 4, and they 
show that decadal OC differences do not matter.  However, it is possible that our findings are driven 
by regional differences in OC experience. We account for such regional dissimilarities by adding 
interaction terms between corruption, organized crime and territorial dummy variables for regions 
where organized criminality is more widespread
172
. Results are reported in column (8) of Table 4. 
We can see that our main thesis continues to be strongly supported and once we account for the 
interaction of OC and corruption at the cross-regional level, the region-specific estimates are not 
statistically significant. 
In each case, the validity of the instruments is confirmed by the Hansen (1982) and Arellano and 
Bond (1991) tests. 
 
Column (1) in Table 4a replicates Column (5) of Table 3-Panel B for comparison. In column (2) we 
show the results of the regression that includes the lag of the dependent variable among the 
benchmark set of explanatory variables.
173
 We run this robustness test because, even if our 
regression may be seen as dynamic since we include the initial level of GDP per capita among the 
explanatory variables
174
, however, given that GMM methods are designed to estimate dynamic 
regressions which include the lag of the depend variable, we want to prove that our results would 
not change. In Column (3) of the same table we report the results of the benchmark regression plus 
corruption square. We run this robustness test in order to show that our results do not derive from 
the fact that the interaction term between corruption and organized crime captures corruption 
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 When we use our baseline measure of OC we consider the period 1983-2009. For this reason we account for the two 
decades 1980’s and 1990’s, excluding the 2000’s to avoid the so-called “dummy trap”.  
172
 As before, the regions have been classified on the base of the data on Mafia-type criminal association (art. 416 bis of 
the Italian Penal Code) averaged for the period 1983-2009, as already done by Pinotti (2011). The regions with the 
highest number of these crimes, in diminishing order, are: Sicily, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Molise, Lazio, 
and Liguria. 
173
 Notice that all our System-GMM regressions work well including also the lag of the dependent variable. Results are 
available on request. 
174
 It is common in the growth literature to do not include the lag of the dependent variable among the explanatory 
variables, but still consider the regression dynamic given the inclusion of the initial level of income among the controls. 
This allows to estimate growth regression with GMM even in the absence of the lag of the dependent variable in the 
right hand side.  
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squared
175
. In fact, as it can been seen, our baseline results are still valid even if when we introduce 
the corruption term squared. Additionally, the coefficient of the squared term comes out positive 
and statistically significant, showing the non linearity of corruption (corruption has a negative effect 
on the GDP pc growth, which becomes positive for very high levels of the phenomenon). 
 
5.2. Robustness to Alternative measures of Organized Crime. 
 
For the most part of the preceding analysis we have used OC Index5 as our preferred measure of 
organized crime. The literature, however, has used different indexes in order to proxy for the 
presence of criminal organizations, and it is important to verify that our results can be established 
also with the use of other measures. For this reason, we construct a certain number of indexes by 
considering different combinations of“mafia-related”crimes and we use them alternatively through 
our estimations of equation (2). The results are reported in Table 5.  All the different indexes are 
highly and significantly correlated, as it can be seen from Table B in the Data Appendix.  
 Column (1) of Table 5 replicates column (5) of Table 3-Panel B for comparison. As discussed 
previously in the paper, this baseline measure is built as the sum of official data recorded on five 
different crimes that by definition reflect the presence of criminal organizations or that are 
symptomatic of the presence of criminal organizations (i.e.: criminal association, Mafia criminal 
association, homicides by Mafia, bomb attacks and extortion).  Column (2), instead, reports the 
outcomes found by using an index that does not account for the crime of “criminal association”, but 
considers only crimes of Mafia association, homicides by Mafia, bomb attacks and arsons. The 
crimes of arsons and bomb attacks are considered in order to proxy for extortion, which is excluded 
in this measure. It is, in fact, largely recognised that these offences are frequently used in order to 
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 Notice that the correlation between corruption and organized crime is not very high (as it can been seen in the 
Spearmn’s Correlation Matrix in appendix), so that it is highly improbable that the interaction term between the two 
terms is capturing the non linearity of corruption. Moreover, the data we use actually capture two different phenomena 
by definition. Finally, if the corruption and organized crime terms were measuring the same phenomenon, one of the 
two coefficients  would come out statistically insignificant.  
143 
 
intimidate businessmen unwilling to pay for extortion (see e.g.: Confesercenti, 2009; Daniele and 
Marani, 2010).  
The results reported in the following three columns have been obtained by using measures of OC 
which include all the crimes considered in the baseline index, plus crimes of arsons (Column 3), 
crimes of kidnapping for extortion (Column 4), and crimes of arsons and kidnapping for extortion 
(Column 5).  The inclusion of crimes of kidnapping is due to the fact that “historical” Mafias have 
specialized through time in this kind of offence, as also recognized by Pinotti (2011).
176
 The 
estimates in Column (6), instead, have been found by measuring OC with the Index proposed by 
Daniele and Marani (2010). This measure accounts only for certain Mafia-related crimes, which 
are: extortion, bomb attacks, arsons, criminal association and Mafia criminal association.  
Differently from our baseline index, then, this measure includes arsons and excludes homicides by 
Mafia. However, as it can be seen in Table B in Data Appendix and as we would expect, the two 
indexes are highly and significantly correlated (0.841).  
Another measure of OC that has been used in the literature, by e.g. Caruso (2008), is that proposed 
by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and available only for the periods 1995-2003, 
2006, 2008-2010. Based on the definition of criminal organization given by the Italian Minister of 
Interiors, this index includes crimes of: homicides by Mafia, bomb attacks, arsons and “serious” 
robberies (such as robberies in banks and post offices). Column (7) shows the estimation results 
obtained by proxing OC with an index that accounts for the crimes suggested by ISTAT.
177
 
The alternative measures we have seen until now include crimes for which data are available for the 
period 1983-2009. However, in order to test our results for a longer period of time, we construct 
another index of OC, which is less definite but can go all the way back to 1961. This measure is 
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Pinotti (2011) refers to crimes of Kidnapping, and not kidnapping for extortion. However, also in that case the author 
finds a significant positive correlation between the two different typologies of crimes (Mafia criminal association vs 
kidnapping). On the other hand, we consider crimes of kidnapping for extortion, and find a positive and significant 
correlation with mafia criminal association’s crimes (see Table B in Data Appendix). 
177
 Rather than using directly the index given by ISTAT, we build an index as the sum of OC’s offences recommended 
by the same institute. This is due to the fact that the original is available for a shorter period of time, as underlined 
before. Our measure, instead, is able to cover the period 1983-2009. 
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built as the sum of crimes on: robberies (in banks and post offices), kidnapping for extortion and 
extortion. The results are shown in Colum (8).  At the same time, and differently from other 
typologies of property crimes (such as thefts and burglaries), “serious” robberies are considered 
since they are often related to OC as they require a higher degree of organization and the 
collaboration of a plurality of individuals.
178
  
In all these cases, as we can see in Table 5, our main thesis continues to be strongly supported and 
does not seem to be affected by the specific measure adopted to proxy for OC presence. In all the 
cases, instruments are confirmed to be valid by the Hansen (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991) 
tests. 
6. Conclusions 
Using dynamic panel model estimations for a data set of 19 Italian regions over the period 1983-
2009, we find that corruption and organized crime have both a growth-inhibiting effect. 
Additionally, we find that in the presence of criminal organizations the negative impact of 
corruption on growth is less severe. The latest finding may explain why in Italy corruption is less 
harmful than in other countries, and it seems to support the argument that when the phenomenon 
has some form of organization, it is less distorting for growth, as theoretically shown in the contest 
of a dynamic general equilibrium model by Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009). There exist a 
number of studies focused on the links between corruption and OC, however most of them analyze 
the phenomena from a sociological point of view or from a theoretical microeconomic point of 
view. To the best of our knowledge, there are not empirical analyses of the two phenomena jointly 
considered in the context of a growth regression. The investigation we have presented in this paper, 
then, is a contribution which aims to fill this gap. In addition, our study could be extended to allow 
for a theoretical investigation that considers the two phenomena at the same time. The model 
presented by the two authors cited above, in fact, compares organized corruption versus 
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 On the other side, thefts and burglaries do not need stable and repeated interactions among individuals. As a 
consequence, the presence of OC does not increase the incidence of these crimes.  
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disorganized corruption, but it does not account for OC. It may be the case that the organization 
among bureaucrats in the presence of OC leads to a level of bribes even lower. It is important to 
emphasize that we are not giving a prescription for organized crime, but we have just tried to give 
an explanation to the fact that corruption seems to have a less harmful effect in Italy rather than in 
other countries. Then, the suggestion for policy makers when deciding new anti-corruption policies 
is that to better understand the nature of the phenomenon of corruption and to do not ignore the 
possible links with other illegal phenomena present in the economy.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1 
Economic Growth, Corruption and Organized Crime 
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Notes: Economic Growth: GDP per capita growth rate (average 1961-2009). Corruption rate: the official number of crimes against Public 
Administration per 100,000 inhabitants published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics- ISTAT (average 1961-2009). Extortion: number of 
extortions per 100,000 inhabitants reported by the police to the judicial authorities and published by ISTAT (average 1975-2009). Arsons: number of 
arsons per 100,000 inhabitants reported by the police to the judicial authorities and published by ISTAT (average 1975-2009). OC Index5: sum of five 
different crimes which are mafia-related: homicides by mafia, mafia association, criminal association, bomb attacks and extortion (ratios over 
100,000 inhabitants, average 1983-2009). Source: ISTAT-Annals of Judicial Statistics. 
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Figure 2 
 
Time Series Trend (1983-2010) of Organized Crime Index 5 (Mafia association+criminal association+homicides by 
mafia+bomb attacks+ extortion, rate per 100,000 inhabitants) 
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Figure 3 
 
Time Series Trend (1983-2010) of Organized Crime Index 5 (Mafia association+criminal association+homicides by 
mafia+bomb attacks+ extortion, rate per 100,000 inhabitants). Region vs Italy 
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Figure 4 
Rankings of the Italain regions for the 5 components of our Organized Crime Index  
 
 
 
Mafia criminal association rate per 100,000 inhabitants -Average: 1983-2009. Source: elaboration of the author using 
ISTAT data (Annals of Judicial Statistics). 
 
 
 
Criminal association rate per 100,000 inhabitants -Average: 1975-2009. Source: elaboration of the author using ISTAT 
data (Annals of Judicial Statistics). 
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Extortion rate per 100,000 inhabitants -Average: 1975-2009. Source: elaboration of the author using ISTAT data 
(Annals of Judicial Statistics) 
 
 
 
Homicides by Mafia rate per 100,000 inhabitants -Average: 1975-2009. Source: elaboration of the author using ISTAT 
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data (Annals of Judicial Statistics) 
 
 
Bomb Attacks rate per 100,000 inhabitants -Average: 1975-2009. Source: elaboration of the author using ISTAT data 
(Annals of Judicial Statistics) 
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Table A 
Description of Variables and Sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Description 
 
Sources 
GDP growth pc Log difference of GDP per capita in thousands of millions of lire (constant prices 1990) ISTAT- Annals of Statistics 
and Crenos-1961/2009 
Initial GDP pc 
(log) 
Log  of initial GDP per capita in thousands of millions of lire (constant prices 1990) ISTAT- Annals of Statistics 
and Crenos-1961/2009 
Investment Share of gross private investment (as % of GDP) ISTAT- Annals of Statistics 
and Crenos-1961/2009 
Education Percentage of population in age range 14-18 registered in high school ISTAT- Annals of Statistics 
and Crenos-1961/2009 
Inflation GDP deflator ISTAT- Annals of Statistics 
and Crenos-1961/2009 
Population growth Population growth rate ISTAT- Annals of Statistics -
1961/2009 
Public 
spending  
Share of total public spending  (as % of GDP) ISTAT- Annals of Statistics -
1961/2009 
Trade Share of trade (as % of GDP)  ISTAT- Annals of Statistics -
1961/2009 
Financial 
development 
Share of value added of financial and banking sector (as % of GDP) ISTAT- Annals of Statistics 
and Crenos-1975/2009 
Corruption  Number of crimes against Public Administration (PA) based on Statues no.286  through 294. Excluding 
crimes against PA that do not involve corruption such as Statute 279 (insulting a public officer) and Statute 
295 (neglect or refusal of an official duty). reported to the police , per 100,000 inhabitants.-Embezzlement 
and misallocation of public funds. 
ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1961/2009 
Extortion Number of crimes of extortion denounced,  per 100,000 inhabitants ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1975/2009 
Criminal 
Association  
(art.416) 
 Number of  crimes of criminal association,  per 100,000 inhabitants, defined as: 
"the association of three or more people who are organized in order to commit a plurality of crimes" 
ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1975/2009 
Mafia Criminal 
Association 
(art.416 bis) 
 Number of  crimes of  Mafia criminal association ,  per 100,000 inhabitants, defined as: the association is of 
the Mafia type when its components use intimidation, awe and silence in order to commit crimes, to acquire 
the control or the management of business activities(i.e.: concessions, permissions, public contracts or other 
public services), to derive profit or advantages for themselves or others, to limit the freedom of exerting the 
right to vote, and to find votes for themselves or others during the electoral campaign". 
ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1983/2009 
Homicides by 
Mafia 
Number of  homicides by mafia,  per 100,000 inhabitants ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1975/2009 
Arsons Number of  arsons , per 100,000 inhabitants ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1975/2009 
Bomb Attacks Number of  bomb attacks,  per 100,000 inhabitants ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1983/2009 
Robberies in 
Banks  
Number of robberies in banks, per 100,000 inhabitants ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1975/2009 
Robberies in Post 
Offices 
Number of robberies in post offices, per 100,000 inhabitants ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1975/2010 
Kidnapping for 
extortion 
Number of kidnapping for extortion, per 100,000 inhabitants ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1975/2011 
OC Index5 Sum of the following crimes: Mafia criminal association, homicides by Mafia, criminal association, bomb 
attacks, extortion; per 100,000 inhabitants 
ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1983/2009 
OC Index ISTAT Sum of the following crimes: homicides by Mafia, bomb attacks, arsons, serious robberies( in banks and post 
offices); per 100,000 inhabitants 
ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1983/2009 
OC Index 
CRENOS 
Sum of the following crimes: extortion, kidnapping for extortion, serious robberies ( in banks and post 
offices);  per 100,000 inhabitants 
ISTAT- Annals of Statistics 
and Crenos- 
1961/2009 
OC Index Daniele- 
Marani 
Sum of the following crimes: extortion, bomb attacks, arsons, criminal association, Mafia criminal 
association; per 100,000 inhabitants 
ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1983/2009 
PCA OC Index5 PCA of the following crimes: Mafia criminal association, homicides by Mafia, criminal association, bomb 
attacks, extortion; per 100,000 inhabitants 
ISTAT- Annals of Judicial 
Statistics -1983/2009 
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Table B 
Matrix Spearman Correlation of Alternative Organized Crime Measures and Corruption 
 
 
Crimes Corruption 
Mafia 
criminal 
ass. 
Criminal 
association 
Homicides 
by Mafia 
Bomb 
Attacks  Extortion Arsons  OC Index5 
OC Index 
ISTAT 
OC Index 
CRENOS 
OC 
Daniele 
Marani 
PCA OC 
Index5 
Corruption 1 
           
 
 
           
Mafia criminal association 0.120 1 
          
 
(0.131) 
           
Criminal association 0.057 0.547              1 
         
 
(0.426) (0.000) 
          
Homicides by Mafia 0.059 0.587 0.313 1 
        
 
(0.410) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Bomb Attacks  -0.047 0.423 0.279 0.405 1 
       
 
(0.555) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Extortion 0.525 0.253 0.372 0.313 0.250 1 
      
 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Arsons  0.633 0.121 0.062 0.203 0.279 0.624 1 
     
 
(0.000) (0.128) (0.385) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
OC Index5 0.313 0.448 0.567 0.382 0.602 0.848 0.586 1 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
OC Index ISTAT 0.333 0.207 0.071 0.341 0.444 0.573 0.931 0.596 1 
   
 
(0.000) (0.023) (0.442) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
OC Index CRENOS 0.459 0.227 0.161 0.404 0.196 0.715 0.551 0.529 0.504 1 
  
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.023) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
OC Daniele Marani 0.432 0.288 0.339 0.319 0.477 0.771 0.912 0.841 0.914 0.506 1 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
PCA OC Index5 0.313 0.764 0.929 0.464 0.398 0.436 0.189 0.622 0.160 0.262 0.404 1 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
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                                                                        Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
      
Variable  Mean  Std Devt Min Max Obs 
      
GDP p.c. growth (%) 2.63 2.56 -3.95 11.63 257 
Initial  GDP p.c. (1990 lire) 18,900,000 8,068,528 4,165,179 39,000,000 257 
Investment (% GDP) 24.81 6.68 15.81 71.55 240 
Education  62.06 25.27 11.84 104.79 260 
Inflation (%) 19.77 6.98 5.9 -4.52 260 
Population growth (%) 4.06 3.67 0.12 16.01 257 
Public spending (% GDP) 19.46 5.53 9.62 33.52 200 
Trade (% GDP) 33.95 28.08 1.22 223.44 207 
Financial development (% GDP) 20.03 3.33 12.29 27.54 140 
Corruption  2.35 1.98 0.19 10.2 257 
Extortion  5.29 3.55 0.89 19.03 200 
Criminal Association 1.85 0.96 0.44 6 200 
Mafia Criminal Association  0.3 0.5 0 2.95 160 
Homicides by  Mafia   0.24 0.71 0 6.73 200 
Arsons  13.4 12.72 2.02 101.13 200 
Bomb Attacks  2.37 4.28 0 24 160 
Robberies in Banks  2.34 1.68 0 7.38 160 
Robberies in Posts  1.16 0.96 0 6.81 160 
Kidnapping for extortion 0.24 0.2 0 1.11 200 
OC Index5 10.67 7.41 2.78 43.12 160 
OC Index ISTAT 20.51 15.53 4 76.61 120 
OC Index CRENOS 38.93 40.6 3.19 295.12 200 
OC Index Daniele and Marani  25.95 18.62 7.44 124.78 160 
PCA OC Index5 1.25 1.65 -1.48 8.2 160 
Notes: Data on GDP per capita growth, investment, inflation secondary school enrolment, trade, public spending, financial development and 
population growth are from CRENOS-Cagliari and the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)- Annals of Statistics (different years).  For these 
variables, summary statistics are based on average data for the period 1961-2009. Data on crimes are from ISTAT- Annals of Judicial Statistics 
(different years). The period of time considered for the averages depends on the availability of data (see Table A in  Data Appendix for a detailed 
description of the availability of data). 
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Table 2 
Preliminary Findings 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
                        FE         GMMD         GMMS        GMMS1        GMMS2    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
loggdpinitial       -3.787       -1.056        0.906       -0.162        0.324    
                   [0.963]***   [0.293]***   [0.589]      [1.029]       [1.131]    
Inflat              -0.111       -0.137       -0.185       -0.216        0.221    
                   [0.025]***   [0.018]***   [0.013]***   [0.033]***    [0.033]*** 
Educ                 0.030        0.010       -0.022       -0.032       -0.026    
                   [0.018]*     [0.007]      [0.010]**    [0.028]      [0.029]    
Invest.              0.122        0.123        0.407        0.186        0.178    
                   [0.032]***   [0.022]***   [0.049]***   [0.040]***   [0.046]*** 
Corrup rate         -0.395       -0.868       -0.183       -0.335       -1.524    
                   [0.138]***   [0.150]***   [0.106]*     [0.155]**    [0.477]*** 
corrhighoc           0.232        0.438        0.236        0.547        0.372    
                   [0.133]*     [0.265]*     [0.072]***   [0.202]***   [0.158]**  
Pop_Growth                                                  0.083        0.052    
                                                          [0.076]      [0.085]    
Public Spending                                            -0.134       -0.080    
                                                          [0.056]**    [0.062]    
Trade                                                       0.029        0.026    
                                                          [0.011]***   [0.009]*** 
corrsq                                                                   0.136    
                                                                       [0.047]*** 
Constant            62.507                   -19.016        6.270        0.956    
                  [15.086]***               [10.018]*    [16.284]     [19.101]    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations           225          206          225          177          177    
R-squared            0.529                                                        
F                   37.492                                                        
sarganp                           0.000        0.001        0.000        0.000    
hansenp                           0.440        0.172        0.114        0.147    
ar1p                              0.000        0.000        0.001        0.001    
ar2p                              0.135        0.567        0.278        0.520    
N_g                 19               19           19           19           19   
j                                    24           19           19           21  
n.lags                              2_5          2_3          2_2          2_2   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in brackets [* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01] 
 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the GDP per capita growth rate. p-values in parentheses. Constant term not reported. All the control variables in 
difference and system-GMM are instrumented. Regressions based on fixed effects (Column 1), difference-GMM (Column 2), system-GMM (Column 
3), system-GMM with additional control variables (Column 4), and system-GMM with additional control variables included corruption square 
(Column 5) . The term Corruption*HighOC is the interaction term between the measure of corruption and a dummy variable for the regions where 
the presence of OC is more widespread, which are: Sicily, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Molise, Lazio and Liguria (classified on the base 
of data on Mafia criminal association, as defined by art. 416 bis of the Italian Penal Code). 
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Table 3 
Benchmark Findings 
Panel A: Difference GMM 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
                     GMMD1        GMMD2        GMMD3        GMMD4        GMMD5    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
loggdpinitial       -7.470       -6.288       -9.178       -8.866       -8.966    
                   [1.603]***   [2.909]**    [2.347]***   [2.091]***   [2.022]*** 
inflat              -0.369       -0.405       -0.482       -0.361       -0.423    
                   [0.036]***   [0.020]***   [0.039]***   [0.027]***   [0.029]*** 
educ                -0.038       -0.052       -0.066       -0.020       -0.033    
                   [0.018]**    [0.027]*     [0.022]***   [0.016]      [0.016]**  
invest.              0.284        0.248        0.372        0.147        0.255    
                   [0.044]***   [0.043]***   [0.041]***   [0.039]***   [0.048]*** 
corrup rate         -0.297       -0.256       -0.394       -0.472       -0.635    
                   [0.074]***   [0.127]**    [0.146]***   [0.070]***   [0.100]*** 
OC Index            -3.082       -0.786       -0.220       -0.262        -0.140                                                                                                                     
                   [0.353]***   [0.158]***    [0.090]**   [0.029]***   [0.032]***                                                                                                              
Corr*OC Index        0.424        0.114        0.201        0.026        0.039                                                                                                                 
                   [0.035]***   [0.025]***    [0.039]***  [0.004]***   [0.006]***                                                                                                                 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations           114          114          114          114          114    
R-squared                                                                         
F                                                                                 
sarganp              0.000        0.000        0.001        0.000        0.000    
hansenp              0.338        0.256        0.258        0.256        0.239    
ar1p                 0.005        0.003        0.004        0.003        0.002    
ar2p                 0.717        0.341        0.442        0.933        0.900    
N_g                 19.000       19.000       19.000       19.000       19.000    
j                   21.000       21.000       21.000       21.000       21.000  
lags                   2_4          2_4          2_4          2_4          2_4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:System-GMM  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
                     GMMS1        GMMS2        GMMS3        GMMS4        GMMS5    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
loggdpinitial       -1.600       -0.602       -1.204       -3.057       -1.728    
                   [0.848]*     [0.754]      [0.956]      [0.891]***   [1.202]    
Inflat              -0.351       -0.386       -0.345       -0.322       -0.308    
                   [0.021]***   [0.027]***   [0.027]***   [0.026]***   [0.028]*** 
Educ                -0.079       -0.092       -0.080       -0.055       -0.053    
                   [0.008]***   [0.009]***   [0.013]***   [0.010]***   [0.014]*** 
Invest.              0.218        0.256        0.176        0.107        0.108    
                   [0.042]***   [0.048]***   [0.055]***   [0.039]***   [0.040]*** 
Corrup rate         -0.206       -0.196       -0.749       -0.367       -0.795    
                   [0.045]***   [0.063]***   [0.108]***   [0.073]***   [0.112]*** 
Mafia Ass. Rate     -2.045       -0.720       -0.522       -0.160       -0.126                                                                                                         
                   [0.285]***   [0.043]***     [0.074]***   [0.018]*** [0.021]***                                                                                                          
corrmafiaassrate     0.316        0.143        0.210        0.017        0.039                                                                                                                  
                   [0.050]***   [0.039]***     [0.021]***   [0.008]**   [0.005]***                                                                                                                  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations           133          133          133          133          133    
R-squared                                                                         
F                                                                                 
sarganp              0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000    
hansenp              0.272        0.279        0.491        0.324        0.348    
ar1p                 0.004        0.003        0.002        0.003        0.002    
ar2p                 0.244        0.133        0.841        0.147        0.250    
N_g                 19.000       19.000       19.000       19.000       19.000    
j                   22.000       22.000       22.000       22.000       22.000 
lags                   2_3          2_3          2_3          2_3          2_3   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the GDP per capita growth rate. p-values in parentheses. Constant term not reported. All the control variables are 
instrumented. Regressions based on Difference- GMM (Panel A) and System-GMM (Panel B). The measures of OC are as follows: Mafia crim. assoc. 
(Column 1); Mafia crim. assoc. + homicides by Mafia (Column 2); Mafia crim. assoc.+ homicides by Mafia + crim. assoc.(Column 3); Mafia crim. 
assoc.+ homicides by Mafia + crim. assoc.+ bomb attacks (Column 4); Mafia crim. assoc.+ homicides by Mafia + crim. assoc.+ bomb attacks+ 
extortion: OC Index5 (Column 5) 
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Table 4 
Robustness of Benchmark Findings 
Dependent Variable:GDP pc 
growth [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
  
           Initial GDP per capita (log) -1.73 -2.66 -0.65 -1.13 -2.33 -1.27 -0.96 -4.92 
  
 
(0.151) (0.165) (0.686) (0.325) (0.027) (0.321) (0.503) (0.366) 
  Inflation -0.308 -0.333 -0.311 -0.342 -0.364 -0.115 -0.331 -0.491 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Education -0.053 -0.044 -0.039 -0.039 -0.042 -0.047 -0.053 -0.039 
  
 
(0.000) (0.021) (0.055) (0.014) (0.079) (0.003) (0.008) (0.526) 
  Investment 0.108 0.219 0.239 0.268 0.214 -0.012 0.223 0.212 
  
 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.822) (0.000) (0.183) 
  Corruption -0.795 -0.813 -0.848 -0.851 -0.812 -0.330 -0.796 -3.433 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.032) 
  Organized Crime -0.126 -0.102 -0.195 -0.167 -0.167 -0.148 -0.144 -0.779 
  
 
(0.000) (0.018) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.039) 
  Corruption*Organized Crime 0.039 0.036 0.051 0.054 0.051 0.020 0.045 0.250 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.054) 
  Population Growth 
  
0.31 0.16 0.159 0.261 
    
   
(0.021) (0.169) (0.112) (0.001) 
    Public Spending 
   
-0.163 -0.164     0.050 
    
    
(0.003) (0.001)   (0.326) 
    Trade 
    
0.009   -0.016 
    
     
(0.298)    (0.061) 
    Financial Development  
     
    0.164 
    
      
   (0.043) 
    Corr*OC*'80s 
      
0.019 
   
       
(0.437) 
   Corr*OC*'90s 
      
0.000 
   
       
(0.931) 
   Corr*OC*Campania 
       
-0.069 
  
        
(0.246) 
  Corr*OC*Calabria 
       
-0.074 
  
        
(0.213) 
  Corr*OC*Sicilia 
       
-0.073 
  
        
(0.169) 
  Corruption*OC*Puglia 
       
0.019 
  
        
(0.926) 
  Corruption*OC*Basilicata 
       
0.064 
  
        
(0.425) 
  Corruption*OC*Molise 
       
-0.104 
  
        
(0.210) 
  Corruption*OC*Lazio 
       
-0.255 
  
        
(0.401) 
  Corruption*OC*Liguria 
       
0.246 
  
        
(0.191) 
  Regions/Obs 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/130 19/111 19/133 19/134 
  Number of instruments 22 15 17 19 21 23 18 31 
  Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.348 0.072 0.079 0.074 0.103 0.666 0.077 0.778 
  AR(1) test (p-value) 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.001 
  AR(2) test (p-value) 0.25 0.572 0.276 0.322 0.419 0.317 0.368 0.234 
  No.of lags of endogenous 
variables 2_3 2_2 2_2 2_2 2_2 2_2 2_2 2_2 
  
           Notes: Dependent Variable is the GDP per capita growth rate.  p-values in parentheses. Constant term not reported. All the control variables are 
instrumented. Regressions based on System-GMM. OC measured by our baseline index (OC Index5: Mafia crim. assoc. + homicides by Mafia + crim. 
assoc. + bomb attacks+ extortion). 
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Table 4 b 
Robustness of Benchmark Findings 
 
 
Robustness of Benchmark Findings 
------------------------------------------------------- 
                       (1)          (2)          (3)    
                     GMMS5        GMMS6        GMMS7    
------------------------------------------------------- 
loggdpinitial       -1.728       -2.806       -3.608    
                   [1.202]      [1.125]**    [1.548]**  
Inflat              -0.308       -0.396       -0.349    
                   [0.028]***   [0.025]***   [0.041]*** 
Educ                -0.053       -0.056       -0.018    
                   [0.014]***   [0.011]***   [0.021]    
Invest.              0.108        0.120        0.216    
                   [0.040]***   [0.035]***   [0.062]*** 
Corrup rate         -0.795       -0.757       -1.768    
                   [0.112]***   [0.095]***   [0.476]*** 
ocindex34new        -0.126       -0.138       -0.151    
                   [0.021]***   [0.021]***   [0.051]*** 
corrOC34new          0.039        0.034        0.023    
                   [0.005]***   [0.006]***   [0.012]**  
lag_gdppcgrowth                   0.259                 
                                [0.034]***              
corrsq                                         0.116    
                                             [0.064]*   
------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations           133          133          133    
R-squared                                               
F                                                       
sarganp              0.000        0.000        0.000    
hansenp              0.348        0.320        0.289    
ar1p                 0.002        0.001        0.008    
ar2p                 0.250        0.108        0.735    
N_g                     19           19           19    
j                       22           22           17 
lags                   2_3          2_3          2_2 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the GDP per capita growth rate.  p-values in parentheses. Constant term not reported. Regressions based on System-
GMM. OC measured by our baseline index (OC Index5: Mafia crim. assoc. + homicides by Mafia + crim. assoc. + bomb attacks+ extortion). 
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Table 5 
Robustness to Alternative Measures of OC 
Dependent Variable:GDP pc 
growth [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
OC 
Index5 MA+HM+BA+Ar 
 
OC5+Ars.  OC5+KE 
  
OC5+Ars+KE Daniele and ISTAT Index 
      
 
Marani(2010) 
Caruso 
(2008) 1961-2009   
Initial GDP per capita (log) -1.73 -1.62 -2.66 -2.37 -1.92 -1.95 -1.98 -1.97  
 
(0.151) (0.185) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.025)  
Inflation -0.308 -0.306 -0.316 -0.316 -0.324 -0.325 -0.257 -0.177  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Education -0.053 -0.053 -0.031 -0.036 -0.041 -0.042 -0.07 0.004  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.691)  
Investment 0.108 0.106 0.048 0.097 0.083 0.09 0.056 0.204  
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.424) (0.008) (0.104) (0.057) (0.215) (0.000)  
Corruption -0.795 -0.809 -0.811 -0.761 -0.769 -0.752 -0.281 -0.551  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000)  
Organized Crime -0.126 -0.12 -0.076 -0.044 -0.045 -0.042 -0.04 -0.029  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.000)  
Corruption*Organized Crime 0.039 0.039 0.014 0.009 0.01 0.009 0.006 0.007  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000)  
         
 
Regions/Obs 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/114 19/171  
Number of instruments 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22  
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.348 0.347 0.280 0.284 0.246 0.257 0.548 0.360  
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.000  
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.250 0.262 0.470 0.506 0.505 0.513 0.087 0.203  
No.of lags of endogenous 
variables 2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3  
          
Notes: Dependent Variable is the GDP per capita growth rate.  p-values in parentheses. Constant term not reported. All the control variables are 
instrumented. Regressions based on system-GMM. OC is measured as follows:  baseline index: OC Index5 (Column 1); Mafia association+ 
homicides by Mafia+ bomb attacks +arsons (Column 2); OC Index5+arsons (Column 3); OC Index5+kidnapping for extortion (Column 4); OC 
Index5+arsons+kidnapping for extortion (Column 5); OC index proposed by Daniele and Marani (2010): extortion +bomb attacks +arsons 
+criminal association + Mafia criminal association (Column 6); ISTAT OC index: homicides by Mafia+ bomb attacks+ arsons+ “serious robberies” 
(Column 7); OC index which includes: “serious robberies”+kidnapping for extortion+ extortion (Column 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
